Au contraire mon frere. It may be "irrelevant" to the way the ridiculously pompous legal system views things, but those of us who are interested in real and actual truth can point out it's relevancy with ease.
It informs us that the Justices were aware there were two different standards, and that the one standard was certainly correct, while about the other there was doubt.
As information it is quite beneficial. They were not exhibiting the modern legal malady of undeserved certainty.
Being born a citizen is the definition of a natural born citizen.
I forget. Have I shown you Rogers v. Bellei yet?
Au contraire mon frere. It may be "irrelevant" to the way the ridiculously pompous legal system views things, but those of us who are interested in real and actual truth can point out it's relevancy with ease.
Take the bullflop of your imagination to coourt and lose.
I forget. Have I shown you Rogers v. Bellei yet?
You have only shown me your mental health challenges.
Rogers v. Bellei? I remember your description well. That was the one where the Chief Justice, for a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court, pronounced from the bench that the Court had struck down the Fourteenth Amendment, Article I, Section 1, Clause 1 as being repugnant to a book on The Law of Nations, and that jurisdiction over U.S. citizenship issues resided at court at The Hague, Netherlands.
The Law of Nations is the old fashion term for International Law. The magical book was written by by an Austrian who wrote it in French and then died before the colonies declared independence.
Do I recall your description correctly?
Outside your Court of the Imagination™ I find the following:
https://fam.state.gov/fam/08fam/08fam010203.html
8 FAM 102.3-8 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTORY CONDITIONS SUBSEQUENT FOR RETENTION OF CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY BIRTH ABROAD (ROGERS V. BELLEI)(CT:CITZ-57; 06-07-2021)
a. In Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971) the court upheld the constitutionality of the retention provisions of former section 301(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
b. The court found that:
Congress has the power to impose the condition subsequent of residence in this country on appellee, who does not come within the Fourteenth Amendment's definition of citizens as those 'born or naturalized in the United States,' and its imposition is not unreasonable, arbitrary, or unlawful.c. In Rogers v. Bellei, however, the court held that the constitutional definition of citizenship in the 14th Amendment does not include persons who acquired citizenship by birth abroad to a citizen parent. This definition was:
"one restricted to the combination of three factors, each and all significant: birth in the United States, naturalization in the United States, and subjection to the jurisdiction of the United States."d. The court held:
"The plan thus adopted by Congress with respect to a person of this classification was to bestow citizenship at birth but to take it away upon the person's failure to comply with a post-age-14 and pre-age-28 residential requirement. It is deprival of citizenship, once bestowed, that is under attack here."****
"Of initial significance . . . is the Fourteenth Amendment's opening sentence: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." The central fact, in our weighing of the plaintiff's claim to continuing and therefore current United States citizenship, is that he was born abroad. He was not born in the United States. He was not naturalized in the United States. And he has not been subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. All this being so, it seems indisputable that the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment has no application to plaintiff Bellei. He simply is not a Fourteenth-Amendment-first-sentence citizen . . . . The plaintiff's claim thus must center in the statutory power of Congress and in the appropriate exercise of that power within the restrictions of any pertinent constitutional provisions other than the Fourteenth Amendment's first sentence."
****
"A contrary holding would convert what is congressional generosity into something unanticipated and obviously undesired by the Congress. Our National Legislature indulged the foreign-born child with presumptive citizenship, subject to subsequent satisfaction of a reasonable residence requirement, rather than to deny him citizenship outright, as concededly it had the power to do, and relegate the child, if he desired American citizenship, to the more arduous requirements of the usual naturalization process. The plaintiff here would force the Congress to choose between unconditional conferment of United States citizenship at birth and deferment of citizenship until a condition precedent is fulfilled. We are not convinced that the Constitution requires so rigid a choice. If it does, the congressional response seems obvious.
. . . Neither are we persuaded that a condition subsequent in this area impresses one with 'second-class citizenship.' That cliche is too handy and too easy, and, like most cliches, can be misleading. That the condition subsequent may be beneficial is apparent in the light of the conceded fact that citizenship to this plaintiff was fully deniable. The proper emphasis is on what the statute permits him to gain from the possible starting point of non-citizenship, not on what he claims to lose from the possible starting point of full citizenship to which he has no constitutional right in the first place. His citizenship, while it lasts, although conditional, is not 'second-class.'"
e. The court summarized:
“the statutory pattern, therefore, developed and expanded from (a) one, established in 1790 and enduring through the Revised Statutes and until 1934, where citizenship was specifically denied to the child born abroad of a father who never resided in the United States; to (b), in 1907, a governmental protection condition for the child born of an American citizen father and residing abroad, dependent upon a declaration of intent and the oath of allegiance at majority; to (c), in 1934, a condition, for the child born abroad of one United States citizen parent and one alien parent, of five years' continuous residence in the United States before age 18 and the oath of allegiance within six months after majority; to (d), in 1940, a condition, for that child, of five years' residence here, not necessarily continuous, between ages 13 and 21; to (e), in 1952, a condition, for that child, of five years' continuous residence here, with allowance, between ages 14 and 28. Thus, in summary, it may be said fairly that, for the most part, each successive statute, as applied to a foreign-born child of one United States citizen parent, moved in a direction of leniency for the child.”