Ukrainian forces may be conducting an effort aimed at degrading Russian air defenses, which, if successful, could enable Ukraine to more effectively leverage manned fixed-wing airpower in the long run. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 12 that Ukrainian forces targeted one S-300 air defense battery and two S-400 air defense batteries near occupied Belbek and Sevastopol, Crimea overnight on June 11 to 12.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the strikes destroyed at least two S-300/S-400 Russian air defense radar systems and caused secondary ammunition detonations, and that the Ukrainian military is clarifying battle damage. Geolocated imagery published on June 12 shows damaged and destroyed Russian S-300 assets north of occupied Yevpatoria and a destroyed Russian S-400 radar system south of occupied Dzhankoy, supporting the Ukrainian General Staff's June 10 report about strikes against Russian air defense assets in these areas.[2] Some Russian sources speculated that Ukrainian forces used ATACMS in the June 11 to 12 strike, although ISW is unable to confirm which systems Ukrainian forces used.[3] Founder of the Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) “Kraken” Regiment Kostyantyn Nemichev confirmed on June 12 that Ukrainian forces used HIMARS to destroy four Russian S-300 systems in Belgorod Oblast on an unspecified date, and Ukrainian outlet Suspilne referred to Nemichev’s statements as the first official Ukrainian confirmation of strikes against a Russian S-300 battery in Belgorod Oblast on June 1 or 2.[4] Ukrainian forces’ destruction of the Russian air defense systems in Belgorod Oblast reportedly prompted the Russian command to deploy air defense assets from Crimea to Belgorod Oblast in early June 2024, reportedly degrading Russian air defense coverage around Crimea.[5] GUR Spokesperson Andriy Yusov also clarified on June 12 that Ukrainian drone strikes against the Akhtubinsk Airfield in Astrakhan Oblast between June 7 and 8 damaged two Russian Su-57 fighter aircraft instead of just one aircraft as previously reported.[6] S-300/S-400 air defense systems and Su-57 fighters are significant Russian air defense and aviation assets that deny Ukraine the ability to fly aircraft near the front and support Russian offensive operations in Ukraine.
Ukrainian forces may seek to actively degrade Russian air defenses before Ukraine receives a significant number of aircraft in order to set conditions for Ukraine's future use of manned fixed-wing airpower closer to frontline areas. Ukrainian forces may be attempting to degrade Russian air defenses ahead of anticipated F-16 fighter jet deliveries to Ukraine, which reportedly will begin in small quantities in summer and fall 2024. Ukrainian forces may be able to eventually work towards a concept of operations that combines fixed-wing airpower to support ground operations if the Ukrainian military receives a sufficient number of fighter jets, Western partners train enough trained pilots, and if Ukraine succeeds in degrading Russian air defense capabilities.
Western officials have indicated that Ukraine will continue to face material and training constraints, which will likely prevent Ukraine from leveraging fixed-wing airpower at scale in 2024. Ukrainian and Western officials have previously indicated that it will take significant time to adequately train enough Ukrainian pilots and equip Ukrainian forces with the roughly at least 150 F-16s necessary to gain the air superiority necessary to support ground operations.[7] Ukrainian officials have also identified their envisioned use of F-16s and other fixed-wing aircraft to constrain Russian aviation operations, and Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Ilya Yevlash noted that only two F-16 squadrons, roughly 18 aircraft, would be enough to significantly impact the situation in the Ukrainian airspace.[8] These restraints should not fundamentally constrain Ukraine's ability to leverage airpower at scale in the long run, however, should Ukraine's Western partners lean into supporting Ukraine's air domain and deep strike capabilities.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-12-2024
In a video posted by Atesh partisans on Telegram, an Atesh “agent” is seen pouring a flammable liquid on an R-441 Liven communications satellite. The communications station is seen subsequently catching fire. The incident allegedly occurred in the Klin district of Moscow Oblast - approximately 85 kilometers (over 50 miles) northwest of the Russian capital.
According to Atesh, the communications station is part of the 584th Guards Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment and serves as part of the region's air defense systems.
https://kyivindependent.com/partisans-russian-communication-station-destroyed/ incl the video
The United States finally sanctioned the Moscow Exchange, other significant Russian financial institutions, and Russian defense manufacturers 839 days into Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The US Department of the Treasury announced on June 12 sanctions against more than 300 individuals and entities supporting Russia's wartime economy, including the Moscow Exchange and its subsidiaries; major banks VTB Bank, Sberbank, and Tochka Bank; and leading Russian defense industrial base (DIB) entities including state owned defense conglomerate Rostec, the state owned aerospace and defense company United Aircraft Corporation, vehicle and vehicle components manufacturer Kamaz, main Russian tank manufacturer Uralvagonzavod, and helicopter design and manufacturing company Russian Helicopters.[10] The UK also announced similar sanctions targeting Russian financial institutions, entities supporting the Russian DIB, and Russia's shadow fleet of oil tankers.[11]
The Russian government appears confident that these new sanctions will minimally impact the Russian financial system, and the delay in US and other Western countries sanctioning these entities has given the Russian financial system time to prepare and mitigate such sanctions. The Moscow Exchange immediately suspended trading in US dollars (USD), euros, and Hong Kong dollars (HKP) in several markets on June 12 following the US sanctions announcement, and the Russian Central Bank instituted a fixed exchange rate for over-the-counter trading using the USD and euro on June 13.[12] Western and some Russian media widely circulated reports of some Russian banks appearing to sell USD to Russians at 100-200 rubles per dollar on June 12 and 13, but prominent Russian banks Sberbank and VTB quickly announced on June 12 that the new US sanctions would not impact their operations.[13] The Russian Central Bank has prepared for these sanctions and developed a procedure in October 2022 for setting currency exchange rates when it cannot obtain such data from the Moscow Exchange (data the Moscow Exchange can presumably no longer provide for USD).[14] The Russian Central Bank began publishing information on over-the-counter foreign exchange trade in April 2024.[15] The Russian Central Bank set its rubles per USD exchange rate for June 14 to 88.2080, only 88 kopecks lower than the previous rate, and the ruble-to-euro exchange rate only decreased by 91 kopecks to 94.8342 rubles per euro.[16] Bloomberg reported that multiple Russian metals producers and a fertilizer maker are not worried about the end of USD-ruble exchange trading and that Russian state-owned gas monopoly Gazprom has not used the Moscow Exchange for settlements “in a long time.”[17] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev complained about the new US sanctions, claiming that Russia is stable enough that it does not need to react to these sanctions out of economic need but that Russia should inflict “maximum harm” on the West in reaction to these sanctions because the United States and its allies “declared war on us [Russia] without rules.”[18] Medvedev’s choice to publish this only on his Russian language Telegram account indicates he likely means to posture strength and stability to a domestic Russian audience rather than address international audiences.
Bloomberg assessed on June 13 that the new US sanctions would make it more difficult for Russian businesses to trade on the international market due to the increased costs of over-the-counter trading and reduced foreign willingness to do business with Russian entities due to the fear of secondary sanctions.[19] A source close to the Russian Central Bank told Bloomberg that Chinese banks will gradually reduce their cooperation with the Moscow Exchange given these issues but that these banks will still provide yuan liquidity to support imports. The source also stated that there is uncertainty whether the Russian Central Bank's new exchange rates will work and how much costs of foreign trading and business will rise.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-13-2024