But the issue isn't physical defects, it's that he doesn't like something, which would be more like hating flying. To say that human nature contains constants doesn't mean different people don't have different natures. The Republic, of course, includes discussions of different types of natures. Plato thought the best life was the philosophical one, but not everyone has a nature to enjoy philosophy. They're necessary, of course, for the city to exist; otherwise, you'd have no craftsmen. So there's no reason someone can't have a nature such that they don't like children. It may be that the highest nature would want children (although you've said otherwise), but that hasn't been shown.
What if my taste runs to raping and murdering virgins? It's my choice, and what's best for you has little if any bearing on what's best for me.
In that case, the big issue would be your victims.
You and I both know at bottom that position is ridiculous.
Sure, but that's not the position being discussed.
Your argument only applies in matters of taste. Children are not a matter of taste, but some are not suited to raising children, just as some have not the vision to become pilots or the wits to become mathematicians.
But it is a matter of taste. A person who hates flying has a nature unsuited to being a pilot, even if he can see perfectly. It may be that the best life is that of a pilot, but the nature of someone who hates flying cannot share in the joys of it, and the best life for him is something else.
I prefer the physical defect analogy, because flying is not essential to the human experience; fear of something secondary doesn't portray the difference--but your analogy is superior I should think in that one can overcome a dislike of children, whereas blindness is (for the time being) rather permanent.
that's not the position being discussed
It was an impediment to the discussion I felt necessary to address.
A person who hates flying has a nature unsuited to being a pilot, even if he can see perfectly. It may be that the best life is that of a pilot, but the nature of someone who hates flying cannot share in the joys of it, and the best life for him is something else.
The analogy gets a little hazy, I think, when we consider how that a person with perfect vision (i.e., one perfectly capable of raising children) with a fear of flying (i.e., doesn't like kids) relates to the issue at hand: wouldn't someone perfectly suited to raising children wish to do so? If not, why wouldn't they?
So there's no reason someone can't have a nature such that they don't like children. It may be that the highest nature would want children...but that hasn't been shown.
I agree, people can have a nature unsuited to childbearing, just as they can be unsuited to philosophy. But I and Plato both stress that the lives which can't partake of the respective goods, while possibly best for the parties involved, are inferior compared with those that can, which is the point I have been stressing from the beginning, I think. As far as "showing" that childbearing is better, if you mean "proving on the basis of reason alone" I don't think that's possible--if you don't get why raising kids is a joy, there's no way I can convince you of it; but that is not to say that I'll allow someone to argue unchallenged that being willingly barren is just as good.
...(although you've said otherwise)...
Indeed I have; but as a matter of prudence ;) I would say that people who would choose the highest life of service need not me to defend the good of childbearing for them.