Actually, the reason that I quoted Chief Justice Marshall was to assure you that there is nothing new about the Court's usual deference to Congress's selection of means. I just didn't want you to think that this practice began with Jackson, Lincoln, Wilson or FDR. I provided a more recent example in post 137 in the form of the following quote from South Carolina v. Katzenbach:
“We therefore reject South Carolina's argument that Congress may appropriately do no more than to forbid violations of the Fifteenth Amendment in general terms - that the task of fashioning specific remedies or of applying them to particular localities must necessarily be left entirely to the courts. Congress is not circumscribed by any such artificial rules under 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment. In the oft-repeated words of Chief Justice Marshall, referring to another specific legislative authorization in the Constitution, ‘This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution.’”
Also, in 1819, the courts weren't anywhere near as prolific and arbitrary in striking at state actions, and the phrase "compelling government interest" had not yet seen the light of day.
Typically, when the Court requires that Congress or a state demonstrate a "compelling governmental interest," it is because the Congress or a state has selected a means which is arguably prohibited by the Constitution. In those cases, the Court suspends its usual deference and requires that the Congress or a state demonstrate that its action is necessary to further a "compelling governmental interest." A recent example concerned the University of Michigan's use of race/ethnicity as a criteria for admission to its law school. As this kind of "affirmative action/reverse discrimination" policy appears to conflict with a constitutional prohibition (the equal protection clause), the courts insist that a state demonstrate that its policy is necessary to the furtherance of a "compelling governmental interest." Otherwise, the court will rule that the policy/law is unconstitutional.
Enforcement does not encompass new general prohibitions on behavior, period.
I reject a priori the notion that one needs to prohibit additional activities in order to enforce existing prohibitions. There are time-honored procedures in place for enforcing laws, and for upping the ante when existing policies are ineffective at curbing violations. All Congress needs to do is follow them. Anything else is not necessary, and certainly not proper.
I read you loud and clear. You feel that Congress was not authorized to suspend literacy tests because suspension of the literacy tests involved "new general prohibitions on behavior" which are not described in Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment. Here are my problems with your approach:
First, from a factual standpoint, your attempt to distinguish between the literacy tests that were being used and the prohibition contained in Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment flies in the face of the congressional determination that the literacy tests in question were in fact nothing other than a racial test that is prohibited by the Fifteenth Amendment.
Second, since you have determined that Congress cannot employ "new general prohibitions on behavior" in order to "enforce" the Fifteenth Amendment, I assume that you would deem it to be improper for Congress to provide for any penalties to be imposed on individuals involved in the violation of the Fifteenth Amendment because the amendment prohibits only conduct engaged in by states and does not concern the conduct of individuals. If the Congress had accepted your limitation on its power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment, what could it have done beyond passing legislation which merely reiterated that the states have a Fifteenth Amendment obligation? IOW, other than periodic legislative reminders to the states, what specifically do you have in mind when you refer to "upping the ante" that would not necessarily involve some "new prohibitions" beyond those contained in the amendment itself?
And because the line needs to be drawn somewhere, otherwise it would make meaningless the notion of a federal government with limited powers. They could justify any action as being necessary to the exercise of a particular granted power.
That was Jefferson's prediction about the consequences of interpreting “necessary” means to include merely “convenient” means:
“Suppose this were true: yet the Constitution allows only the means which are 'necessary,' not those which are merely 'convenient' for effecting the enumerated powers. If such a latitude of construction be allowed to this phrase as to give any non-enumerated power, it will go to everyone, for there is not one which ingenuity may not torture into a convenience in some instance or other, to some one of so long a list of enumerated powers. It would swallow up all the delegated powers, and reduce the whole to one power, as before observed.”
The Supreme Court rejected Jefferson’s view. Unless a Congressional means violates some constitutional prohibition, the Court traditionally concerns itself with congressional means only to the extent of determining that there exists a rational relationship between the means selected and some legitimate congressional end.
“We therefore reject South Carolina's argument that Congress may appropriately do no more than to forbid violations of the Fifteenth Amendment in general terms - that the task of fashioning specific remedies or of applying them to particular localities must necessarily be left entirely to the courts...."
Except that doesn't answer the point I was making. I agree that the courts themselves shouldn't be fashioning local remedies, but they should be determining whether Congress' "remedies" violate the Constitution.
Typically, when the Court requires that Congress or a state demonstrate a "compelling governmental interest," it is because the Congress or a state has selected a means which is arguably prohibited by the Constitution.
Which makes it a bogus argument on the part of the courts, because if a state action were truly violative of any provision within the Constitution, no court would be asking the state if it had a good reason for violating it; it would simply pronounce the state in violation. "Compelling government interest" is just a ruse for when the courts don't have a solid argument against something, but still want to exert their control anyway; and it completely puts the lie to any claim that certain legislative matters are too involved for them to get into.
First, from a factual standpoint, your attempt to distinguish between the literacy tests that were being used and the prohibition contained in Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment flies in the face of the congressional determination that the literacy tests in question were in fact nothing other than a racial test that is prohibited by the Fifteenth Amendment.
A literacy test can never be a racial test, in and of itself; though it can be applied in a racially discriminatory manner, just as a gun can be fired for the right reason or for the wrong reason; but that doesn't mean that the gun is the problem, and it doesn't mean that literacy tests are the problem.
Second, since you have determined that Congress cannot employ "new general prohibitions on behavior" in order to "enforce" the Fifteenth Amendment, I assume that you would deem it to be improper for Congress to provide for any penalties to be imposed on individuals involved in the violation of the Fifteenth Amendment because the amendment prohibits only conduct engaged in by states and does not concern the conduct of individuals. If the Congress had accepted your limitation on its power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment, what could it have done beyond passing legislation which merely reiterated that the states have a Fifteenth Amendment obligation? IOW, other than periodic legislative reminders to the states, what specifically do you have in mind when you refer to "upping the ante" that would not necessarily involve some "new prohibitions" beyond those contained in the amendment itself?
No, it is not improper for Congress to punish individuals who are exercising the power of the state. The principle of state sovereignty, which was well understood at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, means that it would be an improper exercise of Congress' power for them to attempt to punish states directly. This leaves them with no other choice, if they are to enforce prohibitions on states, to sanction those persons vested with the legal authority of the states, who use that authority in a manner that results in a violation of the law that Congress is empowered to enforce. It is clearly necessary (and note that I didn't have to hold any hearings or investigations to determine this, and neither does SCOTUS), and the only proper manner of enforcing laws against state actions.
Suppose the authorities of a particular state went ahead and dusted off someone they consider to be politically undesirable. This would seem to be a violation of the 14th-amendment prohibition against states depriving any person of life without due process of law. But how does that get enforced in a situation like this? The only viable option I can see is for federal authorities to arrest those officials responsible and put them on trial.
Unless a Congressional means violates some constitutional prohibition, the Court traditionally concerns itself with congressional means only to the extent of determining that there exists a rational relationship between the means selected and some legitimate congressional end.
Well, that completely ignores the "proper" part of "necessary and proper". I already mentioned the example of SUV's in DC. Another would be if Congress under its power of regulating interstate commerce were to prohibit trading certain items across state borders, and then decided to outlaw manufacturing of that item anywhere, so that federal authorities would no longer have to contend with having to deal with violations of the original prohibition. Maybe you think that's OK, too, but I can tell you that it's definitely not the arrangement that the states would say they signed up for in 1787. Hence it's propriety would be suspect, at best.