Posted on 02/28/2022 8:10:18 PM PST by Mariner
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 25, 2024
The Kremlin continues to strengthen its ties with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov arrived at the ASEAN summit in Laos on July 25 and held a series of bilateral meetings with delegations from East Timor, Indonesia, Cambodia, Brunei, Laos, and the PRC.[20] Lavrov and PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi emphasized the importance of Russia’s and China’s role in developing ASEAN and defending southeast Asia from “interference” by “extra-regional forces.”[21] Russia and China may be posturing themselves as “defenders” of ASEAN member states in order to encourage deeper cooperation and dependence. Russian Prosecutor General Igor Krasnor and PRC Prosecutor General Ying Yong also signed a cooperation agreement at a Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meeting on July 25, which will increase Russian-PRC judicial cooperation.[22] Krasnov characterized the agreement as part of Russia and the PRC’s efforts to improve the “fight against transnational crime.” Russia recently signed a similar agreement with North Korea, and ISW noted that the Kremlin may be interested in further consolidating control over the Russian information space and implementing measures similar to the North Korean and PRC governments.[23]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2024
The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) arrested former Russian Deputy Defense Minister Army General Dmitri Bulgakov on corruption charges on July 26 – the latest in a concerted Kremlin effort to remove senior Russian defense officials since April 2024.[12] Russian state news agency RIA Novosti reported that a source in Russian law enforcement stated that Bulgakov used his position in the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to lobby for the Gryazinsky Food Plant, which the source claimed won catering contracts with the MoD and supplied low-quality food at high prices to the Russian military.[13] Russian authorities arrested top managers of the Gryazinsky Food Plant for embezzling funds from MoD contracts in April 2024, and Kremlin newswire TASS stated on July 26 that Bulgakov’s case materials indicate that Bulgakov is a suspect in the same case.[14]
Bulgakov oversaw Russian military logistics as Deputy Defense Minister from 2008 to 2022, and the Kremlin awarded Bulgakov the Hero of Russia award in 2016.[15] The Russian MoD relieved Bulgakov of his post in September 2022 and stated that he had been transferred to another, unspecified position.[16] A Russian insider source claimed that Russian authorities have been investigating Bulgakov since 2022 and have previously summoned Bulgakov as a witness in an unspecified number of MoD corruption cases.[17] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that there had been talk “in narrow circles” about investigations into Bulgakov since May 2024.[18] Another Russian insider source claimed that Bulgakov was not closely connected to former Russian Defense Minister and current Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu.[19] Russian milbloggers celebrated Bulgakov’s arrest, who they claimed was responsible for systemic logistics issues at the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 that are still affecting the Russian military today.[20]
Russian security forces reportedly detained several unknown actors threatening to blow up an apartment building in the Republic of Dagestan on July 25. Dagestan’s security forces told Kremlin newswire TASS that security forces evacuated an apartment building in Kaspiysk and detained an unspecified number of people intending to detonate an improvised explosive device (IED) in the building.[29] Dagestan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) Spokesperson Gayana Gariyeva later announced that security forces completed their operation and that there is no remaining threat to the public.[30] The Russian government appears to be struggling with isolated terrorist activity following several significant terrorist attacks in recent months, including the March 2024 Crocus City Hall attack and the June 2024 shootings in Dagestan.[31]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-26-2024
As alleged, an improvised explosive device, components for its manufacture, bladed weapons, “flags of a terrorist organization” were found at their residential addresses, and in their mobile phones - “instructions on conducting combat operations in urban and forest conditions, marksmanship training, instructions for assembling explosive, incendiary devices and hand grenades.”
https://t.me/astrapress/60546
Here is a video, one girl is dressed in Niqab https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NSfZ5BxAXKE
FSB: three local residents, supporters of an international terrorist organization (hereinafter referred to as ITO) banned in Russia
At their residential addresses, a homemade explosive device, components for its manufacture, bladed weapons, MTO flags, electronic information carriers, and in the means of communication used - instructions on conducting combat operations in urban and forest conditions, marksmanship training, instructions on assembling explosive, incendiary devices and hand grenades were found.
Note FSB site: http://www.fsb.ru/fsb/press/message/single.htm%21id%3D10440032%40fsbMessage.html
МТО «ХТ») is probably международной террористической организации «Хизб ут-Тахрир аль-Ислами» = "international terrorist organization Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hizb_ut-Tahrir https://hizb-russia.org/
The Investigative Committee posted a video of a fight between 23-year-old Timur Bazhaev near Luzhniki, who beat up the head of the public order department of the Internal Affairs Directorate for the Central Administrative District of Moscow, Colonel Alexander Makhonin. He was responsible for all public safety in the Central Administrative District of the capital. For many years, he has personally supervised the dispersal of protests.
According to deputy Alexander Khinshtein, the conflict occurred when Bazhaev tried to enter the Luzhniki territory from the Luzhnetskaya Embankment through the service gate. The complex was preparing a concert by Leonid Agutin (more than 70,000 spectators), and security was tightened. Makhonin did not let Bazhaev through and suggested that he go through the regular entrance with a search. In response, Bazhaev Jr. climbed over the fence, hit the police colonel in the face and was detained. According to Mash, a criminal case has been opened against the billionaire's son.
Musa Bazhaev is the president and co-owner of the Alliance Group concern.
https://t.me/moscowtimes_ru/24264
The leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs has taken personal control of the investigation into the fight involving the son of billionaire Timur Bazhaev, in connection with active attempts to influence its course.
⭐️For the department, this should become a matter of honor in every sense : the 23-year-old “major” hit not an ordinary police officer , but the head of the public order protection department of the Internal Affairs Directorate for the Central Administrative District of Moscow, Alexander Makhonin. This is the person responsible for all public safety in the Central District.
Order some popcorn
Russia continues to deepen bilateral relations with Iran and North Korea in exchange for the provision of lethal aid to the Russian military for use in Ukraine. Iranian state-affiliated media outlet Mehr News Agency reported on July 23 that Iran will launch its “Hod Hod” and “Kosar” satellites into low earth orbit from an unspecified Russian station in October 2024.[5] Bloomberg reported on July 25 that South Korea's Bank of Korea estimated that North Korea's gross domestic product (GDP) grew 3.1 percent in 2023 compared to 2022 after annual contractions since 2019.[6] The Bank of Korea estimated that North Korea's heavy and chemical industries, particularly the production of iron, steel, copper, nickel, and aluminum, grew the most in 2023 by 8.1 percent. South Korean Defense Minister Shin Wonsik previously stated that Russia's provision of food to North Korea in exchange for weapons helped North Korea stabilize prices and likely boosted North Korean domestic manufacturing.[7] North Korea has reportedly transferred as many as 4.8 million artillery shells to Russia, and Iran has supplied Shahed-136/131 drones and components to Russia.[8]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-27-2024
On 22 February 2024, Putin flew on Tu-160M no. 801. The Tu-160M is the world's largest, heaviest and fastest bomber, designed to carry nuclear-capable free-fall bombs or air-launched cruise missiles carried on a rotary launcher.
cont.
https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1816895244815991121.html
Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to use nuclear saber-rattling to target Western decision-making and promote Western self-deterrence. Putin spoke at the Main Naval Parade in St. Petersburg on July 28 and claimed that if the US deploys long-range missile systems in Germany in 2026, the flight time to Russian industrial and defense targets will be about 10 minutes.[1] Putin also commented on US deployments of Typhon Mid-Range Capability (MRC) missile systems to Denmark and the Philippines for joint exercises. Putin threatened that if the US implements plans to deploy missile systems to these countries, Russia will no longer be bound by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and will take “mirror measures” to deploy unspecified systems that are currently in the final stages of development to unspecified locations. Putin claimed that Russian strategic missile carriers stopped conducting air patrols after the end of the Cold War but resumed these flights in 2007 in response to increased US strategic and reconnaissance aviation activity in areas of the world that are “sensitive to Russia” and in order to “ensure security in the Asia-Pacific region.” The US and Germany announced in June 2024 that the US will begin “episodic deployments” of long-range fire capabilities, including Standard Missile 6 (SM-6) and Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles, in Germany starting in 2026 in order to demonstrate US commitment to NATO.[2] The US Army Pacific stated in April 2024 that it deployed the MRC missile system that can fire SM-6 and Tomahawk missiles to the Philippines as part of exercises, and the US Navy announced in May 2024 that it conducted containerized missile launcher rehearsals with the Danish military on Bornholm Island, Denmark.[3] The current location of the MRC systems is unclear, but the US has not announced that it is deploying the systems to Denmark and the Philippines for purposes beyond the previous exercises. Putin officially suspended Russia's participation in the INF Treaty that banned ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500 to 5,500 kilometers, in March 2019, but Russia has already permanently deployed nuclear capable Iskander-M ballistic missiles, with a reported range of up to 500 kilometers, in Kaliningrad Oblast since 2018.[4] Putin is falsely trying to present the Russian deployment of missiles previously banned under the INF Treaty as an inflection, likely as part of his repeated efforts to use nuclear saber-rattling to push the West to self-deter.[5]
Russia used Navy Day celebrations to showcase Russia's relations with a number of non-Western states as part of efforts to create a supposed Russian-led group of states to rally against the West. Ships from the Chinese, Algerian, and Indian navies participated in the Main Naval Parade in St. Petersburg, and representatives from 31 states, including Azerbaijan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Cuba, Libya, Myanmar, Syria, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and South Africa, took part in events in St. Petersburg; the Russian naval base in Tartus, Syria; and the Baltic, Caspian, and North seas.[6] Russian Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Fomin met with Commander of the PLA Navy Hu Zhongming and discussed cooperation between Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the naval sphere.[7] Fomin also met with Myanmar's Navy Commander Win Htein to discuss further naval cooperation between Myanmar and Russia.[8] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also met with Malaysian Foreign Minister Mohamad Hasan in Kuala Lampur on July 28 and agreed to increase Russian–Malaysian diplomatic contacts.[9] Russia has recently increased its cooperation with a number of these states, including Venezuela, Cuba, India, and Vietnam.[10]
A rebel coalition in Mali reportedly killed and wounded dozens of Russian servicemen and Wagner Group mercenaries as well as a prominent Wagner-affiliated milblogger on the Mali-Algeria border on July 27.[15] The Permanent Strategic Framework for Peace, Security and Development (CSP-PSD) rebel movement claimed that it “routed the entire column of Malian army and Russian mercenaries,” and the Critical Threats Project's (CTP) Africa File will cover the situation in northern Mali in its upcoming update.[16] Social media footage reportedly showed numerous killed Wagner and Malian personnel — including the body of the administrator of the “Grey Zone” Telegram channel Nikita Fedyanin, who routinely covered Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and harshly criticized the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[17] Sources within Fedyanin's close circle confirmed Fedyanin's death to Russian state newswire TASS on July 28.[18] A Russian insider source claimed that Wagner losses amounted to 33 killed and 18 wounded, and various Russian sources claimed that CSP-PSD captured several prisoners — with some speculating that Wagner commander Anton Yelizarov (known under the alias “Lotos”) was captured.[19] Russian sources claimed that the Russian MoD’s Africa Corps successfully mediated a prisoner exchange with CSP-PSD.[20] One Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian MoD paid ransoms for every captured Wagner mercenary except for Yelizarov, and several other milbloggers claimed that Yelizarov died in the ambush.[21] ISW cannot independently verify whether Yelizarov is captured or dead. ISW previously reported that Yelizarov overestimated his ability to convince former Wagner personnel to join Rosgvardia during his efforts to maintain a Wagner contingent and avoid joining the Russian MoD.[22]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-28-2024
Russian blogger:
Very bad news from Africa
We deliberately took our time with this publication. We checked everything, talked to a number of sources who have the appropriate access.
In Mali, a column of Wagner PMC fighters, which was moving together with local units, was attacked. According to our information, approximately 80-85 people were killed. At least 15 more were captured. A Mi-24 helicopter was lost, as well as armored vehicles.
The information about the death of the admin of the GREY ZONE channel “Five Hundredth” was confirmed. Also, we have to report that with a high degree of probability, the Hero of Russia, the commander of the Wagner PMC with the call sign “Lotus” was killed. A great loss for the entire “orchestra”, a real warrior and a skilled commander. He participated in battles not only in Mali, but also in Ukraine, Syria and the Central African Republic.
And now the most important thing - how did it happen that the column was destroyed with such huge losses for us? It is worth noting that before this, Wagner troops carried out a number of successful operations in the Kidal area. The column was destroyed during an attempt to capture the city of Tinzaouatin. The videos that are being distributed online allegedly show that the column was shot by local Tuaregs. But sources in the Ministry of Defense are inclined to believe that it is unlikely that the Tuaregs could have done this on their own.
Sources say that there were mines along the column’s route. Moreover, after the first explosions, the equipment was attacked by FPV drones. The style is similar to how they are currently fighting in the SVO zone. One of the Tuareg warriors has already stated that they are allegedly ready to hand over the prisoners to Ukraine. But in Africa, the practice of ransoming prisoners is widespread, let’s hope that they will not end up in Ukraine. However, if you remember, we reported that Ukrainian special services really do work in Africa. Several months ago, kamikaze drones attacked the convoy of General Andrei Averyanov in Burkina Faso. He managed to survive then, but sources said the attack was the work of the Ukrainians. Last year, air bases and convoys of the Wagner PMC in Mali were attacked several times. The interlocutors also pointed to a Ukrainian trace . The Kremlin snuffbox
https://t.me/kremlin_secrets/4433
Wagner PMC fighters captured in Mali have not yet been freed
Approximately 15 Wagner fighters and representatives of the Malian army remain in captivity of the Tuaregs. Let us recall that the Tuaregs attacked a column of Wagner fighters and representatives of the local army the day before, as a result of which at least 83 people were killed.
According to our information, attempts to ransom our guys from captivity failed. Information about what happened reached both the president and the defense minister. Rumor has it that the hawks in Vladimir Putin’s entourage are proposing to transfer even more people to Mali.
The president is in no hurry and expects an extended report on what happened in Mali on Monday morning. It is worth recalling that the militants destroyed the column and also “landed” the Mi-24 helicopter that had arrived to help the Wagner fighters.
https://t.me/kremlin_secrets/4435
A few words about drones, the Chinese and the Power of Siberia
The very proposal by war correspondent Dmitry Steishin to simulate an attack on the Power of Siberia gas pipeline in order to discuss with China the issue of supplying drones and components to Ukraine could have serious consequences. According to our information, Beijing contacted Moscow and made it clear that any provocations around the gas pipeline are undesirable and that security is provided by the Russian side.
“Moscow and Beijing currently have difficult relations. It is no secret that there is friction over Africa and Vladimir Putin's activity in the Pacific region. In particular, the visit to Vietnam was received ambiguously in China,” a political scientist who closely cooperates with the Kremlin explained to us. At the same time, he emphasized that, in general, both China and Russia fulfill their obligations within the framework of their bilateral partnership.
Any attack on the Power of Siberia could really drive a wedge into relations with allies, a government source assures. He noted that each country has its own interests, and there is nothing strange in the fact that China sells drones and components to both us and Ukrainians. Although, of course, it would be better if these supplies were stopped. But the solution proposed by Steshin will bring more problems than bonuses, the official assures.
“The best way out of the situation is to develop our own production. And drones, and RABs, and components,” the interlocutor said.
Ah heck, just another spoiled rich kid. Will they ever learn?
Ukraine Targets Russia’s Most Important Weapon: Artillery || Peter Zeihan
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JlRNLCq4HWE
Much of the Russian information space response to the recent Tuareg insurgent ambush of a Wagner Group in northern Mali coalesced around the suggestion that the Russian MoD will seek to benefit from Wagner losses, highlighting the continued distrust between the Russian MoD and both the Wagner Group in the Sahel and pro-Wagner commentators. Several prominent critical milbloggers claimed that the Russian MoD is “gloating” over losses the Wagner Group reportedly suffered during the attack and suggested that Russian military authorities will use this incident as a reason to end the deployment of Wagner personnel to the Sahel and completely supplant them with units of the Russian MoD’s Africa Corps.[13] Some Russian milbloggers quoted an unidentified source within the Russian Presidential Administration as saying that Africa Corps personnel will replace Wagner troops in the entire “Sahelian Three” (Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger).[14] Other milbloggers blamed the Wagner command for incompetence and attempts to sabotage the arrival of Africa Corps personnel, highlighting the persistent information space divides between Wagner and Africa Corps–affiliated commentators.[15] Another Russian-veteran-community-linked milblogger more broadly called for Russia to learn from the incident, strongly emphasizing that Russian forces operating abroad should not expect to face “safe” adversaries and that Russia needs to commit more heavily to foreign operations to ensure sufficient personnel and equipment levels for Russian contingents abroad.[16]
The Africa Corps, notably, likely lacks the current capacity to properly supplant Wagner operations, particularly in Mali, as Africa Corps elements have recently deployed to Ukraine to aid Russian offensive efforts in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[17] Supplanting Wagner at scale following losses such as those accrued in the recent ambush would likely involve re-deploying some Africa Corps fighters to Mali away from the frontline in Ukraine, and the Russian military command likely does not see completely supplanting Wagner in Mali or elsewhere in the Sahel as a priority effort at this time.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-29-2024
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