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The author is a serial purveyor of legal bullshit.

Denezpi is distinguished for holding there is no double jeopardy bar to successive prosecutions by the same sovereign, provided there are different offenses being prosecuted. Federal, State and Tribal offenses are separate offenses. Their power to punish derives from wholly independent sources. "An offense defined by one sovereign are necessarily different from an offense defined by another, even when the offenses have identical elements."

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/21pdf/20-7622_ljgm.pdf

Denezpi v. United States, S. Ct. 20-7622 (June 13, 2022)

Slip Op. at 1:

JUSTICE BARRETT delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Double Jeopardy Clause protects a person from being prosecuted twice “for the same offence.” An offense defined by one sovereign is necessarily different from an offense de­fined by another, even when the offenses have identical el­ements. Thus, a person can be successively prosecuted for the two offenses without offending the Clause. We have dubbed this the “dual-sovereignty” doctrine.

This case presents a twist on the usual dual-sovereignty scenario. The mine run of these cases involves two sover­eigns, each enforcing its own law. This case, by contrast, arguably involves a single sovereign (the United States) that enforced its own law (the Major Crimes Act) after hav­ing separately enforced the law of another sovereign (the Code of the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe). Petitioner contends that the second prosecution violated the Double Jeopardy Clause because the dual-sovereignty doctrine requires that the offenses be both enacted and enforced by separate sov­ereigns.

We disagree. By its terms, the Clause prohibits separate prosecutions for the same offense; it does not bar successive prosecutions by the same sovereign. So even assuming that petitioner's first prosecutor exercised federal rather than tribal power, the second prosecution did not violate the Con­stitution's guarantee against double jeopardy.

Slip Op. at 4:

The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides: “No person shall . . . be subject for the same of­fence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” The Clause by its terms does not prohibit twice placing a person in jeop­ardy “‘for the same conduct or actions.’” Gamble v. United States, 587 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 3). Instead, it focuses on whether successive prosecutions are for the same “offence.”

That term, we have explained, “‘was commonly under­stood in 1791 to mean “transgression,” that is, “the Viola­tion or Breaking of a Law.” Ibid.; see, e.g., 2 R. Burn & J. Burn, A New Law Dictionary 167 (1792) (“OFFENCE, is an act committed against law, or omitted where the law re­quires it”). An offense, then, is “defined by a law.” Gamble, 587 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 4); see Moore v. Illinois, 14 How. 13, 19-20 (1852). And a law is defined by the sover­eign that makes it, expressing the interests that the sover­eign wishes to vindicate. Gamble, 587 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 4); see United States v. Lanza, 260 U. S. 377, 382 (1922) (“Each government in determining what shall be an offense against its peace and dignity is exercising its own sover­eignty, not that of the other”). Because the sovereign source of a law is an inherent and distinctive feature of the law itself, an offense defined by one sovereign is necessarily a different offense from that of another sovereign. See Gam­ble, 587 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 4); Moore, 14 How., at 20. That means that the two offenses can be separately prose­cuted without offending the Double Jeopardy Clause—even if they have identical elements and could not be separately prosecuted if enacted by a single sovereign. See Gamble, 587 U. S., at ___, n. 1, ___ (slip op., at 3, n. 1, 4); cf. Block­burger v. United States, 284 U. S. 299, 304 (1932) (offenses defined by a single sovereign are distinct offenses only if each “requires proof of a different element”).

This dual-sovereignty principle applies where “two enti­ties derive their power to punish from wholly independent sources.” Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 579 U. S. 59, 68 (2016). The doctrine has come up most frequently in the context of the States. See, e.g., Heath v. Alabama, 474 U. S. 82, 88-90 (1985) (States are separate sovereigns from one another); Lanza, 260 U. S., at 382 (States are separate sov­ereigns from the United States). It applies, however, to Indian tribes too.

Slip Op. at 9:

We need not sort out whether prosecutors in CFR courts exercise tribal or federal authority because we disagree with Denezpi's premise. The Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit successive prosecutions by the same sovereign. It prohibits successive prosecutions “for the same offence.” And as we have already explained, an offense defined by one sovereign is different from an offense defined by an­other. Thus, even if Denezpi is right that the Federal Gov­ernment prosecuted his tribal offense, the Clause did not bar the Federal Government from prosecuting him under the Major Crimes Act too.

[...]

Denezpi does not even try to reconcile his position with the text of the Clause. Instead, he presents the dual­ sovereignty doctrine as “a carveout to the rule against dou­ble jeopardy” and argues that the carveout does not extend to successive prosecutions by a single sovereign. Brief for Petitioner 15-17. But Denezpi is wrong to treat the dual ­sovereignty doctrine as an exception to the Clause. Gamble was very clear on this point: “Although the dual-sovereignty rule is often dubbed an ‘exception' to the double jeopardy right, it is not an exception at all. On the contrary, it fol­lows from the text that defines that right in the first place.” 587 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3). The Clause does not ask who puts a person in jeopardy. It zeroes in on what the person is put in jeopardy for: the “offence.” And again, in 1791, “offence” meant the violation of a law. Supra, at 4-5. We have seen no evidence that “offence” was originally un­derstood to encompass both the violation of the law and the identity of the prosecutor.

Treating the identity of the prosecutor as part of the def­inition of “offence” is as odd as it sounds.

Slip Op. at 13:

Denezpi's single act led to separate prosecutions for vio­lations of a tribal ordinance and a federal statute. Because the Tribe and the Federal Government are distinct sover­eigns, those “offence[s]” are not “the same.” Denezpi's sec­ond prosecution therefore did not offend the Double Jeop­ardy Clause. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

It is so ordered.