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I've seen Russian field accounts of orderly redeployment of RUS units of all types via road and rail through southern Belarus and Russia toward eastern Ukraine. Equipment runs the gamut of combat (e.g. armor on lowboys, towed artillery, etc.), combat support (transport, engineer, etc.) and combat service support units. While there is propaganda on all sides, Ukrainian reporting seems jingoistic and almost desperate in tone while Russian reports and briefings are calm and to the point. Something tells me that the lockstep reporting we've been getting doesn't match reality, but we'll see.

Another thing that doesn't square with the conventional assumption (that Russia intended to capture Kiev) is the small size of the attacking force (est. <200,000) relative to the 600,000-man strength of the near-peer defender. This is exactly opposite the normal 3:1 offensive ratio, and supports my opinion that Russia's opening-phase objectives were more limited than many believed. Further, Russia's tactics have thus far mimicked the Maneuver Warfare strategy that the USMC developed in the 1980s -- with speed and confusion exploited by a smaller force to shape an eventual, decisive battle to occur when, where and under the conditions it deems most advantageous.

If my reading is accurate, Russia has accomplished the following:
(a)fixed UKR's best combat units on a long eastern front;
(b)drawn most of UKR's reserves to defend Kiev;
(c)largely destroyed UKR's air force; and
(d)steadily degraded (via air campaign) UKR's ability to reinforce its forces in the east.

The next logical step in this scenario is rapid buildup of RUS forces to encircle UKR forces east of the Dnieper River and force a decisive end. In that phase, we are likely to see the unleashed, pounding offensive tactics that most observers expected Russia to employ at the outset.

Time will tell if my speculation is correct...