> But the bottom line still remains that when something needed done, some people stepped up and did it. <
The problem being that in WW I, nothing really needed to be done. No great nation was out to destroy any other great nation. But no matter. The meat grinder had to be fed.
In this case anyway, Marine Corps General Smedley Butler was right. War is a racket.
But the bottom line still remains that when something needed done, some people stepped up and did it
______________________________________________________
Maybe not but the spirited humor, determination and can-do attitude of the men does feel like something has been lost.
Recommend the series— “The Fall of the Eagles”-— a BBC excellent production from the 70s that is on youtube, all episodes.
You can find the one episode about who and why brought on the Serbian assasination of the Austrian Prince and wife. A couple of “diplomatic” renegades one Russian the other a clever Austro Hungarian (and, pointedly described in the episode- jewish) played footsie (the Russian idiot anyway without the smarter Russian military types, and of course the useless Tsar Nicholas’s knowledge) over what the Russian diplomat perceived as a Russian strategic need— control over the Dardanelles (against the wishes of the Serbian allies of Russia). The Serb nationalists reacted to the sell out of Austro-Hungary empire.
And, you’re correct— other than the playthings of the monarchies... nobody had to go to war over this. But the Kaiser- pumped up cripple and loon that he was... Did. What a waste. All the Eagles of Europe fell— all the principalities.
And a progressive, Wilson, who campaigned on no American involvement, got thousands of boys killed.
“...in WW I, nothing really needed to be done. No great nation was out to destroy any other great nation...” [Leaning Right, post 14]
Inaccurately summarizes the strategic situation.
And falls prey to post-modernist presentism: Euro powers went to war for centuries, over less-than-dire situations. Wars of total annihilation were a 20th-century thing, postdating World War One at that.
Like many up-and-coming powers, Imperial Germany did not want to make war: it merely wanted to advance in any and every direction it liked. If someone chose to resist, it was their fault for starting hostilities. We conservatives ought to recognize that sort of totalitarian propaganda when we see it.
The Imperial German government looked on Czarist Russia as the real threat, but feared a two-front war; its planners and other staff officers thus decided that the lesser threat - France - had to be taken down first, before the slower-moving but much larger Russian forces could be mobilized and deployed. Thus the essence of the Schlieffen Plan crystallized.
But by 1914, the strategic situation had been transformed. The assassination of the heir to the Austrian throne provided an excuse. No real proof was ever found that the Serbian government played any role, but - judging that they’d never get a better chance - the Germans jollied and goaded the Austrians into making impossible demands on Serbia, promising military assistance. German ambassadors around the Continent were explicitly instructed to publish false information about the location & activities of high government officials. To lie, in sum - specifically to lull the Allies and non-aligned nations into a false sense of security.
Up until the moment Austrian forces began their assault on Serbia, the sympathies of the public in almost all Euro nations were with the Austrians, and their aged Emperor Franz Joseph I.
Many Americans are pleased to vilify Kaiser William II as the “evil mastermind”, but by 1914 he was equal parts figurehead and warlord (for the deterioration of relations between William II and his own officials, look up “Daily Telegraph interview”). When it looked like the Russians weren’t backing down in July 1914, he got cold feet and scurried to mend fences, going as far as wiring Czar Nicholas direct, to dissipate the tensions: the exchange is now referred to as the “Nicky-Willy telegrams.”
William was stymied and undercut by his own civilian officials and military officers, who argued with him to the very last moment, pleading the impossibility of halting the invasion of France.
By 1914 Franco-German tensions were at their lowest ebb in decades, but the Germans unwisely chose to stick to their now-outdated plan. Accordingly, they invaded France through Belgium. As co-signatories (with France and Britain) to a treaty guaranteeing Belgian sovereignty and neutrality, the Germans were in immediate violation, but brushed off all criticism. They did not simply march through Belgium, they conquered it, terrorized and killed the populace, and confiscated everything they could.
But more than 100 years ago, nations took treaties more seriously. Britain informed the German ambassador that it would declare war, and did. Interestingly, intervention by British ground forces was not even discussed by the German government during the leadup - its small professional army was dismissed as of no consequence. So the accusations flung against the British concerning “war mongering” are insupportable.
When it comes to examining why battlefield success eluded the combatants, there are many more reasons. And if one attempts to unravel why no one foresaw why the conflict proved so difficult and costly, one must research much farther still.