Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 2, 2024
Russian authorities arrested the former deputy rear commander of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) Colonel Dmitry Peshkov on August 2. Russian state newswire TASS reported on August 2 that Russian law enforcement arrested and charged Peshkov for the embezzlement of food rations for Russian soldiers fighting in Ukraine, to which he pleaded not guilty.[11] Peshkov’s arrest is likely part of a concerted Kremlin effort to remove high-ranking Russian officials from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), potentially to indirectly punish commanders for the failures of their troops or to maintain a cadre of loyal and compliant officers within the highest ranks of the Russian military.[12] Elements of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division have reportedly been conducting offensive operations in the Terny-Nevske area of Luhansk Oblast with limited success and have recently lost some territory to limited Ukrainian counterattacks in this area.[13]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-2-2024
The Kremlin reportedly planned to transfer unspecified missiles and other military equipment to the Houthis in Yemen but did not transfer the materiel following diplomatic pressure. Russia's reported plan highlights its growing military partnership with Iran and suggests that Russia likely aims to leverage Iranian proxies to indirectly confront the West and shape Western decision making. CNN reported on August 2 that US officials and other sources familiar with the matter stated that Russia was preparing to deliver unspecified missiles and other military equipment to the Houthis in late July 2024 but backed down from the plan following US and Saudi diplomatic outreach.[13] US officials reportedly stated that they are unsure if Saudi protests were the determining factor for ending the planned transfer, however.[14] CNN's sources stated that at least three Russian military officials traveled to Yemen in late July 2024 to advise the Houthis and possibly assist the Houthis with live fire exercises, which the Houthis later cancelled.[15] US officials reportedly stated that Russia viewed arming and advising the Houthis as a retaliatory measure for lifting some US restrictions on Ukraine's use of US-provided weapons for strikes within Russia.[16] Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed on June 6 that Russia would provide long-range strike capabilities to unspecified actors for strikes against the West as a “symmetrical response” to the lifting of some of these restrictions.[17] Russia's reported plans to support the Houthis in order to indirectly confront the West and threaten further escalation cohere with several Russia information and hybrid operations that aim to encourage the West to self-deter from supporting Ukraine over fears of confrontation with Russia.[18]
Putin's willingness to consider supporting the Houthis as they attack Israel and international shipping is part of deepening Russian-Iranian military cooperation and Russia's increasing reliance on Iran for high-precision weapons and components.[19] Russia's deepening partnership with Iran will likely encourage Russia to consider supporting other Iranian proxies and leveraging these groups in other indirect attempts to threaten the West with escalation. Increased Russian willingness to use Iran and its proxies to indirectly confront the West will disrupt Russian attempts to portray Russian foreign policy in the Middle East as balanced and may further complicate Russian relations with countries concerned about Russian-Iranian cooperation.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-3-2024