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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 28, 2023

The Russian MoD announced on December 28 that Russia has over 640,000 contract servicemen (kontrakniki) - the first-ever official Russian announcement about the number of kontrakniki in the Russian Armed Forces since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022.[82] Russian President Vladimir Putin recently announced that over 480,000 individuals signed military contracts with the Russian MoD in 2023, and Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev similarly stated on December 28 that 500,000 kontrakniki have joined the ranks of the Russian Armed Forces since January 1, 2023.[83] The Russian MoD also claimed that over 40,000 people fought as members of BARS (Russian Combat Army Reserve) units since the start of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine and that over 7,000 personnel operating within BARS units are currently on the battlefield.[84] The Russian MoD also noted that BARS includes Cossack units and that BARS has had the highest number of recruits from Krasnodar Krai and Rostov Oblast, totaling 6,500 recruits. Russian officials may be counting all military personnel such as mobilized troops, actual kontrakniki, and volunteers (dobrovoltsy) as part of the presented 640,000 kontrakniki number in an effort to exaggerate the proportion of Russia's mixed forces that seem to be professionals. The Kremlin significantly lowered qualifications for kontrakniki in early 2023, prioritizing generating a high number of recruits over recruiting a smaller cadre of more experienced men to preserve the kontrakniki service class as the backbone of Russia's professional military force.[85]

Russian opposition outlet SOTA reported that the Russian MoD may be planning to increase Russia's expeditionary force in Ukraine by redeploying active military personnel in Russia to Ukraine.[86] SOTA observed that Russian officials prepared amendments for the law “On determining the procedure and conditions for sending military personnel of the Russian Armed Forces.” The amendments, if passed, will allow the Russian command to deploy previously uncommitted military personnel to assist the military command, formations, and military units directly involved “in the performance of tasks relating to resolving crisis situations and localizing armed conflicts in peacetime” for a period of more than 30 days but no more than one year. SOTA observed that previously the law did not provide grounds for the deployment of military personnel to localized armed conflicts in peacetime.

The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that the Russian leadership is trying to train more junior lieutenants in a compressed timeframe to offset high personnel losses among junior officers.[87] The GUR noted that Russian servicemen who pass accelerated training and are promoted to the lowest officer ranks immediately deploy to the frontlines. ISW previously observed that Russian Airborne (VDV) Forces Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky alluded to a similar phenomenon in which VDV command schools deployed recent graduates to the frontlines in Ukraine skipping periods of either advanced training or service with units not in combat.[88]

full report: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-28-2023

“Quantity has a quality all its own.” ― Joseph Stalin

https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/795954-quantity-has-a-quality-all-its-own

5,718 posted on 12/29/2023 12:12:18 AM PST by AdmSmith (GCTGATATGTCTATGATTACTCAT)
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Russia's only advantage is mass. The surest way to undermine Russian mass is to destroy Russian hq’s, logistics, and artillery. Long-range precision strike capability that can reach every corner of Russian-occupied Ukraine will make that possible.
https://twitter.com/general_ben/status/1740313065508532575

off the books...
1. expired and removed from TACOM as far as usable due to age.
2 dud rate of the sub munitions are over 1% meaning that they can not be used... even in combat.
3 they have been replaced by newer ATACMS and are not in any contingency plan, and the new ATACMs are now being replaced by PSRM rockets.
4 they are being held in storage only due to it being too expensive to demil right now and DLA is trying to find out the best way to scrap them....
5 no one wants them due to the dud rate and so they cant be sold.. BUT they CAN be transferred free of charge under the excess defense articles act.

that's what I mean by off the books
https://twitter.com/secretsqrl123/status/1738933929506201642

Although the general rule prohibits the transfer of munitions with a dud rate that exceeds the 1% threshold, The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (as amended through December 2022) provides an exception to the rule. According to Sec. 614 of the Act, the “President may authorize the furnishing of assistance” to a foreign government “without regard to” other relevant provisions of U.S. law—including appropriations legislation—when the President determines “that to do so is important to the security interests of the United States.” https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/COMPS-1071/pdf/COMPS-1071.pdf#page=202

It was done with cluster munition https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/why-biden-was-justified-to-send-cluster-munitions-to-ukraine

5,719 posted on 12/29/2023 12:27:32 AM PST by AdmSmith (GCTGATATGTCTATGATTACTCAT)
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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 29, 2023

The Kremlin's efforts to sufficiently mobilize Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) in support of its wartime objectives, including large-scale strike series, may been more successful than Western officials previously assessed due in part to Russia's ability to procure military equipment from its partners and the redistribution of Russia's resources for military production purposes. Head of the German Ministry of Defense's Special Staff for Ukrainian Issues Major General Christian Freuding stated during an interview on December 29 that the German Armed Forces did not expect that Russia would succeed in expanding its DIB and increasing its production capacity in the face of Western sanctions.[30] Freuding stated that Germany did not account for Russia's ability to circumvent Western sanctions by procuring materiel from North Korea, China, and other countries.[31] Ukrainian outlet Ekonomichna Pravda, citing data from Forbes, reported that Russia's December 29 strike cost Russia at least $1.27 billion, calculating that Russia spent over $720,000 to launch 36 Shahed-136/131 drones, over $5 million to launch five Kh-47 hypersonic missiles, and an estimated $1.17 billion on the over 90 Kh-101 missiles that it launched.[32] Forbes previously reported that Russian Kh-101 cruise missiles cost an estimated $13 million per missile compared to Kh-22 missiles that cost an estimated $1 million each and Iskander-M ballistic missiles that cost roughly $3 million each.[33] Russian forces notably appear to be using larger quantities of the more expensive Kh-101 cruise missiles to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and increase the chances of striking targets in Ukraine with smaller quantities of cheaper missile variants.

Russian opposition outlet Meduza estimated on December 29 that Russia's economy will most likely grow by more than three percent by the end of 2023, largely due to the Russian DIB’s unprecedented levels of production that have bolstered Russian economic output.[34] Meduza, citing the Bank of Finland's Institute for Emerging Economies, reported that Russia's DIB generated 40 percent of Russian GDP growth in the first half of 2023 despite only accounting for six percent of Russian GDP.[35] Meduza credited the success of the Russian DIB to Russia's significantly increased, and still increasing, defense budget and the redistribution of Russia's civilian sector resources for military production purposes.[36] Meduza highlighted Russia's Tambov Bakery, a bakery that began assembling 230 to 250 combat drones per month in March 2023, as an example of the Russian economy's redistribution of money and resources towards military over civilian goods.[37] Meduza noted that the Russian DIB is unlikely to generate the same levels of economic growth in 2024, largely due to personnel shortages, already stretched production capacities, and its dependence on imported components and equipment.[38]

full report: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2023

However

Joe Blogs: RUSSIAN Ruble Collapse Has Damaged Economy - Oil & Gas Revenues Fall 63% as Russia Posts Huge Loss. In addition to this huge reduction in income Expenditure is continuing to increase due to the investment in the War, which means that the Russian Economy is now incurring massive LOSSES. In this video I provide more details of the figures and discuss the problems that Russia is now facing.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1ZCbqKwgdM

5,732 posted on 12/30/2023 1:24:39 AM PST by AdmSmith (GCTGATATGTCTATGATTACTCAT)
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