This is a case in which no reasonable person can accept that the legislature would make such a mistake. It therefore doesn't work as an analogy.
But if for some reason such a thing happened, and the debates on the statute showed that they were clearly specifying 65, but the final bill ended up passing with the wrong number in it, then the court, (if it ever got that far) would be right in throwing out the case because it was simply a mistake in how the law was written.
But that would require a competent intelligent judge and we have a big shortage of those in this country.
One is the rule that when the text of a statute is clear, that is the end of the matter.
That's a good rule, but that clearly isn't the case when we are referring to the 14th amendment. The original draft was clearer, but what they ended up with as the final verbiage could easily be misread into a wrong interpretation, as has been done.
Let me give you George Will's good essay on this topic.
It used to be quite easy to find, but now all a search returns is a lot of propaganda spew from the usual liars.
Ann Coulter has a good essay on this topic as well.
Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. 9, 24 (1845)
And I don't care about your citing of court cases. I don't regard "precedent" as a substitute for "first principles". (Which is the methodology used in the Scientific community.)
George Will and Ann Coulter vs.
Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. 9, 24 (1845)
In expounding this law, the judgment of the Court cannot in any degree be influenced by the construction placed upon it by individual members of Congress in the debate which took place on its passage nor by the motives or reasons assigned by them for supporting or opposing amendments that were offered. The law as it passed is the will of the majority of both houses, and the only mode in which that will is spoken is in the act itself, and we must gather their intention from the language there used, comparing it, when any ambiguity exists, with the laws upon the same subject and looking, if necessary, to the public history of the times in which it was passed.
United States v Union Pacific Railroad Company, 91 U.S. 72 (1875)
In construing an act of Congress, we are not at liberty to recur to the views of individual members in debate nor to consider the motives which influenced them to vote for or against its passage. The act itself speaks the will of Congress, and this is to be ascertained from the language used. But courts, in construing a statute, may with propriety recur to the history of the times when it was passed, and this is frequently necessary in order to ascertain the reason as well as the meaning of particular provisions in it. Aldridge v. Williams, 3 How. 24; Preston v. Browder, 1 Wheat. 115, 120 [argument of counsel -- omitted].
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 254 (1901)
In expounding this law, the judgment of the Court cannot in any degree be influenced by the construction placed upon it by individual members of Congress in the debate which took place on its passage nor by the motives or reasons assigned by them for supporting or opposing amendments that were offered. The law as it passed is the will of the majority of both houses, and the only mode in which that will is spoken is in the act itself, and we must gather their intention from the language there used, comparing it, when any ambiguity exists, with the laws upon the same subject and looking, if necessary, to the public history of the times in which it was passed.