So it looks like the Confederacy was worse than Mao's China or Franco's Spain at least in this respect, that it did not trust to law and diplomacy but chose the path of force, as did Indonesia in East Timor, India in Goa and Germany in Danzig. A bit more patience, statesmanship and foresight and you could have had independence and all the troubles it would have brought between classes and races and competing states and confederations or you could have arranged things within the Union to your satisfaction.
The Confederacy had suceeded in getting most of the federal installations evacuated. They could have existed and built a nation leaving a token federal post intact until a more general settlement had been reached. Given all that it took to defeat the Confederacy, it would be a mistake to think that Sumter and its small garrison posed a real threat to the Confederacy.
But it wasn't to be. Either Davis wanted a war to consolidate his power and pull the upper South into his orbit, or the Confederates were simply betrayed by their own overheated rhetoric, or both. This failure is pretty typical of the movement, for it was always "our sovereignty" and "our rights" raised to absolutes at the expense of other people's rights and freedoms. It was always a crisis demanding immediate action, and never a question of patient work towards a goal. And then when things go wrong, it's the cries of victimization. Those who bait bears or wrestle with lions, shouldn't be surprised if they get mauled.
There is one kind of rhetoric one uses in fighting against a real oppressor, and another that one uses in trying to get a "civil divorce" from a relationship that isn't working. The problem then, and the problem now, is that Southern nationalists have always used the first language -- the language of oppression and victimization and "no alternative" -- when that hardly described their real situation. Defeat in the war only convinced some that the language of victimization and oppression was the right one, and that was exactly the wrong lesson to learn.
In any event, these debates have been going around and around without any resolution achieved or any in sight. Something new comes up sometimes, but for the most part the arguments and assertions are already familiar to all and haven't had much effect.
They were between a rock and a hard place.
Walt
That's nice and all, but unless Lincoln was offering as a gesture of good faith to defend the ports of his neighbor to the south, your said function of those forts of providing common defense was not an issue in 1861, meaning Lincoln's troops had no purpose being there other than one of disingenuous nature.
And Sumter was built by the federal government using stone shipped in to create an Island.
Sure it was, but where is it said that when a country literally splits into two halves, one half gets to keep ALL of that country's federal possessions including those located in the other half, while that second half gets nothing? Common sense dictates that the half in which property X lies gets to keep property X, especially considering that the other half has no _legitimate_ practical use of a military installment inside of its counterpart.
A bit of consideration of the complexities of the situation would have been advisable, rather than resorting to force.
Ideally, yes. But considering that Lincoln indicated early on that he was of the uncompromisable position that the north gets to keep all, and the south gets nothing, such consideration of those complexities was not feasible.
So it looks like the Confederacy was worse than Mao's China or Franco's Spain at least in this respect, that it did not trust to law and diplomacy but chose the path of force
How so? The confederacy only resorted to force after the other side indicated that no ammount of diplomacy would facilitate the turnover of the property. South Carolina actively attempted to arrange the peaceful turnover of the fort from Anderson from December 1860 until April of 1861, and only resorted to force after Lincoln sent a fleet of three warships to "provision" the fort with military supplies and troops. In other words, they actively tried negotiation, but the other side was simply unwilling to negotiate.
A bit more patience, statesmanship and foresight and you could have had independence
Could it have? Even though Lincoln asserted a position that he would never permit independence and would fight a war to stop it? And even though Lincoln's only response to attempted southern negotiation of the turnover of the fort was to send a fleet of warships to increase that fort's garrison?
The Confederacy had suceeded in getting most of the federal installations evacuated.
Indeed, except for the one blocking the entrance to one of their single most important ports.
They could have existed and built a nation leaving a token federal post intact until a more general settlement had been reached.
As I asked earlier, what settlement would that have been? Had they simply left Sumter as it was prior to April, they would have effectively been sitting there watching while Lincoln sailed war fleets into the harbor and stocked the thing full of men and weapons. Cause that is exactly what Lincoln was trying to do when the confederates opened fire.
Given all that it took to defeat the Confederacy, it would be a mistake to think that Sumter and its small garrison posed a real threat to the Confederacy.
What makes you think that Lincoln would not have attempted a march on Richmond anyway had sumter been left alone and ignored? He certainly indicated that was what he wanted to do.
Either Davis wanted a war to consolidate his power and pull the upper South into his orbit, or the Confederates were simply betrayed by their own overheated rhetoric, or both.
False dilemma. You neglect a contributing factor possibility, namely that Lincoln literally provoked the confederates into firing.