Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 10, 2024
Iran will reportedly deliver “hundreds” of ballistic missiles to Russia in the near future. Reuters, citing multiple intelligence sources including two European intelligence sources, reported on August 9 that Russian MoD representatives signed a contract with Iran on December 13, 2023, for the delivery of Fath-360 close range ballistic missiles and that Iran will deliver these missiles at an unspecified “soon” time.[56] The Fath-360 missiles have a maximum range of 120 kilometers and a warhead weighing 150 kilograms. Multiple intelligence sources also told Reuters that dozens of Russian military personnel are currently training in Iran to operate Fath-360 missile systems. Western and Ukrainian sources have previously warned that Iran may be preparing to provide Russia with short range ballistic systems, including multiple systems with maximum ranges and payloads significantly greater than the limits imposed upon Russia under its Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) obligations.[57] These short-range ballistic missiles will likely allow Russian forces to strike Ukrainian near-rear targets while reserving its own missile stockpiles (such as Iskander missiles) for deep-rear Ukrainian targets.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-10-2024
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 11, 2024
The hastily assembled and disparate Russian force grouping responding to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast is comprised of Russian units likely below their doctrinal end strength and ill-prepared to establish the joint command and control (C2) structures necessary to coordinate operations. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on August 11 that Russian forces have thus far redeployed roughly 10 to 11 battalions from across the theater to Kursk Oblast but suggested that these battalion units are below their intended end strength, likely further exacerbating the disorganization of the Russian response.[22] Mashovets reported that Russian forces have deployed to defend in Kursk Oblast: a reinforced motorized rifle battalion of the 138th Motorized Rifle Brigade (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and up to three battalions from the 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 72nd Motorized Rifle Division (both of the 44th Army Corps [AC], LMD) from the Northern Grouping of Forces in northern Kharkiv Oblast; one motorized rifle battalion of the 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) from the Kupyansk direction; up to two airborne (VDV) assault battalions of the 217th VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) from within Kursk Oblast; units of an unspecified echelon of the 104th VDV Division from Kherson Oblast; one battalion possibly of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) from the Kherson direction that Mashovets assessed is more likely of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (BSF) from northern Kharkiv Oblast; and additional battalions of the 38th and 64th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 35th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]), likely from the Zaporizhia direction.[23] Mashovets’ reporting largely coheres with a report from another Ukrainian source on August 9 and contradicts widespread Russian milblogger claims on August 10 and 11 that elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade are fighting near Sudzha and Martynovka.[24]
Russia’s redeployment of battalion and lower-level units rather than full brigades and regiments to defend in Kursk Oblast is likely contributing to Russian forces’ difficulty in quickly establishing effective C2 in the area. Ukraine-based open-source intelligence organization Frontelligence Insight reported that both Russian and Ukrainian forces will redeploy battalions across the frontline and that these battalions are often at the strength of reinforced companies due to manpower and materiel shortages, including newly-created units that are not fully staffed.[25] Frontelligence Insight noted that drone units often deploy separately from their parent units due to their higher mobility and combat effectiveness, and so observing drone activities in any given area of the theater does not necessarily mean that the drone element’s parent unit is operating in the vicinity.[26] The disorganized nature of regular Russian battalions, combined with the Russian decision to assign the defense of Kursk Oblast to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) rather than to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) as well as the integration of conscripts, FSB personnel, and Rosgvardia elements in combat, will hinder the Russian effort to establish effective C2. Mashovets assessed that Russian forces are likely attempting to buy time for further, more comprehensive force redeployments to defend in Kursk Oblast and focusing on minimizing the Ukrainian offensive effort rather than establishing a joint C2 structure.[27] A prominent, Kremlin-awarded, Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces in Kursk Oblast are struggling to communicate with each other and often do not know the units operating on their flanks due to rapid redeployments of Russian units from different force groupings, ultimately undermining the integrity of the Russian defensive lines.[28]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2024