The fundamental nature of the guarantee against double jeopardy can hardly be doubted. Its origins can be traced to Greek and Roman times, and it became established in the common law of England long before this Nation's independence. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 151 -155 (1959) (BLACK, J., dissenting). As with many other elements of the common law, it was carried into the jurisprudence of this Country through the medium of Blackstone, who codified the doctrine in his Commentaries. "[T]he plea of autrefoits acquit, or a former acquittal," he wrote, "is grounded on this universal maxim of the common law of England, that no man is to be brought into jeopardy of his life more than once for the same offence." Today, every State incorporates some form of the prohibition in its constitution or common law.
Zero support for blanket incorporation.
I never claimed otherwise - you are refuting a case I do not make. My only point is that your statement that Justice Black's views on the 14'th have never been cited or agreed with by any other decision or justice is an overstatement. The Benton case itself cites the dissent directly, in the majority opinion. Therefore it has been cited.
Clearly, Justice Marshall finds Black's reasoning to be something he at least partially agrees with, else he would not have cited it. And if you find that an inadequate example of another Justice agreeing with Black, there is always Duncan v Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), where Justice Black restated his Adamson dissent yet again, and was joined by Justice Douglas. Clearly Justice Douglas also finds Black's reasoning compelling, else he would not have signed on to such a dissent. Therefore, Black has been both cited by other justices, and found to be compelling by other justices. Contrary to what you said before.