So the president is not considered an officer of the United States?
Not under the stipulations of the 14th Amendment which CLEARLY excludes him.
What Barnes didn’t mention was that to include the “President” as an office would have lent legitimacy to Jeff Davis. To the drafter of the 14th, the only “President” was Lincoln and, by extension, unfortunately, Johnson. But no, not under this definition. Law clearly looks at precision in wording . . . when it works right.
It seems preposterous to assert that the President in NOT an Officer of the United States, when Article II of the Constitution repeatedly mentions the “Office of President”, “removal from Office, etc.
The simplest reason the 14th A is inapplicable is that Trump has never been found guilty of insurrection, despite a Congressional impeachment inquiry about the J6 events. That was the time or never.
So the president is not considered an officer of the United States?
No, the President is most definitely NOT an "officer of the United States." As explicitly stated in two Supreme Court opinions, an officer of the United States is an appointed position. No elected official is an officer of the United States. 14A, §3 does not apply to the President. I also made this point here on another thread on 8/25/2023. "Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution, known as “the Appointments Clause,” states how federal officers must be appointed."
See the applicable Supreme Court opinions below.
https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep124/usrep124303/usrep124303.pdf
United States v Mouat, 124 US 303, 307 (1888)
What is necessary to constitute a person an officer of the United States, in any of the various branches of its service, has 'been very fully considered by this court in United States v. Gernaine, 99 U. S. 508. In that. case, it was distinctly pointed out that, under the Constitution of the United States, all its officers were appointed by the President, By and with the consent of the Senate, or by a court of law, or the head of a Department; and the heads of the Departments were defined in that opinion to be what are now called the members of the Cabinet. Unless a person in the service of the Government, therefore, holds his place by virtue of an appointment by the President, or of one of the courts of justice or heads of Departments authorized by law to make such an appointment, he is not, strictly speaking, an officer of the United States.
https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep099/usrep099508a/usrep099508a.pdf
United States v Germaine, 99 US 508, 509-510 (1878)
The argument is that provision is here made for the appointment of all officers of the United States, and that defendant, not being appointed in either of the modes here mentioned, is not an ofcer, though he may be an agent or employ6 working for the government and paid by it, as nine-tenths of the persons rendering service to the government undoubtedly are, without thereby becoming its officers.The Constitution for purposes of appointment very clearly divides all its officers into two classes. The primary class requires a nomination by the President and confirmation by the Senate. But foreseeing that when offices became numerous, and sudden removals necessary, this mode might be inconvenient, it was provided that, in regard to officers inferior to those specially mentioned, Congress might by law vest their appointment in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments. That all persons who can be said to hold an office under the government about to be established under the Constitution were intended to be included within one or the other of these modes of appointment there can be but little doubt. This Constitution is the supreme law of the land, and no act of Congress is of any validity which does not rest on authority conferred by that instrument. It is, therefore, not to be supposed that Congress, when enacting a criminal law for the punishment of officers of the United States, intended to punish any one not appointed in one of those modes. If the punishment were designed for others than officers as defined by the Constitution, words to that effect would be used, as servant, agent, person in the service or employment of the government; and this has been done where it was so intended, as in the sixteenth section of the act of 1846, concerning embezzlement, by which any officer or agent of the United States, and all persons participating in the act, are made liable. 9 Stat. 59.
As the defendant here was not appointed by the President or by a court of law, it remains to inquire if the Commissioner of Pensions, by whom he was appointed, is the head of a department, within the meaning of the Constitution, as is argued by the counsel for plaintiffs.