The reaction that you prescribe -- pulling back on the throttle -- was not the intuitive or trained response to the deadly condition that the Ethiopian Air flight crew confronted. The initial malfunction of the MCAS system was potentially lethal and set in motion a series of events and crew reactions that led to the crash. A superior pilot and crew might have averted the disaster, but the 737 MAX is supposed to be flown by pilots and crews of ordinary experience and ability, not by a select few of extraordinary ability.
It seems that due to bad sensor inputs,
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The stick shaker activated shortly after takeoff because of a bad alpha vane on the left side. At that point MCAS was not activated because the flaps were extended.
Competent pilots would have taken one of two actions.
The could believe the stick shaker and taken action to prevent a stall. This would include leaving the flaps extended. They did not do that.
They could believe the stick shaker was wrong due to a bad sensor. In that case they could compare the left and right side instruments with the backup instruments. That would have told them there was a bad sensor on the left side. The fix was to simply switch both the left and right instruments to the sensors on the right side. Had they done that, MCAS never would have activated and they could have flown back to the airport.
These incompetent pilots took neither action and they crashed the plane.