That is your deliberately distorted view of what you want to project onto me.
The *natural law principles* that are outlined in the book are what our concept of citizenship is based on. That the book has been adopted as an authority on international law does not detract from the fact it puts forth a set of principles that follow natural law.
The Federal government uses the English common law system of law.
Except where it doesn't.
Previously, I had asked you to locate a letter written by James Madison in which he points out that the "common law" has been modified greatly by the states. I believe he also says words to the effect "had we undertaken the effort to make a distinction we would have written a "digest of laws" rather than a constitution!"
I used to have a link to it, but i've lost it. I know you can find it, and when you do, I want you to read the message James Madison is trying to impart, and take it to heart, because it clarifies where we deviated from "common law."
I believe he also mentions something about the Common Law requiring people to support the Church of England.
Nice try at making believe I was referring to the Magna Carta.
Do analogies go over your head? I never said you were referring to the Magna Carta. I simply pointed out what you were doing was *LIKE* saying we should be ruled by England if I cite the Magna Carta.
Notice I still say "Like" doesn't mean "is." Though some on your side seems to think it does.
The *natural law principles* that are outlined in the book are what our concept of citizenship is based on.
You are full of crap.
Wong Kim Ark 169 U.S. at 654
The Constitution nowhere defines the meaning of these words, either by way of inclusion or of exclusion, except in so far as this is done by the affirmative declaration that "all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States." In this, as in other respects, it must be interpreted in the light of the common law, the principles and history of which were familiarly known to the framers of the Constitution. Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162; Ex parte Wilson, 114 U. S. 417, 422; Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 624, 625; Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465. The language of the Constitution, as has been well said, could not be understood without reference to the common law. 1 Kent Com. 336; Bradley, J., in foore v. United States, 91 U. S. 270, 274.
Wong Kim Ark 169 U.S. at 655
In Minor v. Hapyersett, Chief Justice Waite, when construing, in behalf of the court, the very provision of the Fourteenth Amendment now in question, said: "The Constitution does not, in words, say who shall be natural-born citizens. Resort must be had elsewhere to ascertain that." And he proceeded to resort to the common law as an aid in the construction of this provision. 21 Wall. 161.
Wong Kim Ark 169 U.S. at 655
II. The fundamental principle of the common law with regard to English nationality was birth within the allegiance, also called "ligealty," "obedience," " faith" or "power," of the King. The principle embraced all persons born within the King's allegiance and subject to his protection. Such allegiance and protection were mutual—as expressed in the maxim, protectio trahit subjectionem, et subjectio protectionem—and were not restricted to natural-born subjects and naturalized subjects, or to those who had taken an oath of allegiance; but were predicable of aliens in amity, so long as they were within the kingdom. Children, born in England, of such aliens, were therefore natural-born subjects.
Wong Kim Ark 169 U.S. at 658
It thus clearly appears that by the law of England for the last three centuries, beginning before the settlement of this country, and continuing to the present day, aliens, while residing in the dominions possessed by the Crown of England, were within the allegiance, the obedience, the faith or loyalty, the protection, the power, the jurisdiction, of the English Sovereign; and therefore every child born in England of alien parents was a natural-born subject, unless the child of an ambassador or other diplomatic agent of a foreign State, or of an alien enemy in hostile occupation of the place where the child was born.III. The same rule was in force in all the English Colonies upon this continent down to the time of the Declaration of Independence, and in the United States afterwards, and continued to prevail under the Constitution as originally established.
Wong Kim Ark 169 U.S. at 660
"Nothing is better settled at the common law than the doctrine that the children, even of aliens, born in a country, while the parents are resident there under the protection of the government, and owing a temporary allegiance thereto, are subjects by birth." 3 Pet. 164.
3 Pet. equals 28 U.S.
It was of such a case, that Mr. Justice Story, delivering the opinion of the court, said: "The incapacities of femes covert, provided by the common law, apply to their civil rights, and are for their protection and interest. But they do not reach their political rights, nor prevent their acquiring or losing a national character. Those political rights do not stand upon the mere doctrines of municipal law, applicable to ordinary transactions, but stand upon the more general principles of the law of nations." 3 Pet. 248. This last sentence was relied on by the counsel for the United States, as showing that the question whether a person is a citizen of a particular country is to be determined, not by the law of that country, but by the principles of international law. But Mr. Justice Story certainly did not mean to suggest that, independently of treaty, there was any principle of international law which could defeat the operation of the established rule of citizenship by birth within the United States; for he referred (p. 245) to the contemporaneous opinions in Inglis v. Sailors' Snug Harbor above cited, in which this rule had been distinctly recognized, and in which he had said (p. 162) that "each government had a right to decide for itself who should be admitted or deemed citizens ;" and in his Treatise on the Conflict of Laws, published in 1834, he said that, in respect to residence in different countries or sovereignties, "there are certain principles which have been generally recognized, by tribunals administering public law, [adding, in later editions, "or the law of nations,"] as of unquestionable authority," and stated, as the first of those principles, "Persons who are born in a country are generally deemed citizens and subjects of that country." Story Conflict of Laws, § 48.
An argument that International Law applied was made and the U.S. Supreme Court rejected it.
169 U.S. at 662
Again, in Levy v. McCartee, (1832) 6 Pet. 102, 112, 113, 115, which concerned a descent cast since the American Revolution, in the State of New York, where the statute of 11 & 12 Will. III had been repealed, this court, speaking by Mr. Justice Story, held that the case must rest for its decision exclusively upon the principles of the common law; and treated it as unquestionable that by that law a child born in England of alien parents was a natural-born subject; quoting the statement of Lord Coke in Co. Lit. 8a, that "if an alien cometh into England and hath issue two sons, these, two sons are indigenae subjects born, because they are born within the realm;" and saying that such a child "was a native-born subject, according to the principles of the common law, stated by this court in McCreery v. Somerville, 9 Wheat. 354."
169 U.S. at 662
In United States v. Rhodes, (1866) Mr. Justice Swayne, sitting in the Circuit Court, said: "All persons born in the allegiance of the King are natural-born subjects, and all persons born in the allegiance of the United States are natural-born citizens. Birth and allegiance go together. Such is the rule of the common law, and it is the common law of this country, as well as of England."