ALL the actions in the McCollum memo were logical and to be expected ANYWAY: if you are expecting a tense situation, you FORWARD DEPLOY the fleet. Of course it went to Hawaii. Duh!
Second, Stinnett lies in claiming to "uncover" new information about radio traffic. In fact, there was no traffic to uncover, as I and other have shown. There WERE constant, ongoing transmissions from JAPAN, but not by ships at sea, and if you read Stinnett closely, you'll see that he has no evidence whatsoever on this. He has two transmissions dated BEFORE the fleet left. Wow. That's a shocker.
Third, Stinnett banks on the fact that you don't know the difference between an interception, a decrypt, a translation, and an analysis. EVEN IF ALL FOUR of these conditions are met, you STILL have no proof that any info reached FDR. But in fact, Stinnett doesn't have proof that ANY of the four conditions were met before Dec. 7, and we know for a fact that the translation and analysis wasn't done until 1945 in most cases.
Bomb plots, light signals (ending Dec. 6th), Japanese spy in consulate. FBI and Washington knew. Did Kimmel/Short???
Where is JD #7001 (Japanese Dispatch #7001)? Layton shows index with it missing. SRH-051 (declassified March 11, 1980 interview) has Briggs recalling he intercepted it [People were on "alert" to look for same you may recall]. Safford says he saw it; Kramer changed his mind, and Clausen proved it never existed. Don't forget Lt. Linn's comments, also.
After Toland's Postscript (second edition) ... SS Lurline radio log got "legs" out of the Archives.
And did Nave and Mortimer get it "right" on FECB's success in breaking Japanese naval codes? What happened to those British warships (Repulse, Prince of Wales)? Was the delay in intercept/decypher/ ... four (4) hours too long a time to save them ... or just poor CAP? ... Comments?