First of all, if you were to say to me, there was a certain unspecified constitutional question that Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson - or Hamilton and just about anyone else - were arguing over, and were to ask me which one is right, without even knowing what the question was, I'd say that it's most likely that Hamilton was wrong, simply because he stood out time and time again as the most statist and authoritarian of the Founding Fathers. Further, I find it interesting to contrast the quote from him that you cited, with his remarks in the Federalist No. 33, concerning that very clause of the Constitution:
Though a law therefore for laying a tax for the use of the United States would be supreme in its nature, and could not legally be opposed or controuled; yet a law for abrogating or preventing the collection of a tax laid by the authority of a State (unless upon imports and exports) would not be the supreme law of the land, but an usurpation of power not granted by the constitution. As far as an improper accumulation of taxes on the same object might tend to render the collection difficult or precarious, this would be a mutual inconvenience not arising from a superiority or defect of power on either side, but from an injudicious exercise of power by one or the other, in a manner equally disadvantageous to both.
So in the passage you quoted, he seems to be saying that the N&P clause refers to anything that might be useful in exercising a particular delegated power, but here in the Federalist, the series of essays designed to convince people to vote for the Constitution in the first place, he's saying that even when a state engages in a practice that renders it difficult for Congress to do its job (in this case, taxing the same object Congress is trying to tax), Congress nonetheless has no power to restrain that state.
Having said that, I do think that Hamilton seems to make some reasonable points, after perusing the link you posted. Although I'd have a little trouble swallowing his idea that a central bank would be necessary to the regulation of interstate commerce, I do generally agree that Congress has the power to create entities and programs designed to support government operations, particularly when it's doing things (such as establishing a bank) that any private entity has the right to do. Unfortunately, I don't know enough about the specific controversy surrounding the bank to make a specific commentary, and I'm a bit suspicious of it, because I really don't know what a bank could do for government that government can't do for itself using less involved means. But generally speaking, the case is of an entirely different order than the one we've been talking about, where we're talking about Congress' right to restrict a state activity that it hasn't been given the express power to restrict.
This is how I understand necessity and propriety: I'm assuming first, that the whole point of listing the powers of Congress, was that Congress would be generally limited to only those powers, which the 10th amendment seems to confirm. Therefore, as I said in my last post, the clause can not be understood to mean giving Congress new categories of power over society. In other words, Congress can't just change the "landscape" out there in order to make it easier for them to drive around - as Hamilton seemed to agree in Fed 33. That is not necessary and proper. Necessary and proper acts include doing things that private entities would be allowed to do, in order to provide support for constitutional operations; and they also include passing laws that are of the most basic nature that any government would be able to pass and still be able to call itself a government, such as, as I mentioned in the last post, providing for the punishment of acts of violence against federal officers doing their job. It should not involve much of anything else.
Right, Hamilton argued that:
(1) the congressional means must be "plainly adapted to that end," (i.e. useful); and
(2) the congressional means must be among those means "which are not prohibited" by the Constitution (e.g., the Bill of Rights).
Jefferson's view of strict necessity is not without its own problems. For one thing, any time that there exists more than one alternative means to accomplish a particular end, no one of those alternative means can be viewed as an indispensable means. If you can travel to Brazil by means of either ship or car, neither means can be said to be a strictly necessary means. A sometimes separate issue concerns what might be called extravagance. In his argument, Hamilton pointed out that the lighthouses that the government had already provided were not strictly necessary to the exercise of any express constitutional power. Marshall cited the congressional statutes providing for criminal laws against perjury. Isn't it at least a matter of opinion whether courts can function without criminalizing false testimony? And since the Constitution expressly provides for procedures in the event of a president's death or disability, how could a Secret Service protection detail be viewed as indispensable?
BTW, who did Jefferson envision would be resolving any differences of opinion concerning these issues of what is really necessary? In post 148, I listed three of the possible constitutional checks on Congress to ensure that Congress does not exceed its authority. Do you think that Jefferson would have trusted judges to choose the means by which the Congress exercised its express powers? At the time, Jefferson was arguing that President Washington should veto the legislation to establish the national bank. But the President does not require any strict definition of the term "necessary" in order to exercise his veto power. The President can veto legislation whether or not he thinks the legislation is constitutional.
You’ve made reference to Federalist No. 33. Hamilton argued there that, in the last analysis, we must depend upon the people to enforce limits on the Federal Government:
“But it may be again asked, who is to judge of the necessity and propriety of the laws to be passed for executing the powers of the Union? I answer first that this question arises as well and as fully upon the simple grant of those powers, as upon the declaratory clause: And I answer in the second place, that the national government, like every other, must judge in the first instance of the proper exercise of its powers; and its constituents in the last. If the Foederal Government should overpass the just bounds of its authority, and make a tyrannical use of its powers; the people whose creature it is must appeal to the standard they have formed, and take such measures to redress the injury done to the constitution, as the exigency may suggest and prudence justify.”
Can you see why judges like Marshall might feel that it would be inappropriate in a representative democracy for the judiciary to be choosing between "alternative means" and/or deciding on the propriety of a means which is arguably just an "extravagance"? Aren't legislatures inherently better equipped than courts to resolve these issues in a manner consistent with the wishes of the people? As a general rule, our courts have felt poorly equipped to get deeply involved in these issues. As an alternative, they have attempted to utilize specific constitutional prohibitions (e.g., the Bill of Rights, the bill of attainder and ex-post facto clauses, etc.) to impose limits on the exercise of federal powers.
Under the circumstances, what more do you think courts should reasonably be expected to do?