Massive Gate 3 Leak (2003 DSOD report photo) - DWR readying to troubleshoot the issue by closing gate inlet with stoplog panels.
This image reveals just how serious the gate problems are in the side seal assemblies. Massive pressurized leakage observed from wide gaps in the side seal. DWR found that the side seals were irregular in gap to wall seal spacing, even though the design had "J-bolts" that were intended to allow fine tuning the spacing to the wall to the spec setting of 0.040 inches (all along the 38+ foot arc on each side assembly).
DSOD Inspectors noted that significant leakage from the gates to be a common condition ("extensive leakage" was considered normal). Problem is - these "gaps" allow lodging or wedging of debris. A "frozen" gate (unmovable) is a Category 1 Failure Mode and is extremely serious. The root of the problem goes to the mechanical stability of the side seal assemblies - note the angled connection bolts in Gate 3. These are "bent" bolts (in the pre-fix design). A very weak alignment mechanical design when considering the forces the approx 33 ton main radial gate may apply in dynamic forces (0.017 inch effective axis "vibration" causes complete loss of the 0.040 specified "gap" spacing").
The side assemblies may be outgunned in the mechanical forces from the heavy radial gate - thus "shifting" the gap alignment constantly.
Even after the divers worked to clean out and "unseal" the gates March 16 (see post above), Gate 7 is observed closed in the March 17 flow. (perhaps it was jammed and causing the lift motor circuit breakers to trip from excessive current?). The other possibility is that DWR is having gate issues to where they are sequencing neighboring gates to shift the hydrostatic pressure to allow "lifting" of a sensitive gate (i.e. keeping 7 closed to allow a differential flow reduction on Gate 8 - and thus allowing an easier lift of Gate 8). However, information will likely not be flowing like water on these issues.
Massive leakage gushing from a supposedly "sealed" Gate 3. DWR prepping closing the inlet to Gate 3 to figure out the problem.
DWR keeps Gate 7 closed during startup for some reason (jam on 7 or alleviating issue on 8). Flows start in paired gate openings from the middle and are paired outward until the desired base flow startup is achieved. This photo is an abnormal condition.
Are DWR & DSOD "cooking the books" on Inspection reports? A "Water vortex" observed draining into ground in front of ES - was kept out of the regular 2005 DSOD Inspection Report. Why?
With news articles continuing to repeat the issue of Trust with DWR and the public, yet more information is surfacing that adds to these concerns. Recently, a newly formed group, "Oroville Strong!" sent a letter to DWR asking questions & stating issues regarding the Spillway crisis & its impact to Oroville.
DWR responded to their letter in assuring that the integrity of the dam is administered through advising experts, groups, and through layers of FERC & DSOD Inspections. DWR even provided a link url in their response (url to access all of the DSOD Inspection reports going back to 1998) to address "Oroville Strong!" concerns.
But, DWR's response to "Oroville Strong" has just reignited the trust concerns again as a "discovery" of discrepancies** exist in a DSOD Inspection report verses what was filed with FERC in the database storage of Inspection report information (report called a "Performance Report").
DWR/DSOD seemingly "Hid" information of a "water vortex" (i.e. water induced flow formation) above the ground in front of the emergency spillway. This "water vortex" was discovered in a FERC/DWR database document that was NOT mentioned or hinted in the publicly released DWR/DSOD Inspection report. In fact, there is a special photograph, besides the specific notation of this "water vortex", that are NOT included in the publicly released DSOD Inspection report (different photographs, different matrix list of items checked, etc). However, the bigger problem to this new discovery is that DSOD chose not to include this "water vortex" draining into the ground - and the associated investigative photograph of the vortex - in the publicly released DSOD Inspection report.
Water vortex conditions are evidence of a subterranean flow. The Emergency Spillway and the FCO Headworks have a grout curtain of injected material to seal the lower rock of the face of both of these structures from "subterranean flows". When a "vortex" forms, the water penetration velocity is such that a "Coriolis Effect" forms and causes surface water disruption from the downward flow. This is very different than a slow "seepage" process.
Any time a "water vortex" is observed in front of an impermeable boundary at a dam or spillway, this is an important issue to note and track. However, the problem becomes even greater as this item seems to have been desired to be "kept out of the report - intentionally" from the publicly accessible DSOD Inspection report.
What else is being "hidden" via a process of deciding to "not include" Inspection specifics in the regular DSOD Inspection reports? Yet is reported in different documents to FERC? This discovery was almost by accident. It was assumed that all of the Inspection report issues and findings would match in ALL reports from ALL dates. It was only from the prior knowledge from searching through all of the original DSOD Inspection reports (publicly available) is where this notable "discrepancy" stood out when observed in a FERC document. The FERC database is not easy to search through. Most of the important technical information is blocked as secret using the CEII status. So in essence, this discovery, may have been kept blocked if it wasn't selected as CEII as is nearly all of the rest of the information DWR chooses to keep from the public.
If DWR want's to repair their reputation with the public ,regarding their technical competence and transparency, then DWR should identify to the public why there seems to be "differences in the books" on Inspection Reports, especially on notable items DSOD felt was important enough to photograph.
**Multiple photograph differences besides the water vortex "missing" or "removed" from the main DSOD Inspection pdf file report.
(per Oroville Strong letter & DWR's response): DWR provided database link of public access to DSOD Inspection reports: See file 2005(May 17).pdf (this report has NO mention of the water vortex, and NO picture of the water vortex).
https://d3.water.ca.gov/owncloud/index.php/s/j76ZsTk6tDgKxoo
DWR's Wording response to Oroville Strong Letter (that notes their Inspection integrity & reports that are accessible to the public):
https://www.orovillestrong.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Final-Signed-DWR-Response-to-Coalition-Letter_linked.pdf
DWR's response to questions from a letter sent by "Oroville Strong!". Original questions in light grey font. Answers in black font. DWR conveys assurance on technical competency and transparency while providing a url link in the response.
DWR/DSOD May 17, 2005 Inspection report - NO mention of the "water vortex" observed in front of the Emergency Spillway. NO photograph that Inspectors took of this "water vortex". Left out of this Inspection report. Why?
Critical revelation of a "water vortex" + photograph in front of emergency spillway. Kept out of regular DSOD report. (found via careful searching of FERC database - reveals that DWR has a "different" set (superset) of findings in an Inspection Matrix plus associated pictures that are different from the public DSOD Inspection report. FERC & DSOD inspection documents state the exact same date, time, inspectors, of DSOD information from the May 17, 2005 Inspection - yet items left out of public DSOD Inspection report.
