Posted on 02/28/2022 8:10:18 PM PST by Mariner
The minus side is that more Koreans will add weight to the standard Russian mass frontal assaults, but the plus side is that more NK killed thins out Kim Jong Un’s hordes and distracts him from an immediate assault on South Korea.
Interesting the Turkish demand that Russia “put Crimea under Turkish control.” I wonder what kind of deal Zelenskyy and Erdogon worked out when they met a few months ago? Various kinds of Turkish support in exchange for what? Turkish drones and other war materiel? Long term lease by Turkey of Sevastapol? Return of valuable real estate in Crimea for former Turkish ethnic or national owners? General right of return for former Turkick residents/Ukraine citizens? Any other ideas?
Good, thoughtful post. Thank you. I wasn't aware of that huge death benefit they are paying.
.....or (3) a collapse in the willingness of Ukraine’s allies to fund its war effort.
Which explains the flood of Muskovite "influencers" here, there, and everywhere. Some of whom are about as subtle as a mugging in the park. Keir Giles has a whole chapter in his book titled "Politics: Warfare by Other Means
There are some of those influencers here. Either that or we have people with Bidenesque mental issues.
Russian President Vladimir Putin directed on June 28 the production and deployment of nuclear-capable short- and intermediate-range missiles following the American withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty in 2019, likely as part of the Kremlin's ongoing reflexive control campaign to influence Western decision making in Russia's favor.[1] Putin attended a Russian Security Council meeting in which he claimed that Russia had vowed to uphold the INF’s provisions against producing or deploying intermediate-range ground-based missiles until the United States violated these provisions and that Russia must now also produce and deploy such systems.[2] The United States suspended participation in the INF on February 1, 2019, and withdrew from the treaty on August 2, 2019, due to Russian violations of the treaty with its development, testing, and deployment of intermediate-range 9M729 (SSC-8) missiles, and Russia suspended its participation in the INF in response on February 2, 2019.[3] Putin specifically cited two 2024 US bilateral military exercises; one with the Philippines in Northern Luzon, Philippines on April 11 and a second with Denmark near Bornholm Island, Denmark on May 3-5. Both of these bilateral US exercises involved a Typhon Medium Range Capability (MRC) launcher, which US readouts specified can launch SM-6 and Tomahawk missiles.[4] The SM-6 missiles have a maximum range of 370 kilometers, while the Tomahawks have a maximum range of about 2,500 kilometers.[5] US officials did not specify which missiles, if any, may have been involved in either exercise.
Putin is more likely using these exercises as a scapegoat for his broader reflexive control campaign aimed at discouraging Western military assistance to Ukraine. These US and partner exercises involved launchers capable of launching missiles that could pose variable threats to Russia from the exercise locations. Bornholm Island is roughly 300 kilometers from the westernmost shore of Kaliningrad Oblast and roughly 1,400 kilometers from Moscow. The US Sixth Fleet specified that the Bornholm Island exercise involved transporting the Typhon launcher from land to shore as part of convoy protection rehearsals, suggesting that these exercises likely involved shorter-range weapons.[6] The Russian border area closest to the Philippines – the area southwest of Vladivostok – is roughly 2,800 kilometers from Northern Luzon, out of range of the Tomahawk missiles. Putin's June 27 condemnation follows the People's Republic of China (PRC) delayed condemnation of the US exercise in Northern Luzon on May 30. Putin likely invoked the Philippines exercise in part to posture favorably to the PRC, North Korea, and Vietnam as he attempts to create a coalition of states in support of a new “Eurasian security architecture.”[7] The Kremlin has invoked the fear of a nuclear confrontation between Russia and the West throughout its full-scale invasion to push the West to self-deter from providing Ukraine the weapons it needs to sustain its defense against Russian forces, and the Kremlin notably employs this effort during key moments in Western political discussions about further military assistance to Ukraine.[8]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-28-2024
Article 4 of the 23-point treaty could be seen as warranting automatic military intervention in the event of aggression against either country. That would amount to the restoration of a Cold War-era alliance for the first time in 28 years.
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20240629000451315
So far nothing about troops to Ukraine, and it is not likely. If Kim sends troops to Ukraine they have declared war on Ukraine and that is very serious.
https://x.com/GoreClipps/status/1807007030416388463
video Eng subtitles
Two prominent Russian officials appear to be spearheading divergent paths for addressing religious extremism in Russia as ethnic and religious tension in Russia continues to rise. Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin commented on the June 23 terrorist attacks in the Republic of Dagestan and claimed on June 29 that Islamic terrorists were “able to carry their banner of Islamic terror” into Russia and that the State Duma must respond to the threat of Islamic terrorists in Russia.[1] Bastrykin’s indictment of Islamists prompted backlash from Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov, who urged Bastrykin and other Russian officials to choose their words carefully and avoid characterizing all Muslims as terrorists.[2] Kadyrov warned that such statements threaten the unity and stability of Russia's socio-political situation. Russian milbloggers and lower-level Russian officials have previously participated in similar debates, and it is significant that Kadyrov was willing to openly criticize another high-level Kremlin official on this issue.[3] Bastrykin has previously positioned himself as a prominent figure in Russia's ultranationalist movement and is placing himself at odds with Kadyrov, who often presents himself as a representative of Russia's Muslim minority.[4] Putin previously attempted to quell concerns within the Russian information space about the threat posed by migrant and Muslim communities following the Crocus City Hall attack on March 22 by simultaneously calling for unspecified changes to Russia's migration policy and denouncing Islamophobia and xenophobia.[5] Putin may weigh in on Bastrykin’s and Kadyrov’s debate in the coming days in hopes of similarly quelling concern among Russians and a possible future conflict between Bastrykin and Kadyrov.
Russian ultranationalists continue to express growing doubt in Russian authorities’ ability to prevent another terrorist attack and to address ethnic and religious tensions within Russia following the June 23 terrorist attacks in the Republic of Dagestan. Russian ultranationalists widely circulated a story alleging that extremists harassed a Russian doctor in Dagestan who refused to see a patient who would not remove her niqab (a long garment worn by some Muslim women to cover their entire body and face, excluding their eyes) and claimed that extremist actors orchestrated the event to incite further ethnic and religious tensions within Dagestan.[6] Russian ultranationalists also claimed that Dagestani officials know the identities of extremist thought leaders but have allowed radical Salafi-Jihadists to control entire spheres of public life within the republic.[7] These claims led to renewed discussions about banning niqab in Russia, which prompted Bastrykin to voice indirect support for banning the style of dress.[8] Select Western and Muslim-majority countries have imposed various statutes banning religious dress and garments that cover one's face, although the Russian ultranationalist discussion focusing on niqab is strange given the scarcity of Muslims wearing niqab in Russia. The Russian ultranationalist preoccupation with the niqab appears to be a talking point for ultranationalists to express their perception of an extremist threat emanating from Russia's Muslim-minority communities and to criticize Russian authorities for not doing enough to prevent what ultranationalists consider to be inevitable future terrorist attacks.[9] Russian ultranationalists will likely continue to express their fears about further terrorist attacks in ways that further inflame ethnic and religious tension, and ISW continues to assess that Russian ultranationalist rhetoric is partially alienating minority and Muslim-majority communities and generating animosities that Salafi-Jihadi groups can exploit in recruitment efforts.[10]
Some new Russian military personnel are reportedly receiving insufficient training before deploying to Ukraine. A Russian milblogger claimed that new Russian personnel receive roughly 14 days of training on average before deploying to the frontline.[63] The milblogger noted that new Russian personnel receives four to five days of real training and that the 14 days encompass the time between signing a military contract and arriving at the front in Ukraine.[64] A former Storm-Z instructor agreed with the milblogger’s assessment and bemoaned problems with general training.[65] The milblogger also noted that an average Ukrainian soldier appears to receive much more training than the average Russian soldier.[66] The Russian military is currently committing all Russian forces, regardless of their formal designations, to more or less similar operations along the front and continues to mainly leverage mass in infantry and occasional mechanized assaults to make creeping advances instead of relying on highly trained units.[67] This decision has likely lowered training requirements for most new Russian personnel set to fight in Ukraine, although 14 days is still insufficient for generating even limited combat effective personnel. While many new Russian personnel may receive inadequate training, Russian forces likely provide Russian personnel with further training following deployment to Ukraine and are likely attempting to offer better training for select elements.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-29-2024
Russia is allied with Iranian forces and allied groups supporting President Bashar al-Assad in Syria. In January, the Kremlin's top Middle East official Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov received a Houthi delegation in Moscow.
According to US intelligence, Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman intervened to stop Putin from providing the Houthis with missiles.
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.