[beebuster2000]

from my non naval business operating experience:
every major screw up ever, that i have seen, the people lower down in the organization knew exactly what to do but thought they shouldn't do it because they needed permission form above or because they thought someone above was smarter than them and therefore knew what was gong on. every time.

these accidents are starting to smell like that to me. i bet the lower down in rank you get in these incidents the clearer the peril and the greater clarity about exactly what should have been done.

it can not possibly be lack of nav info, my guess is the nav station is awash in really good info on collision and target tracking.

[River_Wrangler]

My theory, as a licensed captain for the past 40 years, is that their are too many people on the bridge and in the operations command chain and they become a distraction. On commercial vessels the captain is the steersman, throttle man, navigator and radar observer. He also is the sole lookout, operates the radio and has responsibility for all actions of his crew.

On a typical navel vessel their are 6 to 10 people ( McCain had 12) performing the same task and reporting up the chain to a commander who makes decisions to maneuver down through the chain. What could possibly go wrong?

I operated many types of oilfield support vessels in all weather and high traffic areas. You must have a comprehensive situational awareness and be able to react to unusual situations in seconds. My opinion is that reaction time and judgement is compromised through the military mind set. When seconds count you cannot wait for someone to come on the bridge, acquire situational awareness and make a judgement call to tell a group of sailors to turn the helm and reverse one or more throttles. That sets up a cluster that might be to late anyway.