The Kremlin and Kremlin affiliates continue efforts to use Russia's relationship with Republika Srpska (the Serbian political entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina) to destabilize the Balkans. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed at the opening of the Russian embassy in Banja Luka on June 11 that ties between Russia and Republika Srpska are at an all-time high.[18] Lavrov claimed that the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) will prioritize the construction of religious and cultural institutions in Banja Luka that are critical for the strengthening of the “ties of brotherhood” between the people of Russia and Republika Srpska. A prominent, Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on June 16 in an interview with a Republika Srpska TV channel that Russia will support Republika Srpska’s independence and that the opening of the Russian embassy in Banja Luka demonstrates the friendship and cooperation between Russia and Republika Srpska.[19] The milblogger claimed that Russia may open a Russian cultural center (Russia house – Russkii dom) in Republika Srpska. Moldovan and Ukrainian officials have previously warned that Russian officials use Russkii dom to promote Russian propaganda and conduct “subversive work” abroad.[20]
The same milblogger’s channel claimed in April 2024 that it opened a “media school” in the Balkans and that the channel's team spent a week in Serbia and Republika Srpska giving lectures on how to operate Telegram channels and fight “misinformation.”[21] Republika Srpska President Milorad Dodik stated on June 7 that Republika Srpska intended to hold a referendum on its independence from Bosnia and Herzegovina on an unspecified date.[22] The Kremlin has previously leveraged its relationship with Republika Srpska to further influence the Balkans, sow divisions in the West, and undermine the Dayton Accords to throw the Balkans into turmoil.[23]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2024
Russian President Vladimir Putin dismissed four deputy defense ministers and replaced them with a “close relative,” the son of a former Russian prime minister, and an economist on June 17 in an ongoing purge of officials in the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[5] Putin dismissed deputy defense ministers Nikolai Pankov, Ruslan Tsalikov, Tatiana Shevtsova, and Army General Pavel Popov, replacing them with deputy defense ministers Anna Tsivileva and Pavel Fradkov and First Deputy Defense Minister Leonid Gornin.[6] Tsivileva is Putin's first cousin once removed (“niece”), wife of the recently appointed Energy Minister Sergei Tsivilev, and the Chairperson of the Kremlin-initiated ”Defenders of the Fatherland” Foundation.[7] Tsivileva was also previously part of the Council on Issues of Trusteeship in the Social Sphere under the Russian Government in 2019.[8] The Russian MoD specified that Tsivileva will oversee social and housing support for the Russian Armed Forces as deputy defense minister.[9] Fradkov is the son of former Russian Prime Minister and longest serving Director of Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Mikhail Fradkov.[10] Pavel Fradkov served as the First Deputy Administrator of the Presidential Administration since 2021, Deputy Head of the Federal Agency for State Property Management (Rosimushchestvo) from 2012 to 2015, and at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (MFA) Department of Pan-European Cooperation from 2005 to 2012.[11] Fradkov’s brother Pyotr Fradkov is the Chairperson of the Russian state-owned Promsvyazbank and recently met with Kremlin-affiliated governor of the pro-Russian Moldovan autonomous region of Gagauzia, Yevgenia Gutsul, on April 9, possibly as part of Kremlin's efforts to destabilize Moldova.[12] The Russian MoD reported that Fradkov will oversee property management issues, land resources, construction of MoD facilities, and the national economy.[13] Gornin served as the First Deputy Minister of Finance since May 2018, Deputy Minister of Finance from 2012 to 2018, and Minister of Finance and Tax Policy of Novosibirsk Oblast from 2010 to 2011.[14] The Russian MoD specified that Gornin will be responsible for the MoD’s budget policy and will oversee financial support for the Russian Armed Forces.[15] Gornin will also work on increasing the transparency of financial flows and ensuring the effective spending of budget funds. Putin also signed a bill on June 17 that increased the number of Russian deputy defense minister positions from 11 to 12.[16]
Tsivileva’s, Fradkov’s, and Gornin’s appointments support Putin's recent efforts to introduce his relatives and the children of other senior Russian officials to the Russian public and to install economic advisors to the MoD to improve the wartime economy. Both Tsivileva and Fradkov reportedly participated in the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) alongside Putin's daughters and the children of other senior officials on June 6 and 7.[17] ISW assessed on June 7 that Putin attempted to introduce his children and the children of officials in his close circle to the public, likely to set conditions for them to eventually assume high-profile and powerful roles in the Russian government.[18] Tsivileva also notably met with Putin on June 1 to discuss state financial support for combatants who had fought in Ukraine as part of private military companies (PMCs).[19] Putin also has been increasingly appointing economists to take senior positions at the Russian MoD and notably replaced Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu on May 12 with former First Deputy Prime Minister Andrei Belousov who is an economist by trade.[20] Putin also replaced former Russian Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General Yury Sadovenko with former Deputy Economic Minister and Federation Council Accounts Chamber Auditor Oleg Savelyev on May 20.[21] These appointments suggest that Putin is prioritizing the appointment of officials whom he deems to be loyal to the regime and economists to improve Russia's defense industrial base (DIB). Putin also may be attempting to groom possible successors to his regime from the pool of his children and relatives and children of other senior officials.
Russian milbloggers largely focused on celebrating the dismissal of Pankov, Tsalikov, Shevtsova, and Popov and largely overlooked the apparent nepotism that benefited two of the new deputy defense ministers.[22] Russian milbloggers welcomed new MoD appointments, stating that Putin finally removed officials that thought of themselves as untouchable.[23] Russian milbloggers also claimed that these dismissals are a step in the right direction to resolve corruption in the Russian MoD and improve the defense industrial base (DIB).[24] Russian milbloggers specifically focused on the news of Tsalikov’s dismissal, citing his poor management of the Russian MoD’s information policies and official coverage of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[25] Some milbloggers implied that Tsalikov had conflicts with Russian milbloggers who criticized the Russian MoD.[26] A Wagner Group-affiliated milblogger claimed that the Kremlin stopped considering Tsalikov as Shoigu’s replacement in 2022 after Putin received a memo from unnamed state security agencies about Tsalikov’s corruption.[27] The Wagner-affiliated milblogger added that Shevtsova was the subject of numerous independent investigations, including one into how former Deputy Minister of Finance Tatyana Nesterenko and former Head of the Federal Treasury Roman Artyukhin sang songs that mocked the Russian army and soldiers at Shevtsova’s birthday celebration. The Wagner-affiliated milblogger concluded that he was disappointed that Putin did not dismiss Deputy Defense Minister Alexey Krivoruchko, who is a leading figure in many independent anti-corruption investigations, over his corruption schemes involving the Russian joint-stock arms manufacturing company Kalashnikov Concern. Some Russian political bloggers drew parallels between the appointments of deputy defense ministers under Belousov and former Russian Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov, who also had an economic background as the Minister of the Russian Tax Service from 2004 to 2007.[28] Russian political bloggers noted that Serdyukov appointed officials from the Russian Federal Tax Service, whereas Belousov is appointing officials from the Russian ministries of finance and economic development and from among Putin's friends and family.[29]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-17-2024