El Sur: Opponents of Chavez Unbeaten-Unbowed - April 20 by Richard Jahnke - 11:16 AM
VENEZUELA Unbeaten, unbowed: Opponents of President Hugo Chávez are surprisingly determined and aggressive after the failure of the April 9-12 demonstrations to lead to his removal from office.
____ 1. Top military officers arrested in after the interim government collapsed strongly defended their actions in court, reports Yahoo! News - AP.
"We still consider this to be an illegitimate government," said Rear Admiral Carlos Molina Tamayo as he was whisked away by military police. "The armed forces are very beaten down and divided." Tamayo had denounced Chavez in February.
Asked if Chavez was reorganizing the military to his liking, Molina Tamayo replied: "Maybe. But he can't remake the country to his liking."
Army Gen. Nestor Gonzalez has defended the coup as "a humanitarian act meant to avoid having the army attack the people and produce a massacre." Gonzalez said generals balked at Chavez's order to activate "Plan Avila," calling out troops to defend the palace by any means necessary during the march by hundreds of thousands of civilians.
____ 2. In El Universal the Mayor of Baruta, Henrique Capriles charged pro-Chávez activists with operating "a laboratory to falisfy scenes of violence" ("laboratorio para falsificar escenas de violencia
The official commented that he has received confidential information according to which various deputies, among them Juan Barreto, discovered editing some films in order to blame opposition groups.
El funcionario comentó que le han llegado informaciones confidenciales según las cuales varios diputados oficialistas, entre ellos Juan Barreto, se encuentran editando algunas filmaciones para inculpar a los grupos opositores.
____ 3. El Nacional reports that the Confederación de Trabajadores de Venezuela (CTV) intends to stage another march on May 1. In his first public appearance after the events of April 11, the union's leader Carlos Ortega also said he is willing to meet with President Chávez.
"If it is to resolve the things we are disposed to meet even with the devil," he indicated.
"Si es para solucionar las cosas estamos dispuestos a reunirnos hasta con el demonio," indicó.
____ 4. Also according to El Nacional, the head of the Organización de Periodistas Iberoamericanos (OPI) wrote Chávez asking compensation for the family of the news photographer assassinated on April 11.
In a letter directed to Chávez, the president of the OPI, Alvaro Julio Martinez, asked the chief of estate to take all measures necessary to insure that the killer of (Jorge) Tortosa does not remain immune and those responsible for the crime are carried before justice.
En una carta dirigida a Chávez, el presidente de la OPI, Alvaro Julio Martínez, le solicita al Jefe de Estado que tome las medidas necesarias para que la muerte de Tortosa no quede en la impunidad y los responsables del crimen sean llevados ante la justicia.
Why is this?
First, while Chávez's opponents made mistakes, his supporters committed crimes.There is at least one video showing "Bolivarian circle" members shooting at the crowd. There are witnesses. Pro-Chávez crowds mobbed newspapers and TV stations. (See El Sur.) All of this creates a problem of legitimacy, without which there is only force. For Chávez this is a dilemma. If he fails to protect his Bolivarian shooters, he defeats the purpose of the organization. The circles are the street-fighting arm of the MVR (Fifth Republic Movement); when circle members shot demonstrators and mobbed the media, they were doing what they were designed to do. If he protects the Bolivarian shooters--the likely course--he loses legitimacy. (The Organization of American States, human rights organizations and press-protection organizations are all watching.) Legitimacy is a problem because there is no Soviet Bloc into which Chávez can take the country anymore.
Second, nothing fundamental has changed. Chávez has some five years still to go into his term and already he is unpopular enough to be besieged. His economy is stagnant. Oil revenues are capped, now by his voluntary acceptance of Venezuela's OPEC quota, in a few years by capacity (see El Sur). There isn't the slightest prospect conditions in the country will improve enough to lift his popularity. Sometime between now and 2007 there will be another crisis just like this.
Third, if Chávez decides to meet his next crisis with force, who can he trust? According to the picture of events that has emerged, Chávez lost the support of the military on April 11 when he tried to call the military out into the streets to head off the demonstrations. This can't give him confidence the military will fight the public for him next time. A post-restoration shake-up will let Chávez raise up a new, military hierarchy, of course. This new handpicked leadership should be more loyal, except that Chávez had appointed the old leadership, which, in the crunch, turned out not to be.
Fourth, at the heart of Chávez's "Bolivarianin Revolution" and "Fifth Republic Movement" are absolutely nothing. BOLIVARISM IS ENTIRELY CONTENTLESS. It consists of populist solganeering and local pride (Simon Bolivar came from the part of Great Colombia that is now Venezuela). This was enough when the country was focused on the wholly negative task of ousting the previous, corrupt government. But it is not something like Scientific Socialism or Islamism, that can be studied, believed and committed to. For Venezuelans well-enough placed to not be particularly moved by generalized appeals to envy--indeed well-enough placed to be threatened by Chávez's verbal assaults on the relatively well off (which includes the officer corp)--it has little intrinsic appeal. Since there's nothing to Bolivarism except appeals to lower-class envy, the attachment of MVR officials is largely opportunistic. This is not the foundation for loyalty.
Chávez is reported to have said on his return something to the effect that, while under guard, he always believed he would return, just not so soon. For him, sooner almost certainly was not better. Chávez would have a much brighter future if it was Pedro Carmona dealing with Venezuela's problems, amidst the uproar from Chávez partisans, returning himself in triumph later, perhaps even winning another term as president. Instead, it is Chávez who is dealing with the country's problems amidst an anti-Chávez uproar. Though it's too soon to be sure, the officers who stripped Chávez of power probably did him a better turn than those who restored him to it.