In that case the DC COA held: "[T]he `leave of court' authority gives no power to a district court to deny a prosecutor's Rule 48(a) motion to dismiss charges based on a disagreement with the prosecution's exercise of charging authority." United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., 818 F.3d 733, 742 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
The case further held:
The Constitution allocates primacy in criminal charging decisions to the Executive Branch. The Executive's charging authority embraces decisions about whether to initiate charges, whom to prosecute, which charges to bring, and whether to dismiss charges once brought. It has long been settled that the Judiciary generally lacks authority to second-guess those Executive determinations, much less to impose its own charging preferences.
I guess we'll see.
I don't know that the DPA in Fokker is really analogous since in my view Flynn is past the charging/adjudication stage.
Flynn's guilt has been established by the court.
That the DOJ wants to withdraw charges at this point is a situation not many have dealt with.