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Mountain Division: Why the U.S. can't match the British at high altitudes.
The American Prospect ^ | Mar 21, 2002 | Jason Vest

Posted on 03/21/2002 11:59:34 AM PST by My Identity

In a recent Slate "Today's Papers" column, Eric Umansky drew attention to a Wall Street Journal item reporting the impending arrival of 1700 British troops in Afghanistan at the U.S. military's request. Quite rightly, Umansky was most interested not in what was included in the dispatch, but what wasn't. "Given that the US presumably still has plenty of troops available," he wrote, "it would have been helpful if the paper had asked why the US requested the deployment."

While I can't report the official American rationale -- the Pentagon doesn't seem to be in any hurry to return my calls -- there are some points worth examining in order to answer Umansky's very worthy question. The tentative summation? The United States asked for the British because the United States doesn't have adequately-trained forces (or, at least, ones ready to go), and because the bulk of the forces we used in Operation Anaconda weren't the right ones in the first place. And this highlights some real shortcomings in the U.S. Army.

That's not to dis the troops who fought at Shahikot in recent weeks; they got their orders and did their duty. But before we get to the British, let's take a closer look at who saw action around Gardez in recent weeks. While some Special Forces were involved, the majority of U.S. combatants were troops from the 101st Airborne's 3rd Brigade -- which hasn't seen a lot of action since the Gulf War -- and the 10th Mountain Division. In a previously posted Prospect article, I characterized the 10th Mountain Division as "ostensibly" a specialist unit in mountain operations. Space didn't permit me to expound on this further, so I'll do it here: Despite the presence of the word "mountain," the 10th does not, in fact, have any particular expertise in mountain warfare.

It is true that at its Fort Drum home in upstate New York, there are two "Mountain Leader Combat" courses open to individuals: one that runs two weeks with a four-day field training exercise, another that goes ten days focusing on weaponry and clearing rooms. But when the 10th was reactivated in 1985, it was not as a mountaineering or altitude combat force, but as a general light-infantry unit. Many in the Army believe the "mountain" designator was, in fact, an attempt to endear the service to then-Senator Bob Dole, who'd served in the original 10th during World War II. While elements of the 10th have seen combat most notably (and tragically) in support of the 1993 Task Force Ranger retreat in Mogadishu, others have spent most of the past decade in support or peacekeeping missions in Kuwait, Iraq, Haiti and Bosnia.

(Aside to loyal Chicago Tribune readers: The entire 10th Mountain Division was not "in the gulf [war]" and has not "had substantial training in this kind of mountainous terrain," as Lexington Institute analyst Daniel Goure was quoted as saying in the October 4, 2001 edition of the paper. Only the 548th Corps Support Battalion, which specializes in supply and services, went.)

It does bear mentioning that the U.S. Army maintains an advanced mountain warfare school in Jerico, Vermont, where some individual members of the 10th Mountain have trained. And that it's not an easy course. There are, however, some important caveats to bear in mind. In my previous Prospect piece, I mentioned a recent article in the Army-published Military Review, co-authored by retired Lieutenant Colonel Lester Grau and Lieutenant Colonel Hernan Vazquez, titled "Ground Combat at High Altitude," which made some serious systemic criticisms of the U.S. Army's mountain warfare training regimen. Aside from the fact that the Army doesn't really train for high-altitude combat (maximum elevation at Jerico is 4,393 feet; high-altitude combat is defined as over 10,000 feet, and Anaconda took place at elevations ranging from 8,500 to 13,000 feet), it's noteworthy that the mountain school does not train entire units, but only individuals -- 30 soldiers in two classes, twice a year, for two weeks.

Or, to put it another way, it's not exactly reflective of Grau and Vazquez's point that in mountain warfare, "experience counts and is not gained in two months of training," or their admonition -- based on the standards of other nations' mountain warfare units -- that a fundamental of mountain combat is giving soldiers at least 10 days to acclimate -- and that "an acclimated soldier is not an experienced mountaineer."

Now let's take a closer look at the composition, experience, and training regimen of the key players in the British force specifically requested by the U.S. military: the 650-man 45 Royal Marine Commando, also known as the Mountain and Arctic Warfare Cadre. True specialists in high-mountain and extreme cold weather warfare since the 1970's, the unit was training late last year in the mountains and deserts of Oman, which are almost identical to the topography of Afghanistan. A key force in the Falklands War of 1982 (it famously marched 80 miles in a day and won a key battle), the group has also devised some effective and innovative tactics during combat tours in Northern Ireland and the high ranges of Northern Iraq and Kosovo, and, for versatility's sake, jungle work in Belize and Sierra Leone.

But what really sets it apart from the American 101st and 10th is how it's structured and how it trains -- much closer to the standard espoused by Grau and Vazquez. Passing basic training isn't easy: A recruit has to traverse 30 miles of Dartmoor crags with full back gear in seven hours. And the group trains together, eschewing the individual approach favored by their U.S. counterparts. What's more, they're serious about their training. Every year, the 45 Commando spends 10 weeks at the Royal Marine Arctic Warfare Course, 215 miles inside the arctic circle at Elvigardsmond, Norway, enduring some of the most deadly conditions a soldier can face. According to U.S. Army Major Donald Vandergriff, a scholar who's made a detailed study of various military personnel systems, part of what enables the 45 Commando to survive its annual Norway stint and do well in combat is that its organizational principles simply aren't the U.S. Army's.

"They train the entire unit, not individuals; their NCOs [non-commissioned officers] are empowered or trusted to do more, and a battalion or brigade has half the officers of a similar U..S unit, which is significant, because officers and NCOs acquire more responsibility earlier in their careers, which translates into more experience at their profession," Vandergriff said. "And their officer selection and promotion systems are different; the criteria is tougher and more strenuous than ours. And they also use an 'up and stay' promotion system versus our 'up and out' system, which allows competent officers to stay longer at a place where they perform well."

But why stop and contemplate any of this? Seemingly mundane, unsexy matters like training and personnel just don't seem like that big of a deal, especially when General Tommy Franks has deemed Operation Anaconda an "unqualified and absolute success." Even though some of his Afghan allies beg to differ, and even though no one is entirely sure just how many of the enemy were a) there in the first place, b) slipped through the airtight cordon that was Anaconda to reinforce those already there, and/or c) escaped through the airtight cordon.

But, then, it's probably asking too much of anyone to dwell on any of these particulars. After all, days before "success" was declared, The New Republic's Lawrence Kaplan had all but declared the conflict triumphantly over, declaring the real story was how the Army units "battling al-Qaeda fighters at close range and Army commanders improvising as they went along" all worked in the service of "banishing" Vietnam and emboldening casualty-averse commanders to field Army troops and fight. So what if aspects of Anaconda might highlight systemic failures in readiness and doctrine that are yet to be corrected? Apparently it's more pleasant to be enveloped in the fog of war.


TOPICS: Extended News; News/Current Events
KEYWORDS: british; mountaindivision; operationanaconda; us
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To: rangermedicswife
My husband would have been one if they would have let him jump out of a perfectly good airplane every once in a while.

Marine Recon regularly jumps out of perfectly good airplanes and helicopters. Guess he couldn't pass muster.

41 posted on 03/21/2002 1:08:38 PM PST by SMEDLEYBUTLER
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To: My Identity
How can anyone give a detailed analysis of what happened at Shahikot? The action is barely even over. Hagenback, who is probably the one who is the most in the know given that he has access to the drone videos and the situation reports, has said that we killed on the order of 500+ Al Qaeda and Taliban at a loss of 8 Americans. And with regard to the 8 deaths, I believe 7 of those occurred on the first night of the operation when one helicopter that was attempting to put reconnaissance teams in on the high ground was ambushed and lost Neil Roberts and the troops in another helicopter were then hit when they went back in to get his body. The point being that our problem was almost certainly not a training problem, given that it was highly trained special operators who were killed, but instead a loose lips problem with our Afghan 'allies'.
42 posted on 03/21/2002 1:09:55 PM PST by vbmoneyspender
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To: g'nad
just surviving and moving at 12,000 ft (summer or winter) will kick your @ss, even if your in great shape. Experience means everything in that environment...not to mention a squared away logistics team...

The Indians are holding Siachen which is at 20,000Ft. More details here

43 posted on 03/21/2002 1:10:14 PM PST by milestogo
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To: ventana
Yes, near Tennessee Pass north of Leadville, CO at an altitude of 10,000ft. The remains of the camp (building foundations, etc) are still there along US highway 24.
44 posted on 03/21/2002 1:19:06 PM PST by Lyndal
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To: milestogo
The Indians and Pakistanis have learned to operate at those altitudes through time and quite a few deaths. They have staging camps at gradually increased altitudes to acclimate the men and prevent altitude sickness, which can kill even an extremely fit man.

The soldiers in your link fighting for Siachen are some hearty mo'fo's...

45 posted on 03/21/2002 1:19:37 PM PST by g'nad
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To: SMEDLEYBUTLER
Marine Recon regularly jumps out of perfectly good airplanes and helicopters. Guess he couldn't pass muster.

My, my. You got me there, Smedley. My bad. There were a couple of other reasons (his being 17 and immature the time for one), but I can assure you that it has nothing to do with him passing or not passing muster. He decided to go back to college and medical school. I dunno. Maybe that had something to do with it too. Marines didn't have a slot for him once his plans changed. Anyway, I don't know why you felt the need to slam him. I didn't say one word against the Marines. I respect them too much.

By the way, your character certainly comes through loud and clear in your post.

Oh ... and thank you for your support. [/sarcasm]

46 posted on 03/21/2002 1:36:42 PM PST by rangermedicswife
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To: vbmoneyspender; g'nad; cascademountaineer; fnord; kd5cts; Seydlitz
How can anyone give a detailed analysis of what happened at Shahikot? ... The point being that our problem was almost certainly not a training problem...

Here's a few choice comments from an article by Hackworth:

"our fine troops, trained in the flatlands of New York and Kentucky, weren't conditioned for mountain warfare at elevations of 9,000 feet"

"Our Joes were sent into battle loaded down like pack mules, insufficiently prepared for the freezing conditions and far from physically up for the game."

"The guerrillas also outranged our grunts"

"our soldiers [were] bunched up like beetles at a bugfest"

"when our brave Apache gunship pilots came to the rescue, they lost all their ships to enemy fire."

"It didn't help that our intelligence was bad regarding the size of the enemy force and its willingness to fight."

"the success of an operation [was] dependent on a non-U.S. unit -- [we] trusted our so-called Afghan allies, who left us in the lurch."

"The generals had envisioned sealing the enemy inside a noose and then pounding him with bombs, a tactic that seldom worked in Vietnam"

"The generals didn't get much right until they shrewdly declared victory and hauled butt away"

Now personally I think that Hackworth is given to hyperbole and sound-bite-itis, but it would seem he has a few valid concerns. And I don't think raising issues about the effectiveness of those on the front line is a sign of latent liberalism. We want to win, decisively, quickly, and efficiently.
47 posted on 03/21/2002 2:17:17 PM PST by My Identity
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To: Vinnie_Vidi_Vici
"I suppose, Physiologically speaking, that the smaller brain volume of the British Troops reguire less oxygen to operate!" Well, if you look at it that way, you're perfect for the job.
48 posted on 03/21/2002 4:21:51 PM PST by ConsistentLibertarian
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To: My Identity
Success in warfare is not on the specifics of battle, but on the desired effects. War's purpose is to achieve political objectives. If the commander says it was successful, the political objectives his boss wanted were achieved.

/john

49 posted on 03/21/2002 5:44:03 PM PST by JRandomFreeper
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To: Vinnie_Vidi_Vici
"I suppose, Physiologically speaking, that the smaller brain volume of the British Troops reguire less oxygen to operate!" Maybe you could lead them in. You could stop a few bullets for them. The 1st and only mobile sandbag. Jerk.
50 posted on 03/21/2002 6:09:36 PM PST by spitz
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To: RoughDobermann
The real 10th trained at Camp Hale near Leadville CO. The valley floor is nearly 10,000 ft. The Camp are was used last month by the Denver area Boy Scouts for their winter Klondoree. Over night lows of -26F.
51 posted on 03/21/2002 6:14:43 PM PST by BiggerBird
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To: kd5cts
If the commander says it was successful, the political objectives his boss wanted were achieved.

I'll relay that to the Vietnam vets. I'm sure they'll be relieved.
52 posted on 03/21/2002 6:53:18 PM PST by My Identity
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To: Vinnie_Vidi_Vici
Theres always one, and on this thread, i'm afraid its you! Idiot.
53 posted on 03/22/2002 2:22:14 PM PST by dennybabyboy-fitzy
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To: Vinnie_Vidi_Vici
Theres always one, and on this thread, i'm afraid its you!
54 posted on 03/22/2002 2:22:23 PM PST by dennybabyboy-fitzy
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To: TEXASPROUD
Yeah, and the army 'Tabbed' it.
55 posted on 03/22/2002 2:24:09 PM PST by dennybabyboy-fitzy
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To: Shermy
Although that would appear the best use of the Gurkhas, giving, that, they are from Nepal. They have shown that they operate best in Jungles, and they have an exceptional record in jungle warfare. The little fella's never cease to amaze me. Last time I was on camp with the Gurkhas, was at ITC Catterick 2000/01, and they were going through infantry training. 5 ft nothing, there humping there Bergans, that look twice the size they do, on an 8-miler CFT. The little Fu***rs have a permanent grin on, the whole way round the course, and no sign of any physical pain.

Great soldiers that I'd gladly go into battle with any day of the week.

56 posted on 03/22/2002 3:28:18 PM PST by dennybabyboy-fitzy
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To: My Identity; Shaggy eel; TEXASPROUD; CasearianDaoist; chookter; Shermy; r9etb.
Let me just dissect this a bit.

The 650-man 45 Royal Marine Commando, also known as the Mountain and Arctic Warfare cadre.

Wrong. 45 RM CDO is one of three Royal marine Commando battalions, the other two being 40 and 42 battalions. Other units, Also under the RM umbrella are the SBS (Special Boat Squadron), Commachio group (I believe this units role has now been swallowed up by the SBS), a specialist coxwain squadron, and the Mountain & Arctic Warfare cadre. 45 CDO and the M & A W Cadre are two completely separate units. All Royal Marine Commando units go through high standard Mountain and Arctic training in Norway and Scotland, but the standards required from the M & A W cadre go way, way beyond that. Training at the CTCRM (Commando Training Centre-Royal Marines) lasts for 30 weeks, and does involve mountain warfare skills (along with other warfare skills) i.e basic climbing and abseiling skills, but not cliff assaults. The Commando course is the basis course for all those wishing to join one of the 3 CDO Battalions, and has a pass rate of about 40%. When these Marines have had at least 3Yrs experience with there Rifle company's, then, and only then can they even consider applying for training with the Specialist units within the RMs, namely the SBS and the M&A W cadre (only marines can join the SBS. Soldiers from the army can go through M & A W cadre training, but only marines serve on the cadre). Bear in mind, the quality of men that have passed the CTCRM, the pass rates of both the SBS and the M & A W cadre are less than 10%, probably closer to, if not less than 5%.

Passing basic training isn't easy : A recruit has to traverse 30 miles of Dartmoor crags with full back gear in seven hours.

The 30 miler is the final test in the Commando course, it forms part of test week, similar to SEALS BUD/S hell week. The 30 miler is one of many tests in the final week, the rest being elaborate assault courses (one aptly named the Tarzan course) and a 48hr continuous battle. The 30 miler is carried out a few times during training for the Cadre, but purely as part of the training programme to push the students to further distances with heavier weight. The cadre goes through 2 phases - ML1 and ML2. The combined course run to about 18 months, and involves agent running in Norway, and a lot of time spent above 10,000ft and in temps less than -40'C. The purpose of the cadre was to provide deep penetration recce patrols into Russian Siberia and to organize partizans in Finland, Sweden and Norway, if the Soviets did ever try to invade. The final ML test is a 300km march/ski which involves passing through a series of handler agents, one of whom hands you to the enemy, then its resistance to interrogation, escape and evasion. Again, 45 CDO, although very highly trained, is not the Mountain and Arctic Warfare cadre. The cadre only has around 30-40 men, not 650.

"They train the entire unit, not individuals; their NCOs are empowered or trusted to do more......"

CTCRM trains the unit, but M & A W cadre does tend to be for the individual. NCOs in the British armed forces (including the army) on the whole have more experience and responsibilities than there US counterparts, and are generally older. I was amazed by the first US army sergeant I met when I came to the US, he looked like he'd only been out of school 5 minutes, I asked him how old he was, he was 22 yrs old and a sergeant 1st class. You'd be lucky to see a 22 yr old Corporal in the British army, let alone sergeant. Promotion is a lot harder to earn in the British army.

Den

57 posted on 03/22/2002 5:25:46 PM PST by dennybabyboy-fitzy
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To: dennybabyboy-fitzy
Thanks, very informative. How would you constrast the RM with the USMC? I do not just mean the rank and file but the elite USMC units.
58 posted on 03/22/2002 5:42:35 PM PST by CasearianDaoist
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To: CasearianDaoist
Starting with the basics : The royal marines do not allow women into its ranks, it is purely a fighting force. They tried the Liberal 'GI Jane' s**t last year and allowed 3 women soldiers from the army (corps arms, not infantry) to take part in the all-arms commando course (a shortened Commando course run for those who already have military experience). The first woman to flake lasted 2 days, the last one to throw in the towel lasted just over a week : Point proved, and taken (by the libs). The CDO battalions are classed as elite units, but not special forces. The Royal Marine training is a lot harder physically than the USMC, and is a lot longer. The commando training course is the longest basic infantry training course in the west (if not the world) at 30 wks long. The battalions each have there recce patrols platoon, which are made up of the far more experienced marines who would have served for more than 3 yrs. These platoons are the equivalent of the USMC Force Recon units, The physical training carried out by the marines is on a par with Force recon, so they just get moved to the recce platoons, and then learn the in the troops. SBS and mountain and arctic warfare cadre traininig are more severe. The SBS is the equivalent of the SEALs, and runs a selection and training programme that is like an elongated version of BUD/S, but SBS training is a lot more diverse and regarded as a lot harder, physically. BUD/S is a lot of long runs, lack of sleep and boat work (as well as time at NAVSPECWAR), SBS selection involves daily forced speed marches (for 2 months) of about 30-40 miles, over mountainous terrain carrying anything from 55-110lbs of equipment. high seas canoeing (with 2-man kleppers), once they reach land in there 2 man teams, they disassemble the canoes, shove them on there backs and march to a RV point. The M & A W cadre are an unknown quantity. In peacetime they are a training cadre providing Mountain leader training to the forces of all NATO countries, in wartime they are deep penetration raiders and intelligence gatherers. They were the sole NATO unit tasked with recce (recon) patrols beyond the 2000 mile arc into Soviet territory, they were also tasked with sabotage and even offensive moves in Russia. During the cadre ML courses, the recruits are put under constant special forces scenarios for the entire 18 months. All those that go through the cadre (and the SBS), have to pass sniper training to finish the course.

Theres not a unit in the USMC (that I know of) that goes through the same training as the cadre or the SBS. The British, in general, are a lot harsher to recruits training for there special forces, and a lot fussier about who they let in. The policy from the DS training staff on SAS/SBS selections is one of discouragement, a case of 'you want to put yourself through this s**t, don't expect encouragement from me'. It shows in the number of those that serve in the special forces, theres only about 750 soldiers in all the British special forces.

Den

59 posted on 03/22/2002 6:56:57 PM PST by dennybabyboy-fitzy
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To: My Identity
...few enemy bodies despite "hundreds killed", etc.

Considering some of the weapons we're using, there isn't much left to see.

60 posted on 03/22/2002 7:04:55 PM PST by grimalkin
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