Who cares? He was *NOT* a member of the Constitutional convention, nor a Delegate to any State ratifying convention, so he has no first hand knowledge of what they meant by "citizen."
It is based upon the assumption that there was a known rule of law, ascertaining who were native citizens of the United States; and as has already been shown that there was no such rule known, except that of the common law.
He should have read that Pennsylvania law book. It would have made him aware of the rule.
Defaulting to the common law out of ignorance is not a good result. Perhaps had he attended one of the conventions, he would have been better informed as to what they meant when they said "natural born citizen."
Judgment and Decision Making. Vol. Id. No. 6. November 21) 15. pp. 549-563On the reception and detection of pseudo-profound bullshit
Gordon Pennycook* James Allan Cheyne† Nathaniel Barr‡ Derek J. Koehler† Jonathan A. Fugelsang†
Abstract
Although bullshit is common in everyday life and has attracted attention from philosophers, its reception (critical or ingenuous) has not, to our knowledge, been subject to empirical investigation. Here we locus on pseudo-profound bullshit, which consists of seemingly impressive assertions that are presented as true and meaningful but are actually vacuous. We presented participants with bullshit statements consisting of buzzwords randomly organized into statements with syntactic structure but no discernible meaning (e.g., "Wholeness quiets infinite phenomena". Across multiple studies, the propensity to judge bullshit statements as profound was associated with a variety of conceptually relevant variables (e.g., intuitive cognitive style, supernatural belief. Parallel associations were less evident among profundity judgments for more conventionally profound (e.g.. "A wet person does not fear the rain") or mundane (e.g., "Newborn babies require constant attention") statements. These results support the idea that some people are more receptive to this type of bullshit and that detecting it is not merely a matter of indiscriminate skepticism but rather a discernment of deceptive vagueness in otherwise impressive sounding claims. Our results also suggest that a bias toward accepting statements as true may be an important component of pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity.