You still haven't provided the readers with any
evidence that Tobin's conduct was unprofessional, much less "
inept". Instead, you imply that Tobin, who reacted to the
disastrously unprofessional and inept conduct of James Kallstrom much the same way as
Kathleen Crowley did when confronted with similarly unprofessional and inept conduct by other FBI officials prior to 9/11, should have kept his mouth shut.
10 May 1999
SENATOR GRASSLEY
[excerpt][quote][emphasis added]
Today's hearing is the result of a 2-year review by the subcommittee into how Federal agencies handled the investigation of what caused the crash of TWA Flight 800. The subcommittee conducted dozens of interviews of professionals from various agencies who were either on the crash scene or were at high levels within the various headquarters of the various agencies.
A consensus emerged from the interviews, supported by documentary evidence, about the conduct of the investigation. The collective testimony from today's witnesses will leave a very clear picture of that conduct, and, of course, it is a troubling picture.
This investigation was run by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. There is much doubt about whether the FBI had statutory authority as the lead agency. There will be more on that point later.
What the public knows about the crash and its cause is what they know through countless press conferences and leaks to the press. The public also has heard numerous conspiracy theories and myths or disinformation.
The purpose of this hearing is to provide a much more real picture of what happened and, hopefully, why it happened. The motivation for the subcommittee's efforts is to continue to help restore public confidence in Federal law enforcement. It is my intention to examine some very basic and systemic problems uncovered in this investigation.
The goal is to have a constructive dialogue with the FBI to ensure similar problems are not repeated in the future. No one will be fingered as a scapegoat. However, if the FBI says today that its problems are of the past and it is now fixed, I will not buy that, and I warn the public not to buy it, either. There is a whole lot more to be done before the root causes of the problem are fixed. It is a systemic cultural problem that transcends any simplistic fix.
I would like to give a word about today's witnesses, because it is not easy for them to be critical of questionable actions that they saw by FBI personnel. These witnesses will likely have to work with the FBI again, and the FBI is bigger and more powerful than their agencies. So there is an intimidation factor here.
But that is not why these witnesses are coming forward. They are coming forward because of what they saw and what they saw offended them, both from a law enforcement standpoint and from the standpoint of public safety. They are coming forward because they truly believe it will serve the public interest and will improve the way that we investigate future incidents. This is an honorable thing for these people to do. The subcommittee appreciates their testimony and I am confident that the public will, as well.
This is a story about how the world's preeminent law enforcement agency, at least in terms of image and expectation, sometimes acted like it did not even have a clue.
I believe that each and every FBI agent and employee who showed up on the scene of that tragic crash did the best job they could and had the best motives. The same goes for the employees of the other agencies and groups that worked so hard. Many volunteered to do that, and they sacrificed their time and their commitment to a greater and humanitarian good.
There was a basic problem, however. In my view, it was one of leadership. FBI leadership in the case of the TWA Flight 800 was a disaster.
The FBI says that its investigation in this case is a model for the future. The FBI believes that even now. I say that because of their testimony they submitted for this hearing. If the FBI still believes that after this hearing, then I think the American people should be very alarmed about whether or not the FBI gets the message, because this investigation, which by statute was supposed to be run by the NTSB but which was commandeered by the FBI, is a model of failure, not success. And anyone who doubts that is not confronting reality.
The testimony that we will hear today will describe three things. First, it will show how the FBI lacked the proper training to handle an investigation of this type and violated the most basic standards of forensic science in terms of collecting evidence, handling that evidence, and preserving the evidence.
It is the kind of thing that would make even rookie cops wince.
Second, we will try to understand the culture within the FBI that allows this sort of thing to happen. Why does the world's preeminent law enforcement agency make the kinds of mistakes that even rookies do not make?
And third, why is it that the FBI would try to prevent critical public safety information from getting to the proper authorities? [end quote]
SECTION H12: TOBIN ALLEGATIONS
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/fbilab1/20sbtobi.htm
(excerpts)
I. Introduction
This section discusses certain issues that William Tobin, a metallurgist now working in the Materials Analysis Unit (MAU), has brought to the attention of the OIG. Tobin has identified cases in which he believes other examiners, primarily in the Explosives Unit (EU), have incorrectly conducted or reported metals-related examinations.
To investigate these matters, we interviewed Tobin and several others,......
II. The Reporting of Metals-Related Examinations
Tobin identified one general area and two specific cases in which he thought metals-related examinations had been incorrectly performed or reported: (1) in reports prepared by EU examiners regarding the gauge of wire; (2) in a report in the La Familia case indicating that holes had been drilled into metal pipes; and (3) a suggestion in the Mauchlin case that a handgun barrel was made from Swedish steel. We address each of these matters in turn.
II. The Reporting of Metals-Related Examinations
Tobin identified one general area and two specific cases in which he thought metals-related examinations had been incorrectly performed or reported: (1) in reports prepared by EU examiners regarding the gauge of wire; (2) in a report in the La Familia case indicating that holes had been drilled into metal pipes; and (3) a suggestion in the Mauchlin case that a handgun barrel was made from Swedish steel. We address each of these matters in turn.
A. Improper Wire Gauging
Tobin contends that EU examiners have themselves conducted certain examinations that would be better performed by qualified metallurgists..........
With respect to the wire gauging issue, we draw several conclusions. The measurement of wire gauge is, in our view, something that appropriately-trained EU examiners can perform themselves without involving a metallurgist.
B. The La Familia Case
In the La Familia case, Tobin, who worked on the case, thought that the EU and the Firearms and Toolmarks Unit (FTU) in 1996 reported the results of metals-related examinations in a misleading or incorrect manner.
We have several conclusions concerning the La Familia case. When Tobin saw what he thought were incorrect or misleading statements in the February 9, 1996, report, he was correct to raise the issue. He should, however, have talked with Mohnal before issuing his own February 13 dictation. As a general matter, we think that examiners should first discuss issues informally among themselves if there appears to be a difference of opinion in interpreting data or reporting conclusions. Had Tobin attempted such informal communication here, it might have avoided both much of the controversy and the need for Tobin to further revise his dictation. We find unpersuasive Tobin's explanation that he prepared his dictation as he did because he knew from past experience that Mohnal would ignore his concerns.
We also find that Tobin and Ennis did not take appropriate steps to resolve their differences concerning whether the evidence indicated that holes had been drilled in the pipe nipples.
IV. Conclusion
William Tobin displayed poor judgment by failing to discuss his concerns in the La Familia case with the principal examiner before Tobin issued his revised dictation. We also think that Tobin and FTU examiner Michael Ennis should have taken further steps, with involvement by their unit chiefs if necessary, to attempt to resolve the apparent differences in their conclusions about the holes found in the pipes. Because they did not reconcile their opinions on a scientific basis, Tobin and Ennis might have contradicted each other if they had testified about the results of their examinations.
Tobin testified that by September of 1996, approximately 4-6 weeks after his arrival on the case, there was a general consensus that there was "no bomb or missile damage" evident on the TWA wreckage. At the time frame indicated in Tobin's testimony, approximately one half of TWA800 was still at the bottom of the ocean.
FBI, TWA Flight 800 Brookhaven National Laboratory Examinations. Declassified FBI Report, 1997. (excerpts)
"It became apparent by the end of November 1996......."
NOT HIS DECISION TO MAKE
TOBIN: I was ordered to.......But it was in a very emotional, very frenzied manner, so I inquired as to why.....I was told.......which again flies in the face of my interpretation of whose aircraft this was.......But, so I inquired as to why........And I said, well I'm still missing some critical information, why.......And my response at that point was, well I'm still missing some critical information. Why.........And I was told, yes, we want that overhead bin and I was continued -- told to go find that overhead bin.
"Ultimately, when there is disagreement on whether or how to proceed, the responsibility for the decision rests squarely on the shoulders of the investigators in charge of the case." Louis Schiliro
You still haven't provided the readers with any evidence that Tobin's conduct was unprofessional, much less "inept". Instead, you imply that Tobin, who reacted to the disastrously unprofessional and inept conduct of James Kallstrom much the same way as Kathleen Crowley did when confronted with similarly unprofessional and inept conduct by other FBI officials prior to 9/11, should have kept his mouth shut.
Tobin was apparently UNABLE to "keep his mouth shut".....nor it seems, to follow orders.