Posted on 03/17/2002 2:25:49 PM PST by Mom_Grandmother
Is It Possible, Could America Have Won the Vietnam War In '1968?
By '1968, North Vietnamese morale was at it's lowest point ever. The plans for "Tet" '68 was their last desperate attempt to achieve a success, in an effort to boost the NVA morale. When it was over, General Giap (Senior General Vo Njuyen Giap) and NVA viewed the Tet '68 offensive as a "failure", they were on their knees and had prepared to negotiate a "surrender."
At the time, there were fewer than 10,000 U.S. casualties, the Vietnam War was about to end, as the NVA was prepared to accept their defeat. Then, they heard "Walter Cronkite" (former CBS News anchor and correspondent) on TV proclaiming the success of the Tet '68 offensive by the NVA. They were completely and totall amazed at hearing tha the US Embassy had been overrun. In reality, the NVA had not gained access to the Embassy--there were some VC who had been killed on the grassy lawn, but they hadn't gained access. Further reports indicated that riots and protesting on the streets of America.
According to General Giap, these distorted reports were insperational to the NVA. They changed their plans from a negotiated surrender and decided instead, they only needed to persevere for one more hour, day, week, month, eventually the protesters in America would help them to achieve a victory they knew they could not win on the battlefield.
Remember, this decision was made at a time when the U.S. casualties were fewer than 10,000, at the end of '1967, beginning of '1968. Today, there were 58,000 names on the Vietnam Wall Memorial that was built with the donations made by the American public.
Although General Giap did not mention each and every protester's name in his book, many of us will never forget the 58,000 names on the Wall. We will also never forget that names of those who helped in placing those additional 48,000 names there: Jane Fonda, Tom Hayden, Walter Cronkite, and other's.
Gene Kuentzler, '66-67, S-3 Operations 19th Combat Engineer Battalion
Bingo.
Livin' In a Marxist Paradise
I knew an an ARVN Major, a District Chief, who had been fighting the same war for seventeen years. I knew an ARVN 1Lt, a Company Commander, whose troops shed their weapons and uniforms and fled south with their women and children. The 1LT stayed and progressively collapsed his perimeter, popping claymores and finally his command bunker. When morning came he was dead along with about 70 of his pajama-clad countrymen.
So you can't paint them all with the same brush.
Close but not quite. Indochina was a loose federation consisting of Laos, Cambodia, and three areas (pays) of what had been Vietnam: Cochin China, Annam, and Tonkin. The latter three were much more closely associated (by language along with culture) with each other than with Cambodia or Laos. After WWII the French created the Republic of Cochin China made up of all these areas under the aegis of a French union. In 1950 the French saw the handwriting on the wall that it was over as far as a colonialism as so brought back the Bao Dai as head of the State of Vietnam. Unfortunately for the French, the Bao Dai was more interested in partying it up and spent most of the rest of the war in a resort town.
Of course the USA didn't learn from the mistakes of the French and supported another incompetent government and leaders.
I'm not but unfortunately corruption and incompetence was widespread in the ARVN, particularly at the higher levels.
Okay, they negotiated a settlement in 1973. Then they waited two years and launched their final offensive. Hey, they weren't going anywhere but we were (home). Time was on their side. No way we would keep going back over and over and over again.
Where we had enthusiastic allies: Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Also the Iraqi army, including the much heralded Republican Guard, were demoralized compared to the high morale of the NVA.
McClellan had the exact Confederate battle plans in his possession at Antietam but it still ended up in a standoff, not full victory. Lincoln fired him again after that battle.
Keep in mind that Tet was designed to decimate the southern cadres as much as it was to attack the US.
Hence when final victory did arrive,(achieved by a NORTHERN army )the leadership all had to come from the north,surprise!
Also it wasn't till Nixon mined Haiphong harbor that the north finally came to the bargining table.
That's my memory and I'm sticking to it.
Well, you may be right, I know I couldn't win any war. You have a good evening.
Correct. Peace accords were signed, the POWs were released, and there was peace for a couple of years....until the NVA launched another attack and won. Bottom line, time was on North Vietnam's side. They were willing to wait for however many years it took to win. We weren't.
I trust you are not arguing that McClellan had the Confederate battle plans to fight the battle of Antietam, because the Confederates had no intention to fight there.
If you are asking the age-old question why McClellan didn't use all of his forces at Antietam, consider -- immediately preceding this campaign, at Second Manassas, Lee had divided his army. When Pope was attacking Jackson, Longstreet came from nowhere (from Pope's perspective) and nearly crushed his Army of Virginia.
Now, McClellan has plans showing that Longstreet is in the Boonsboro/Hagerstown region, and Jackson is at Harpers Ferry. Northern troops heard the bombardment of Harpers Ferry conclude, and correctly concluded that Harpers Ferry has fallen. The question arises -- where is Jackson, and is he going to hit McClellan on the flank just as Longstreet hit Pope? As it turns out, the answer is no -- but how is McClellan to know this for sure. If the Army of the Potomac loses at Antietam, then the war may be over.
FYI, my West Point atlas of American Wars states that Lee commanded 55,000 on September 7, 1862, following Second Manassas, but only 40,000 on September 16, 1862, at Antietam. Thus McClellan (even at the end of the battle) could reasonably conclude that there were additional troops which hadn't been heard from.
So why didn't McClellan handle his troops better at Antietam? Little known fact. In the Peninsular campaign, McClellan had four corps commanders. Two months later, at Antietam, he had six -- only two of which had been corps commanders before Richmond. Basically, after Second Manassas, the remnants of two separate armies were thrown together in order to defeat Lee. It is hardly a reasonable criticism of McClellan to make him solely responsible for the disorganized nature of the attack.
I hold no brief for McClellan. However, I get tired of the same criticisms being regurgitated again and again by lazy historians who demonstrate no reasoned analysis of the situation. Besides which, it is always necessary to demonize McClellan for running against Lincoln in 1864.
After Nixon abolished the draft, it became academic. Nixon was more concerned with getting the student protestors off the back of his neck and getting out than he was on winning. We could have won it, but not without the political will and the total commitment of the administration that both the Johnson and Nixon presidencies lacked.
If anything good came out of it, it would be the low casualties of the Gulf War in achieving a tactical victory in Kuwait, and a similar approach (thus far) in the war on terrorism.
We still need to learn the not-so-gentle art of closing things out though.
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.