When a South American Air Force bought one of the Korean Airlines’ 707s in the ‘80s, I was sent by my company as an instructor pilot to check out their three crews.
The KAL aircraft had 3 independent overwater nav systems - one each for the captain, copilot, and navigator. According to the KAL SOP (standard operating procedures), they were supposed to be independently programmed. However, they had a “Left / Right / Remote switch that could allow the Nav to program all three systems at once. I cautioned the Air Force guys to NEVER do this because an inadvertent error in setting the latitude/longitude would not be caught. They were good about never doing this.
For years, I wondered if the Koreans were, or did they just dump the programming on the Nav and hope that he did it correctly. Two transposed numbers could have put them right over Russian airspace...
After another KAL crash (this time due to operator error) in the 90s, I recall reading here (pretty sure it was here) of the infallible attitude of “authority” among KAL pilots, and that they would not accept correction from subordinates, even if they might be right. I wonder if that might have played a role here as well.