[Boogieman]

“When my nonsensical scheduled task runs under the context of CORP\joe, the permissions I have to the DB in this moment are applied, not when the job was created.”

The idea is you run the task under the actual server administrator account, not your own AD account. That account is not going to be demoted, so it will still have permission to run a query later on, even when your own AD/SQL permissions are gone. It may seem to be of limited utility, but it’s still an exploit.

[Technical]

Alright - *could* a developer create an extremely unsafe backdoor to allow an exploit in this unlikely scenario? Sure. You can create backdoors in any system. Just because I *could* build a papier-mache unicorn, does it mean there is one standing in my front yard?

This is exactly how the conversation went yesterday. I pointed out that if Dominion machines have developers creating backdoors like this, it would be discovered in a code security audit. That's the way real world software development works for applications with high profile security concerns.

So the individual I was conversing with said there was no way Dominion code was audited. So then I posted links to federal government documents published under Trump that contained a code audit of Dominion software.

So then the individual asserted that they may be audited, but that the code deployed was different than the audited codebase. At that point, I gave up.

And let's not lose sight of the fact, this mysterious batch file (whose contents have not been posted online - and I'm not counting someone scrolling over fuzzy text) is not what Lindell promised. This is a classic bait and switch.