Actually I don't think you ever mentioned Rand, but no matter...
the metaphysical(Metaphysically, life is the only phenomenon that is an end in itself) while denying independent "reality" of metaphysical objects(values---Epistemologically, the concept of "value" is genetically dependent upon and derived from the antecedent concept of "life"). Eventually we have settled on the mind, and here you are accusing me of some ulterior attack on evolution. My point has been to establish things that are not physical. You either accept that contention or reject it. Which is it? I have not yet dealt with any requirement for instantiation.
OK. Do you understand that Rand's thinking (and mine in this case) is very dialectic, in the classical sense? (See Merriam Webster's definition #5a: 5 usually plural but singular or plural in construction a : any systematic reasoning, exposition, or argument that juxtaposes opposed or contradictory ideas and usually seeks to resolve their conflict b : an intellectual exchange of ideas)
Rand & I are arguing against metaphysical dualism. The non-physical is not fundamentally opposed to the physical. Descartes was wrong: The "soul" is not some kind of supernatural organ that's attached to the brain via the pineal gland. :-) But the subtler forms of that kind of thinking are also wrongheaded.
Here's an interesting history of the mind-body dilemma. I guess my view is closest to that of Lewes in the article's 19th Century section:
Dual-aspect monism was the brain child of George Henry Lewes (1817- 1878). Born in London, Lewes was one of the most versatile and brilliant minds of the century. A writer, actor, biologist, philosopher, and psychologist, his interests ranged across a staggering array of topics. He was the author of a still widely read Biographical History of Philosophy (1845/1846). His Physiology of Common Life (1859/1860) converted the young Pavlov to the study of physiology, and his five-volume Problems of Life and Mind (1874/1879) constituted a major contribution to the psychology of the period.
In The Physical Basis of Mind [10], which forms the third volume of Problems of Life and Mind, Lewes articulated the classic modern formulation of double aspect theory, dual-aspect monism. In presenting his position, Lewes went well beyond the theories of his predecessors, supplementing the double aspect notion with a view that has come to be called neutral monism. Neutral monism involves the claim that there is only one kind of "stuff" and that mind and body differ only in the arrangement of that stuff or in the perspective from which it is apprehended.
Borrowing a metaphor from Fechner, Lewes characterized the relation of mind to body as a curve that maintains its identity as a single line even though characterized at every point by both concavity and convexity. Mental and physical processes, in other words, are simply different aspects of one and the same series of psychophysical events. When seen from the subjective point of view (e.g., when someone is thinking), the psychophysical series is mental; when seen from the objective point of view (e.g., when someone observes what is going on in the thinking person's brain), it is physical.
In the argument for the dual-aspect view, however, Lewes's innovation was by no means restricted to his neutral monism. Mental and physical descriptions, he went on to assert, employ terms which are not intertranslatable. The visual experience of a large elephant can not be adequately described through statements that characterize either the laws of light or the mechanisms of the nervous system. Mental terms, in other words, cannot in principle be replaced by physical terms. In making this claim, Lewes transferred the domain of discourse from metaphysics to language and provided what is still the best argument against extreme reductionism and the replacement of psychology by physiology.
I don't know if "mental terms cannot in principle be replaced by physical terms", but in practice it makes much more sense to deal with the two phenomena on their own terms. And yet it's intuitively obvious that they're two sides of the same coin.
Does this help, or have I gone off on a tangent again?
No tangents noted.
To refresh your mind here is the Rand quote from post 526 and my question from post 536 to her quote in your post----
FWIW, here's how Rand sees it:
It is only an ultimate goal, an end in itself, that makes the existence of values possible. Metaphysically, life is the only phenomenon that is an end in itself: a value gained and kept by a constant process of action. Epistemologically, the concept of "value" is genetically dependent upon and derived from the antecedent concept of "life". To speak of "value" as apart from "life" is worse than a contradiction in terms. "It is only the concept of 'Life' that makes the concept of 'Value' possible."
How can Rand talk about things above the physical without invoking something beyond the physical? If she remains in the physical world, a whirlwind is no different than "life", an organized conglomeration of physical forces. When she mentions "value" she steps out of the physical and into the mind.
Now to your assertion that it is intuitive that they are two sides of the same coin I ask, what coin are you talking about? To me you are asserting that the mind is a measurable property of matter. You tie yourself to Lewes viewpoint that ---Mental and physical processes, in other words, are simply different aspects of one and the same series of psychophysical events. When seen from the subjective point of view (e.g., when someone is thinking), the psychophysical series is mental; when seen from the objective point of view (e.g., when someone observes what is going on in the thinking person's brain), it is physical.
This is illustrated with the metaphor ---Lewes characterized the relation of mind to body as a curve that maintains its identity as a single line even though characterized at every point by both concavity and convexity.
However, there is a big problem here. I know of no other measurement that measures itself. So what we have here is something quite different from the line metaphor. As a "measurement" the mind is quite distinct from any other measure of matter.(if one asserts that it is a "measurement" of matter)