Basically, in 1942, one deck-load strike (all offensive aircraft based on one carrier) could be expected to sink one enemy carrier. Finding the enemy was the critical factor. Allocate too few aircraft to search, and the odds are that the enemy will elude you; allocate too many, and your firepower will be diluted (the Dauntless was a scout-dive bomber).
The Japanese had four carriers; the US had three. Whoever attacked effectively first would win.
More to follow later.
Basically, in 1942, one deck-load strike (all offensive aircraft based on one carrier) could be expected to sink one enemy carrier. Finding the enemy was the critical factor. Allocate too few aircraft to search, and the odds are that the enemy will elude you; allocate too many, and your firepower will be diluted (the Dauntless was a scout-dive bomber).
The Japanese had four carriers; the US had three. Whoever attacked effectively first would win.
The US had a "force multiplier" in place at Midway: PBY Catalina flying boats, intended for maritime search and patrol. To attack Midway, the Japanese fleet would need to draw within range of Midway's search planes; this meant that Spruance could allocate his dive bombers to the attack mission instead of expending them in penny packets to find the enemy.
In early going, the Japanese had the better of the battle, with Torpedo 8 from the Hornet losing all but one man, Ensign George Gay. However, the torpedo attack drew the fighter cover down low, and kept them from engaging the dive bombers.
Additionally, Midway served as a valuable decoy, distracting Nagumo (he had TWO missions: aid in the seizure of Midway and destroy the remainder of the US fleet). He ordered several ordnance changes, and thus delayed his own strike against the American fleet until the dive bombers arrived.
Let's go back to Hughes' analysis that one carrier deckload could sink one enemy carrier.
Let's look at Scenario A, which the Japanese desired. They hoped to find the Americans and attack effectively before the Americans could locate them. With four deckloads on the attack, the Japanese would easily sink all three US carriers without loss to themselves. No more capital units in the US Pacific Fleet; the Japanese the war would probably extend well into 1946, or even 1947.
Scenario B is no less appetizing for the US. In this scenario, both sides detect and attack simultaneously. The Japanese sink all three American carriers; three Japanese carriers also sink. The one remaining carrier establishes enough air supremacy to allow the Japanese to sink Midway; the war goes on into 1946.
The third option is one the Japanese fear the most. Scenario C presumes that the Americans locate the Japanese task force while their own carriers remain safely hidden. A surprise attack by 3 undetected carriers would sink 3 Japanese carriers; a Japanese counterstrike would sink one carrier; and the US second strike would sink the remaining Japanese carrier.
Attack effectively first. That is the most importannt rule in naval warfare.
The Battle of Midway shows many glimpses of future warfare, from over-the-horizon targeting (a major issue in the 1980s as the Tomahawk antiship missile--which could fly out much further than the launching ship's sensors could see) to modern concept of "network-centric warfare" (where remote sensors communicate their reports to the commander).