Representative John Bingham 1862 (Cong. Globe, 37th, 2nd Sess., pg 1639 (1862):
Nothing said in 1862 by anyone was in reference to the text of the citizenship clause of the 14th Amendment.
“I find no fault with the introductory clause [S 61 Bill],
S-61 was not the 14th Amendment of 1868.
The Civil Rights bill of 1866 was introduced by Senator Lyman Trumbull. Anything anyone, including John Bingham, mumbled about the Civil Rights Act is irrelevant to the 14th Amendment.
Representative John Bingham of Ohio, considered the father of the 14th Amendment....
... had nothing whatsoever to do with the citizenship clause which was drafted and proposed in the Senate by Senator Jacob Howard.
http://memory.loc.gov/ll/llcg/059/0600/06811639.gif [dead link]In 1866 while introducing the bill H.R. 127 (14th Amendment) Jacob M. Howard (Author of the Citizenship clause) states:
The Fourteenth Amendment was proposed with a Joint Resolution, June 16, 1866. Here you have a Senator introducing a House Resolution which was really a Joint Resolution. Senator Howaard wrote an amendment to the Amendment, adding a citizenship clause.
14 Stat. 27 (9 Apr 1866)
CHAP. XXXI. — An Act to protect all Persons in the United States in their Civil Rights, and furnish the Means of their Vindication. April 9, 1866.
H.R. 127, Joint Resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, May 10, 1866Reconstruction of the Union
After the Civil War, Congress and the executive branch struggled over when and how to bring the former Confederate states back into the Union. The Joint Committee on Reconstruction—established by Congress in December 1865 to investigate under what terms the seceded states should regain their congressional representation—strongly disagreed with President Andrew Johnson’s efforts toward quick readmission. After a yearlong study, the fifteen-member committee outlined qualifications for readmission, including ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
The CG is in the process of being moved, or it has been moved. Old links do not work, and not much at the new site for searching or navigating works.
Rep. John Bingham introduced the 14th Amendment legislation in the House of Representatives, February 28th, 1866, absent any citizenship clause. Sen. Jacob Howard introduced his amendment to Bingham's draft, adding the citizenship clause, May 23, 1866.
As shown by the introduction of the 14A citizenship clause by Mr. Howard, his intent of the clause was quite clear and specific.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The question is on the amendments proposed by the Senator from Michigan, [Mr. Howard.]Mr. HOWARD. The first amendment is to section one, declaring that "all persons born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the States wherein they reside." I do not propose to say anything on that subject except that the question of citizenship has been so fully discussed in this body as not to need any further elucidation, in my opinion. This amendment which I have offered is simply declaratory of what I regard as the law of the land already, that every person born within the limits of the United States, and subject to their jurisdiction, is by virtue of natural law and national law a citizen of the United States. This will not, of course, include persons born in the United States who are foreigners, aliens, who belong to the families of ambassadors or foreign ministers accredited to the Government of the United States, but will include every other class of persons. It settles the great question of citizenship and removes all doubt as to what persons are or are not citizens of the United States. This has long been a great desideratum in the jurisprudence and legislation of this country.
Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 US 511, 519 (1993), Scalia, J., concurring
The greatest defect of legislative history is its illegitimacy.We are governed by laws, not by the intentions of legislators. As the Court said in 1844: "The law as it passed is the will of the majority of both houses, and the only mode in which that will is spoken is in the act itself...." Aldridge v. Williams, 3 How. 9, 24 (emphasis added). But not the least of the defects of legislative history is its indeterminacy. If one were to search for an interpretive technique that, on the whole, was more likely to confuse than to clarify, one could hardly find a more promising candidate than legislative history. And the present case nicely proves that point.
Judge Harold Leventhal used to describe the use of legislative history as the equivalent of entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the guests for one's friends.
One problem with with quoting what some Framers discussed is that the people never ratified Framer discussions. They ratified the black letter text of the Constitution itself. Neither Framers nor the Federal legislature ratified the Constitution or any of its amendments. That was done by States.
The purported intent of the lawgiver is irrelevant if the actual words of the law have a clear meaning. The words prevail even where the lawgiver's words are contrary to his intent. This is even so with legislation where the legislators voted to pass legislation. The words are ratified or passed into law, the intent is not.
Ex Parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 86, 108-09 (1925)
The language of the Constitution cannot be interpreted safely except by reference to the common law and to British institutions as they were when the instrument was framed and adopted. The statesmen and lawyers of the Convention who submitted it to the ratification of the Conventions of the thirteen States, were born and brought up in the atmosphere of the common law, and thought and spoke in its vocabulary. They were familiar with other forms of government, recent and ancient, and indicated in their discussions earnest study and consideration of many of them, but when they came to put their conclusions into the form of fundamental law in a compact draft, they expressed them in terms of the common law, confident that they could be shortly and easily understood.
"A Matter of Interpretation," Federal Courts and the Law, by Antonin Scalia, 1997. This book contains an essay by Antonin Scalia and responses to that essay by professors Ronald Dworkin, Mary Ann Glendon, Laurence Tribe, and Gordon Wood. There is a final response by Antonin Scalia.
Laurence Tribe, pp. 65-6
Let me begin with my principal area of agreement with Justice Scalia. Like him, I believe that when we ask what a legal text means — what it requires of us, what it permits us to do, and what it forbids — we ought not to be inquiring (except perhaps very peripherally) into the ideas, intentions, or expectations subjectively held by whatever particular persons were, as a historical matter, involved in drafting, promulgating, or ratifying the text in question. To be sure, those matters, when reliably ascertainable, might shed some light on otherwise ambiguous or perplexing words or phrases - by pointing us, as readers, toward the linguistic frame of reference within which the people to whom those words or phrases were addressed would have "translated" and thus understood them. But such thoughts and beliefs can never substitute for what was in fact enacted as law. Like Justice Scalia, I never cease to be amazed by the arguments of judges, lawyers, or others who proceed as though legal texts were little more than interesting documentary evidence of what some lawgiver had in mind. And, like the justice, I find little to commend the proposition that anyone ought, in any circumstances I can imagine, to feel legally bound to obey another's mere wish or thought, or legally bound to act in accord with another's mere hope or fear.
Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. 9, 24 (1845)
In expounding this law, the judgment of the Court cannot in any degree be influenced by the construction placed upon it by individual members of Congress in the debate which took place on its passage nor by the motives or reasons assigned by them for supporting or opposing amendments that were offered. The law as it passed is the will of the majority of both houses, and the only mode in which that will is spoken is in the act itself, and we must gather their intention from the language there used, comparing it, when any ambiguity exists, with the laws upon the same subject and looking, if necessary, to the public history of the times in which it was passed.
United States v Union Pacific Railroad Company, 91 U.S. 72 (1875)
In construing an act of Congress, we are not at liberty to recur to the views of individual members in debate nor to consider the motives which influenced them to vote for or against its passage. The act itself speaks the will of Congress, and this is to be ascertained from the language used. But courts, in construing a statute, may with propriety recur to the history of the times when it was passed, and this is frequently necessary in order to ascertain the reason as well as the meaning of particular provisions in it. Aldridge v. Williams, 3 How. 24; Preston v. Browder, 1 Wheat. 115, 120 [argument of counsel -- omitted].
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 254 (1901)
In expounding this law, the judgment of the Court cannot in any degree be influenced by the construction placed upon it by individual members of Congress in the debate which took place on its passage nor by the motives or reasons assigned by them for supporting or opposing amendments that were offered. The law as it passed is the will of the majority of both houses, and the only mode in which that will is spoken is in the act itself, and we must gather their intention from the language there used, comparing it, when any ambiguity exists, with the laws upon the same subject and looking, if necessary, to the public history of the times in which it was passed.
There is no possibility of entering your psychoanalysis of Congress into any litigation. Your citations and quotes generally have nothig whatever to do with the text of the 14th Amendment. Bingham had nothing whatever to do with the drafting or entering or congressional debate of the citizenship clause of the 14th Amendment.
The Act of May 24, 1934, regarding American births in Panama, gave birth citizenship to children of Americans born "outside the territory and jurisdiction of the United States." It was meant to capture all those not captured by the 14th Amendment, "born within the territory and jurisdiction of the United States." The intent was clear as was the plain text of the words. However, children born in the Canal Zone were born outside the territory of the United States, but within the jurisdiction of the United States, as pursuant to treaty, the United States exercised jurisdiction within the CZ "as if" it were the sovereign.
Rep. John Sparkman explained in 1937, "the Canal Zone is not such foreign territory as to come under the law of 1855 and, on the other hand, it is not part of the United States which would bring it within the fourteenth amendment." Congress passed the Act of Aug. 4, 1937 granting citizenship to "[a]ny person born in the Canal Zone on or after February 26, 1904" who had at least one U.S. citizen parent.
Words are adopted; intent is not. If there is a clear meaning to the words adopted, intent is not relevant.
The Courts have spoken regarding the term, "subject to their jurisdiction." It means subject to United States laws. Persons not subject to United States laws could come on your property, kill your dog, rape your wife, shoot you in the nads, and would only face the legal consequence of deportation. He would not be subject to prosecution for lack of jurisdiction before any U.S. state or federal court.
You may not like Court opinions, but your muttering about irrelevant, or out of context, quotes of Bingham are legally meaningless.
In re Wong Kim Ark, 71 Fed. 382, 386 (1896)
The fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States must be controlling upon the question presented for decision in this matter, irrespective of what the common-law or international doctrine is. But the interpretation thereof is undoubtedly confused and complicated by the existence of these two doctrines, in view of the ambiguous and uncertain meaning of the qualifying phrase, “subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” which renders it a debatable question as to which rule the provision was intended to declare. Whatever of doubt there may be is with respect to the interpretation of that phrase. Does it mean “subject to the laws of the United States,” comprehending, in this expression, the allegiance that aliens owe in a foreign country to obey its laws; or does it signify, “to be subject to the political jurisdiction of the United States,” in the sense that is contended for on the part of the government? This question was ably and thoroughly considered in Re Look Tin Sing, supra, where it was held that it meant subject to the laws of the United States.
In re Look Tin Sing, 21 Federal Reporter 905, 906, Circuit Court, D. California, September 29, 1884
The first section of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution declares that "all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States, and of the state wherein they reside." This language would seem to be sufficiently broad to cover the case of the petitioner. He is a person born in the United States. Any doubt on the subject, if there can be any, must arise out of the words "subject to the jurisdiction thereof." They alone are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States who are within their dominions and under the protection of their laws, and with the consequent obligation to obey them when obedience can be rendered; and only those thus subject by their birth or naturalization are within the terms of the amendment. The jurisdiction over these latter must, at the time, be both actual and exclusive. The words mentioned except from citizenship children born in the United States of persons engaged in the diplomatic service of foreign governments, such as ministers and ambassadors, whose residence, by a fiction of public law, is regarded as part of their own country. This ex-territoriality of their residence secures to their children born here all the rights and privileges which would inure to them had they been born in the country of their parents.
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2755257/PA-TedCruzruling.pdf
Elliot v. Cruz, 137 A3d 646 (Pa Cmmw Ct 2016)
Having extensively reviewed all articles cited in this opinion, as well as many others, this Court holds, consistent with the common law precedent and statutory history, that a “natural born citizen” includes any person who is a United States citizen from birth.Accordingly, because he was a citizen of the United States from birth, Ted Cruz is eligible to serve as President of the United States, and the objection filed by Carmon Elliott to the Nomination Petition of Ted Cruz is denied.