The problem is that US “elites” are educated in an inbred system that teaches that while “imperialism” is wrong, controlling other countries and peoples “in our interest” (and in our image) is both possible and proper.
The results are wasteful adventures that are intrusive, heavy-handed (but insufficiently brutal and ruthless to succeed), corrupt (absent brutality, you have to buy friends, plus reward the politically-connected at home and abroad to “build consensus”), lacking in clear objectives (clarity would expose the imperialism), ideological (our fixation on democracy rules all) and doomed to failure (because success was never really the point, was it?).
The legitimate US interest in Afghanistan was to deny Muslim extremists a place to plan and launch terrorist operations against the West. After CIA operators connected local war lords with US air power to defeat the Taliban, The Swamp’s lust to get some too blinded them to the obvious: Dance with them what brought you. I.e., using a light footprint, back six or so natural regional war lords and pay them to keep the Taliban at bay. Let the Kabul warlord operate some semblance of a national government in a very lose federation. This would have had many challenges (such as keeping the warlords from each others’ throats), and subtlety we apparently don’t have, but would have cost enormously less. But defense contractors, consultants, diplomats, military brass, and politicians wouldn’t like that, so they did what they always do: spend, flail, and fail.
IOW's act like a grown up colonial power -- something the USA has never been good at. Still... it would have been the proper way to handle it. I also would argue that prior to Obama's 'surge' the light-footprint strategy was what we were pursuing. The only strategic thing we really wanted in Afghanistan up to that point was the maintenance of Bagram Air Base.
—”The problem is that US “elites” “
Secondary hearsay is all I can report on the elites.
At the opposite end of the scale, I’ve seen a bit, and because change is very slow on the bottom, might have some validity?
The strategic corporal is so far into the hills they need to pump in fresh sunlight. He is doing well learning local customs/language...
When the LNs face one of their known enemies, they do well.
And so it is reported and the paperwork moves on...
Somehow it boils out of the top of the system that the”hearts and minds” are being won over.
Transcription errors, perhaps?
Guessing, the purveyors of bad news are seldom promoted?
The legitimate US interest in Afghanistan was to deny Muslim extremists a place to plan and launch terrorist operations against the West. After CIA operators connected local war lords with US air power to defeat the Taliban, The Swamp’s lust to get some too blinded them to the obvious: Dance with them what brought you. I.e., using a light footprint, back six or so natural regional war lords and pay them to keep the Taliban at bay. Let the Kabul warlord operate some semblance of a national government in a very lose federation. This would have had many challenges (such as keeping the warlords from each others’ throats), and subtlety we apparently don’t have, but would have cost enormously less. But defense contractors, consultants, diplomats, military brass, and politicians wouldn’t like that, so they did what they always do: spend, flail, and fail.