Later, it seemed he's spend about 500 pages building up to 200 pages of what I liked. Then, even later, his 200 pages turned into almost absolute rah-rah for current policies regarding high tech, mobile warfare and air power.
Hence my own book where we get into some serious trouble after relying too long on that alone. Don't get me wrong, those things are critically important, but we'd best be prepared to take and hold ground for long periods of time if we ever face a committed foe willing to do the same and spend the price to do so ... soaking up our high tech warshots in the process.
I talk to folks today who actually believe the circumstances at Chosin were a U.S. victory because our one Marine division disabled so many attacking Chinese divisions. (I have an uncle who served there and am awed at what they were able to do). But, just the same, my answer to that is simply, "at the end of the day, who held the ground? In fact, who holds it to this day?"
The same principles applied then (more mobile, higher tech, air domincance) and e were pushed back by a foe willing to committ an almost undending supply of fodder to the fray. There may be those today, using assymetrical arfare, who are willing to do the same.
Oh well ... there I go. Those are just my own thoughts and ramblings. Just ignore the last three paragraphs or so and focus on the first one in this response.
That's all right. I'm a rambler myself. I'm not sure whether anything I have to say is worth focusing on but I ramble just the same. It seems, deadly important when it comes out my mouth though!