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To: AndyJackson
More on the Fokker case:

Attorney Sol Wisenberg Drops a Bomb on Judge Sullivan’s Corrupt Actions: “If the Government Wants to Dismiss a Case – The District Court Cannot Refuse to Do So!”

21 posted on 05/13/2020 9:07:06 PM PDT by 11th_VA (May you live in interesting times - Ancient Chinese Proverb)
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To: All

Once dismissed by DOJ, it’s no longer Sullivan’s case. DiGenova & Toensing tells Gorka what the DOJ can do about Sullivan’s refusal to dismiss or desires to sentence Flynn.

Watch 25:15 to 31:10

https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=1848&v=SLpyzWOEOt8&feature=emb_title


24 posted on 05/13/2020 9:10:48 PM PDT by Desslok
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To: 11th_VA

Judge Emmet Sullivan does not have the authority to prevent the dismissal of charges against Gen. Michael Flynn. In the 2016 case linked above, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled that a judge cannot block a prosecutor from dismissing criminal charges against a defendant. Here are excerpts from the decision:

The Constitution allocates primacy in criminal charging decisions to the Executive Branch. The Executive’s charging authority embraces decisions about whether to initiate charges, whom to prosecute, which charges to bring, and whether to dismiss charges once brought. It has long been settled that the Judiciary generally lacks authority to second-guess those Executive determinations, much less to impose its own charging preferences.

. . .

The Executive’s primacy in criminal charging decisions is long settled. That authority stems from the Constitution’s delegation of “take Care” duties, U.S. Const. art. II, § 3, and the pardon power, id. § 2, to the Executive Branch. See United States v. Armstrong,517 U.S. 456, 464, 116 S.Ct. 1480, 134 L.Ed.2d 687 (1996) ; In re Aiken Cnty.,725 F.3d 255, 262–63 (D.C.Cir.2013). Decisions to initiate charges, or to dismiss charges once brought, “lie[ ] at the core of the Executive’s duty to see to the faithful execution of the laws.” Cmty. for Creative Non–Violence v. Pierce,786 F.2d 1199, 1201 (D.C.Cir.1986). . . .

Correspondingly, “judicial authority is ... at its most limited” when reviewing the Executive’s exercise of discretion over charging determinations. Pierce,786 F.2d at 1201 ; see ICC v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs,482 U.S. 270, 283, 107 S.Ct. 2360, 96 L.Ed.2d 222 (1987). The decision whether to prosecute turns on factors such as “the strength of the case, the prosecution’s general deterrence value, the [g]overnment’s enforcement priorities, and the case’s relationship to the [g]overnment’s overall enforcement plan.” Wayte v. United States,470 U.S. 598, 607, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985). The Executive routinely undertakes those assessments and is well equipped to do so. By contrast, the Judiciary, as the Supreme Court has explained, generally is not “competent to undertake” that sort of inquiry. Id. Indeed, “[f]ew subjects are less adapted to judicial review than the exercise by the Executive of his discretion in deciding when and whether to institute criminal proceedings, or what precise charge shall be made, or whether to dismiss a proceeding once brought.” Newman v. United States,382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C.Cir.1967). . . . .

Those settled principles counsel against interpreting statutes and rules in a manner that would impinge on the Executive’s constitutionally rooted primacy over criminal charging decisions. Of particular salience, Rule 48(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires a prosecutor to obtain “leave of court” before dismissing charges against a criminal defendant. Fed.R.Crim.P. 48(a). That language could conceivably be read to allow for considerable judicial involvement in the determination to dismiss criminal charges. But decisions to dismiss pending criminal charges—no less than decisions to initiate charges and to identify which charges to bring—lie squarely within the ken of prosecutorial discretion. See e.g., Newman, 382 F.2d at 480. To that end, the Supreme Court has declined to construe Rule 48(a)’s “leave of court” requirement to confer any substantial role for courts in the determination whether to dismiss charges. Rather, the “principal object of the ‘leave of court’ requirement” has been understood to be a narrow one—”to protect a defendant against prosecutorial harassment ... when the [g]overnment moves to dismiss an indictment over the defendant’s objection.” Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 29 n. 15, 98 S.Ct. 81, 54 L.Ed.2d 207 (1977). A court thus reviews the prosecution’s motion under Rule 48(a) primarily to guard against the prospect that dismissal is part of a scheme of “prosecutorial harassment” of the defendant through repeated efforts to bring—and then dismiss—charges. Id.

So understood, the “leave of court” authority gives no power to a district court to deny a prosecutor’s Rule 48(a) motion to dismiss charges based on a disagreement with the prosecution’s exercise of charging authority. For instance, a court cannot deny leave of court because of a view that the defendant should stand trial notwithstanding the prosecution’s desire to dismiss the charges, or a view that any remaining charges fail adequately to redress the gravity of the defendant’s alleged conduct. See In re United States, 345 F.3d 450, 453 (7th Cir.2003). The authority to make such determinations remains with the Executive.

United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., 818 F.3d 733, 737, 741-742 (D.C. Cir. 2016).


91 posted on 05/14/2020 10:05:19 AM PDT by AJFavish (www.allanfavish.com)
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