From airdisaster.com:
Saudi Arabian Airlines Flight 163
Review of the CVR showed a serious breakdown in crew co-ordination almost from the first sign of trouble. The Captain failed to delegate responsibility to the other crew members, deciding to fly the aircraft and try to assess and remedy the problem as well. The First Officer had very limited experience on the L1011 and did not try to assist the Captain in flying the aircraft or monitoring communications or systems. The Second Officer, who was thought to be dyslexic, spent nearly all of his time searching through the aircraft's operations manual, the whole time repeating to himself "No Problem."
In addition, the Captain did not warn the cabin crew to prepare for evacuation nor did he even indicate that an evacuation was going to take place. Instead, he told the flight crew not to evacuate after landing. After the aircraft was stopped, one final transmission was received, indicating that an evacuation was about to take place. The evacuation never began however. The fire had moved rapidly forward and all of the victims were found in the forward half of the aircraft though none of the doors had been opened.
It is not known why the crew was not able to better coordinate their efforts to handle the emergency more efficiently and prepare the crew for an immediate evacuation. It seems unbelievable that the aircraft could land safely with all alive on board and yet not one person was able to escape. Following the accident, Lockheed removed the insulation from above the rear cargo area and reinforced it with high strength glass laminate. In addition, Saudia revised their emergency procedures and evacuation training and also sealed off all of the C-3 baggage areas.