All I can say is, not to me.
I, starting out attributing neither great vice nor great virtue to Lincoln and reading what you and rdf put up, see a man who says that he approves of the kind of tariffs you discuss and that if the opportunity should present itself he would press for them. Further, the party that nominated him has a tariff plank and he does not disavow it.
But in the letters rdf put up he seems to say that he does not see success with the tariffs until those who are currently opposed to them should cease to be so.
You offer: "I believe yet, if we could have a moderate, carefully adjusted, protective tariff, so far acquiesed in, as to not be a perpetual subject of political strife, squabbles, charges, and uncertainties, it would be better for us."
That shows that Lincoln likes tariffs. Tariffs - terrif. You continue:
In other words, Lincoln first says he's an old tariff Whig whose views have not changed. Next he advocates implementing a tariff, yet not a word about it no longer being his agenda or anything of the sort.
I'm sorry that does not seem to be an advocation of implementation. He merely says again that he things they're good.As I tried to say, I can like something and wish for it, and not be ready to take steps to get it. If I win the lottery, then a Ferrari goes on the agenda. If political situation changes, then tariffs go back on the agenda.
You continue:
The letter continues, again immediately from where the previous quote left off, with a comment on the political viability of the issue.
"Still, it is my opinion that, just now, the revival of that question, will not advance the cause itself, or the man who revives it."
That sounds to me like he's taking it off the agenda. Reviving the issue now won't work. It remains a long term goal but nothing he wants to work toward at the time of writing. It's not on the list of things to do right now.
You continue describing and quoting how Lincoln imagines and hopes, in essence, that sooner or later the issue could be added to the agenda; and you write:
I think it is safe to add that at this future point, Lincoln would not have hesitated to take up the tariff issue, ....
In other words, he might put it back on the agenda later.
I was mistaken about the MENTION of slavery, but I still maintain that that was the issue that pushed the tariff off the agenda.
The reason I say the tariff issue and its merits are irrelevant is that I notice that these threads tend to wander from the lousy way DiLorenzo supports his thesis to the thesis itself. From here it looks like the argument about Lincoln is a convenient distraction from the discussion of DiLorenzo's scholarship.
Actually, Ferrier's own source conceded that the 1857 thing was an error originally made by a secondary source that DiLorenzo cited.
My point exactly.
With no sources to hand and little time to search them, had I any, I made an error. When it was pointed out. I noted it. When my language was misunderstood as making an accusation against you, I clarified and expressed regret for the infelicity of my expression. DiLorenzo describes his shelf of 60 or so volumes (as I recall) of books about Lincoln. I missed the time, if any, when he took responsibility for his errors. I think I stand up against him pretty well.
That he does. He also asserts his own personal hopes that the opportunity to do so will arise in the near future. And when it did arise, he pressed for it as he said and identified it as a major priority the speech I quoted.
Further, the party that nominated him has a tariff plank and he does not disavow it.
He did not disavow it because he agreed with it. That agreement with the tariff plank predated the tariff plank as evidenced by the letters and by Lincoln's earlier career in the Whig party and Illinois legislature where he was a top advocate for the tariff.
But in the letters rdf put up he seems to say that he does not see success with the tariffs until those who are currently opposed to them should cease to be so.
Yes, and it's a perfectly consistent political statement. He did not see success for them because, at the time he wrote that letter, free trade dominated and the protectionists were in a minority in congress. Keep reading though. Right after that he says he anticipates this opposition will fall in the very near future making it possible to install a tariff.
And that's exactly what happened in 1860-61.
That shows that Lincoln likes tariffs.
As does his political history prior to that 1859 letter. If you would like, I'll post some of the statements from years prior when Lincoln was a prominent tariff advocate.
I'm sorry that does not seem to be an advocation of implementation.
Sure it is. It comes with the qualifier of political viability, but that is a given. A tariff could not be implemented and sustained if it were politically impossible in the congress' makeup to do so.
He merely says again that he things they're good.
Then says that when it becomes possible to pass one, they should do it.
As I tried to say, I can like something and wish for it, and not be ready to take steps to get it.
Or you can like something and wish for it, then prepare yourself to achieve it at some future date when achieving it becomes possible. That is what Lincoln did.
If I win the lottery, then a Ferrari goes on the agenda. If political situation changes, then tariffs go back on the agenda.
In that case, so to speak, Lincoln won the lottery. Only he also knew at the time of that letter that his chances of winning were pretty good as opposed to a shot in the darkness of you simply buying a lotto ticket.
That sounds to me like he's taking it off the agenda.
Something can remain on the agenda even though its advancer knows it to be years in the making. A communist definately has his goal of communism on his agenda, though often he knows that achieving it, if at all, will be years in the making.
Reviving the issue now won't work. It remains a long term goal but nothing he wants to work toward at the time of writing.
To the contrary. By consciously allowing the issue to mature, which is what he is doing, he is working toward achieving it. Like a good politician he knew making a bunch of noise about something he wanted wasn't always the best way to get it. Instead he strategized, and consciously so based upon that letter as evidence, of achieving it in the near future by allowing the issue to ripen and to be ready when that day comes. As history shows, that is exactly what happened - Lincoln got his tariff.
I was mistaken about the MENTION of slavery, but I still maintain that that was the issue that pushed the tariff off the agenda.
And I'll disagree, noting that the tariff was never truly pushed off the agenda. Lincoln simply decided it had a better chance if he was patient and took advantage of the right time - a political strategy, and one that later worked for him. As for the issue that made the tariff unviable in 1859 (and also viable in 1861), it was not slavery. It was Congress. More specifically it was Congress' makeup and the fact that, as of 1859, free trade was the policy. That was no longer the case shortly after though. As of 1861, the tariff had become the policy.
The reason I say the tariff issue and its merits are irrelevant is that I notice that these threads tend to wander from the lousy way DiLorenzo supports his thesis to the thesis itself. From here it looks like the argument about Lincoln is a convenient distraction from the discussion of DiLorenzo's scholarship.
It does get away from DiLorenzo, but I don't see any harm to that. DiLorenzo is still being discussed here and elsewhere. But with this, we're simply exploring an issue in greater depth that pertains to Lincoln himself. With no sources to hand and little time to search them, had I any, I made an error. When it was pointed out. I noted it.
Thank you. Your directness about that is appreciated.