The Russian government continues recruitment efforts to support operations in Kursk Oblast. Russian opposition outlet Mobilization News reported on August 14 that Russian forces will send conscripts of the spring draft class from Moscow, Leningrad, Kaliningrad, Sverdlovsk, Murmansk, and Samara Oblasts to aid Russian forces fighting in Kursk Oblast, drawing backlash from human rights activists and relatives who are protesting the use of conscripts in active combat.[23] Russian opposition outlets reported on August 14 that Russian forces are forcing conscripts who survived the initial Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast to sign contracts with the Russian MoD to return to the front in Kursk Oblast.[24]
Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander Apty Alaudinov seems to be posturing himself as the spokesperson for the Russian defense in Kursk Oblast, but his claims have consistently been false and largely contradict claims made by relatively reliable Russian milbloggers. Alaudinov has portrayed himself as a spokesperson for Russian forces defending Kursk Oblast since the start of the Ukrainian incursion on August 6, leveraging his position as a seasoned Chechen commander as well as the position of Chechen forces operating in the area to establish himself as an authority on the defense of Kursk Oblast to Russian state media.[25] Alaudinov has repeatedly claimed that Russian forces have stabilized the situation and achieved various victories in Kursk Oblast, and claimed on August 14 that Ukrainian forces do not control Sudzha and that Russian forces have “blocked” Ukrainian forces within Kursk Oblast – claims that are both demonstrably false given available visual evidence and which contradict the majority of Russian milblogger claims.[26] Many Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces control either significant parts or all of Sudzha as of August 14 and have consistently claimed that Russian forces are struggling to respond to the Ukrainian incursion - very far from Alaudinov’s claims that Russian forces have completely stabilized the situation.[27] Alaudinov’s claims have focused on portraying Russian forces as a capable defensive force that is defeating inept Ukrainian forces and have therefore leaned on several Kremlin information operations to this effect.[28] Alaudinov’s framing of himself, and by extension of the Chechen forces under his command, as a capable defensive body is also dissonant with the widespread perception of the efficacy of Chechen forces within the wider Russian information space. Russian milbloggers have consistently criticized Chechen units operating in Ukraine and near the international border for avoiding combat missions and having poor discipline, and Russian sources made similar complaints about Chechen forces operating in Kursk Oblast following the start of the incursion.[29] Alaudinov may be attempting to rehabilitate the image of Chechen forces by portraying himself as a trustworthy source of information, but his claims highlight the dissonance between the messaging of prominent Russian military commanders, the Russian information space, and the current battlefield reality in Kursk Oblast.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-14-2024
Alaudinov and “Akhmat” angered the military. They are accused of killing at least 40 of our fighters.
Discontent among many soldiers was caused by the words of Apti Alaudinov that the enemy does not control Sudzha, as well as the actions of the “Akhmat” special forces in the Kursk region. “Disrespectful Alaudinov is setting everyone up when he talks nonsense about Sudzha. The enemy video from the city has already been broadcast on many channels. We need to not lie about Sudzha, but to recapture it. But Alaudinov, it seems, is not talking about war, but about talk. I have heard about this for a long time, and now I am convinced,” the officer who is resisting the invasion of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Kursk region was indignant. There are more serious claims against Alaudinov and his fighters. “ At least 40 of our soldiers died in the Kursk region because of the cowardice of “Akhmat”. Conscripts in the first days of the invasion. And not only. I cannot disclose all the information, but several times the Chechens fled from the battlefield. Shame and disgrace!” a source in the General Staff was indignant in a conversation with us. According to him, “there was an order from above not to disclose information about the betrayal of “Akhmat”. But we have no strength to endure it any longer.” According to our information, more than two dozen officers are preparing an appeal to Vladimir Putin with a request to remove “Akhmat” from the Kursk region and conduct an investigation into the actions of its fighters, commanders and Alaudinov personally. The President will receive it in the coming days. Alaudinov’s entourage responded to these claims with the words: “They are simply jealous of us. Let them first learn to fight themselves, and then complain.” The general's associates refused to comment further.
The delayed establishment of a complicated Russian C2 structure in Kursk Oblast continues to highlight the fact that the Kremlin failed to plan for the possibility of a significant Ukrainian incursion into Russia. The Kremlin and the Russian military command have treated the Russian border with northeastern Ukraine as a dormant sector of the front since Fall 2022 and likely did not sufficiently plan contingencies for defending Russian territory.[33] The Kremlin and the Russian military command would likely have established a more cohesive and clearer C2 structure more quickly if they had had standing plans for defending against a Ukrainian incursion. Putin's continued reluctance to declare martial law and acknowledge that Russia is in a state of war — as opposed to the “special military operation” he declared when he launched the full-scale invasion in February 2022 and has maintained in the subsequent two and a half years — has likely heavily shaped the contingencies that the Kremlin and the Russian military command assess Russia must plan for and what types of activities in Ukraine and Russia the Kremlin is willing to publicly acknowledge.[34] The Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast will likely expand the Kremlin's consideration for what type of Ukrainian operations are possible along the border and highlight that Putin and the Kremlin have suffered from a strategic failure of imagination.[35]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-15-2024