I would like to offer a theory on the 2 Carrier Strike Groups in the Eastern Mediterranean and how potentially vulnerable they might be.
First Hamas will never be eliminated, Israel could kill every Hamas Terrorist in Gaza and in a few years, they would rebuild with new Muslims and keep fighting, until Iran is eliminated nothing will change.
Over the years we’ve seen a number of attacks that would have been considered impossible the day before the attack happened, Dec 7 1941, Sept 11 2001, the attack last Saturday by Hamas.
IMO, the US Navy Strike Groups were built to fight off a naval attack, thru submarines, surface ships, enemy air attacks, anti-ship missiles, etc...
What if the attack on a Carrier was conducted in a manner that was never conceived possible in the past, using assets that are not conventional military.
This is just one scenario I have thought of, suppose a commercial civilian airliner took off from a nearby Muslim country, maybe Emirates Air, Etihad, or some other Muslim Airline, flown by experience Muslim pilots. The plane is squawking as a passenger airliner flying over the eastern Med.
On a clear day, a US Navy Carrier could be seen from 25-30,000 ft, by a Boeing 757 or Airbus A340 or larger jet, fully loaded with fuel traveling at 400-500 mph.
At that speed how long would it take for a plane to reach the surface potentially hitting the carrier in a Kamikaze style attack, maybe 1-2 minutes max.
Certainly the carrier would be tracking the plance, how long would it take for the carrier to take evasive action or launch a counter attack to take down the plane before it hit.
A 30-second delay would be catastrophic. The plane is a passenger jet, it might delay the reaction long enough to allow the jet to hit.
My point, a conventional military attack on a Carrier Strike Group would be impossible, a totally unconventional attack by an enemy who has no problem dying to carry an attack on the USA could succeed.
The Vincennes shot down Iran Air Flight 655.
As far as eliminating Hamas there are some positive aspects to killing off the original members and leadership, the original structure, what follows is rarely as good, and all the killing makes recruitment harder and less selective, if Israel really wipes out Hamas and their civilian support and the city, then that makes it harder for Hamas to get civilian support in the future.
You can still get terrorist members and still get civilian support, but when people see what happens to it all, they will try to avoid helping and would rather the terrorist group move somewhere else. People get skittish and less cooperative, sources dry up, and suppliers and networks grow more wary and expensive.