Putin's decision to remove Shoigu from the Russian MoD appears to have also opened the door for the departure of certain Shoigu affiliates from the MoD, likely one of the intended effects of Putin's recent cabinet reshuffles. Several Russian milbloggers and insider sources claimed on May 13 that two deputy defense ministers—Ruslan Tsalikov and Alexey Krivoruchko—submitted their resignations to Shoigu a week before Putin removed Shoigu as defense minister.[25] Russian milbloggers claimed that Tsalikov was “Shoigu’s right-hand man” for many years and oversaw troop support and the Russian MoD’s department on information policy and information warfare.[26] Krivoruchko is also reportedly close with Shoigu and oversaw military-technical support, weapons development, special equipment, and the implementation of state defense orders.[27] Russian sources claimed that both Tsalikov and Krivoruchko were embroiled in corruption scandals, and one Wagner Group-affiliated milblogger noted that frontline troops directly suffered as a result of their corrupt practices.[28] Russian insider sources claimed that Russian authorities questioned Tsalikov over possible corruption charges in late April, and suggested at the time that Tsalikov would be forced into retirement.[29] Russian authorities recently removed former Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov, also a reported close Shoigu ally, from his position on corruption charges.[30] Tsalikov and Krivoruchko may have resigned in hope of receiving new positions outside of the MoD in order to avoid criminal prosecution on charges similar to Ivanov’s charges. Kremlin-awarded milblogger suggested that Tsalikov will also take a new role in the Russian Security Council following Shoigu.[31] Russian insider sources speculated that Belousov, as new defense minister, will only want to leave a maximum of two to three officials affiliated with Shoigu in the Russian MoD, suggesting that more Shoigu affiliates may still resign or be fired in the coming weeks.[32]
One Russian milblogger speculated that Shoigu and his affiliates were part of the alleged “pro-China” party in the Russian MoD and suggested that other MoD officials associated with Russia's China policy will be removed or resign alongside Shoigu, Ivanov, and others, although ISW cannot verify these speculations.[33] Putin likely used the constitutionally mandated ministerial resignations following his inauguration and subsequent nomination of new senior officials as a convenient moment to dismiss ineffective officials. Putin likely assessed that Shoigu’s constitutionally mandated resignation, almost a year after deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s rebellion to remove Shoigu and Russian Chief of the Army General Staff Valery Gerasimov from power, was the appropriate time to remove Shoigu from the Russian MoD without appearing to give in to Prigozhin’s demands.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-13-2024
By the same decree, Putin reassigned the composition of the presidential administration - Anton Vaino remained its head. Sergei Kiriyenko and Alexey Gromov - first deputies of the administration. Maxim Oreshkin moved from the position of assistant to the president to the position of deputy. A similar position was occupied by Vladimir Ostrovenko, Dmitry Kozak and Magomedsalam Magomedov.
The president has ten assistants in the new administration. They also include foreign policy assistant Yuri Ushakov, head of the State Legal Administration of the President Larisa Brycheva, former Minister of Culture Vladimir Medinsky, who is responsible for coordinating state policy in the historical and humanitarian spheres, former Minister of Education and Science Andrei Fursenko, former Yaroslavl Governor Dmitry Mironov, former prime minister of Chechnya Ruslan Edelgeriev, head of the Kremlin Control Directorate Dmitry Shalkov and head of the presidential reference office Dmitry Kalimulin.
Alexey Dyumin is 51 years old. In 1994, he graduated from the Voronezh Higher Military Engineering School of Radio Electronics, and in 1995 he began working in the Federal Security Service (FSO). In August 1999, Dyumin became part of the personal guard of Vladimir Putin, who had just been appointed head of government. After Putin was elected president in 2000, Dyumin continued to work with him. In 2007, Dyumin became the head of security for Viktor Zubkov during the period when he served as prime minister. After Putin took over as prime minister in 2008, Dyumin again became involved in his security. Dyumin, in an interview in 2016, said that he was not the president's adjutant, but was “Putin's foot soldier,” working as part of a group of officers who ensured security in Russia and abroad.
In 2014, Dyumin was appointed commander of Russian special operations forces and took part in the events that preceded the annexation of Crimea to Russia. In 2015, he became the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces - First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces. At the end of the same year, he was appointed Deputy Minister of Defense. He oversaw combat training, as well as construction, housing, and military medicine.
At the beginning of February 2016, by presidential decree, he was appointed acting governor of the Tula region. In September of the same year, he was officially elected to office. In the gubernatorial elections in 2021, Dyumin was re-elected for a new term, gaining 83.6% of the vote.
In June 2023, some telegram channels, in particular Brief, disseminated information that in June 2023 Dyumin was sent to negotiate with the founder of the Wagner PMC, Yevgeny Prigozhin, during the PMC’s “rebellion” and its march to Moscow. Later, the press service of the government of the Tula region denied this information, saying that such issues are beyond the authority of the governor.
The last public meeting between Putin and Dyumin took place on May 2. In the part of it open to journalists, Dyumin spoke in detail about the support that the region provides to the special military operation - from assistance to defense enterprises to assistance to military families. The President praised the region for the good growth in the industrial production index and the share of manufacturing production.
https://www.rbc.ru/politics/14/05/2024/664318ea9a79474413c61609
A few years ago, it was “common knowledge” that Alexey Dyumin would succeed Putin, but Nikolai Patrushev has maneuvered himself into the leadership role. We will know more in a few weeks.
Russian authorities detained Russian Deputy Defense Minister and Russian MoD Main Personnel Directorate Head Lieutenant General Yuri Kuznetsov on May 13 on charges of accepting large-scale bribes. The Russian Investigative Committee and Russian media reported on May 14 that the Russian 235th Garrison Military Court detained Kuznetsov on suspicion of accepting a large bribe in the period 2021-2023 while serving as the head of the Russian General Staff's 8th Directorate, which is in charge of the protection of state secrets.[11] The Russian Investigative Committee reported that authorities raided Kuznetsov’s home and discovered over 100 million rubles (about $1 million) worth of cash, including foreign currency, and luxury items. Moscow's Basmanny Raion Court also detained Russian businessman Lev Martirosyan as part of Kuznetsov’s case.[12] Russian outlet Kommersant reported that Martirosyan bribed Kuznetsov with a total of 30.5 million rubles ($333,935) to help Martirosyan’s hotel companies win government contracts.[13] Kommersant reported that the same Investigative Committee department is investigating Kuznetsov’s and detained Russian Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov’s cases and that the Investigative Committee is forming a special team to investigate similar cases involving high-ranking military personnel. Russian authorities detained Ivanov on April 24 on charges of accepting bribes.[14] Ongoing speculation about further changes within the Russian military and political leadership prompted Russian sources to speculate about the possible return of disgraced Wagner-affiliated Army General Sergei Surovikin to Russian President Vladimir Putin's favor, but Russian sources concluded that insider reports that Surovikin is in Moscow are inaccurate.[15]
Putin appointed former Tula Oblast Governor Alexei Dyumin and former Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev as his presidential assistants on May 14, further re-balancing his ministerial cabinet for his fifth term.[16] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov noted that Dyumin will oversee issues regarding the Russian defense industrial base (DIB), State Council, and sports policy, while Patrushev will oversee the strategic development of the Russian shipbuilding industry as well as “other areas, perhaps.”[17] Russian presidential assistants typically help the Russian president in the execution of their powers, including by preparing proposals for presidential work and by participating in official meetings alongside the president.[18] Presidential assistants may perform other tasks as the president orders. Dyumin’s appointment as Putin's assistant on DIB issues is consistent with Putin's apparent effort to restructure the Russian economy for a protracted war — Dyumin generally has a positive reputation amongst Russian commentators and is seen as a solid and effective professional, and Putin likely is hoping to leverage Dyumin’s good reputation to manage his own.[19]
Russian commentators received the news of Patrushev’s new position less certainly, however. Russian opposition outlet Meduza, citing sources close to the Kremlin, stated that its sources were “stunned” when they saw that Putin had removed Patrushev from the Security Council, and even more “shocked” that his new position is to be Putin's assistant on shipbuilding.[20] Putin may have moved Patrushev to this new position in order to rebalance the siloviki-run power vertical that exists within the Russian security services, as ISW previously reported Putin tends to do with powerful siloviki.[21] Patrushev is reportedly a close Putin ally, the individual personally responsible for the assassination of Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin, and Putin's personal diplomat who frequently conducted diplomatic trips on Putin's behalf, according to Western reporting.[22] Putin can continue to use Patrushev’s connections and experience even if Patrushev is nominally acting as an expert on “shipbuilding” strategy. The new position is nevertheless an obvious demotion.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-14-2024