It is fairly straight forward to deduce the blacked out sections. Using a matrix of known issues, and what is excluded (via non-discussion elsewhere, thus the "blacked out" areas), a person may construct the missing pieces.
Big Failure Admission: Initial "spall defect" & then Stagnation Pressure "hydraulic jacking" lifted up & busted the slab at the failure region.
Main Spillway: One point was inferred to the risk of the time schedule (i.e. getting an option completed in time). They "blacked out" the concerns of "cavitation damage" from the high velocity flow in the rough RCC surface. Thus, smoothing layers were to be a priority to integrate.
Upper Main Spillway: They blacked out the information on the poor state of the substructure to the slabs. This information ties to the urgency to completely replace the upper spillway.
Emergency Spillway: There is a concern regarding the stability of the Large Concrete Ogee Weir. They blacked out a proposal to address this stability with layers of re-inforcement at the base, but there is a problem with forces peeling the re-inforcement away. The "blacking out" of this section was more of keeping this "flaw" state of the Emergency Spillway from being public (PR issue). The later report came to the acceptable conclusion of the massive RCC buttressing. (first report discussions talked about drilling anchors through the massive monolith Ogee Weirs - showed their concerns of "stability").
Another key point to the Emergency Spillway is that the current fixes are described for 30,000+ cfs (temporary until the full upgrade). This 30,000+ cfs rate is suspiciously aligned with the current rate of the main spillway. This could infer that they plan on depending on the Emergency Spillway to insure the May to November construction schedule. Nature may have the last say on what happens to an uncontrolled increase over 30,000+ cfs (when the main spillway is shut off & an unexpected meltoff occurs).
Critical Schedule: Construction window stated as May to November. As the spillway is limited to 35,000 cfs, inferred by the Target "slippage" from 40K to 50K cfs, there is a race with nature on whether the reservoir can be maintained from a predictable & manageable inflow (i.e. not having to use the main spillway). The report(s) do not state if the window can shrink to June to November, but there is a cutoff to construction options. (Emergency Spillway usage dependency comes to the forefront to meet these windows).
Very Surprised: No hint at all regarding the replacement of the Anchor Tendons on the FCO gate structure. DWR must be placing all of their eggs in the basket on the Dissipation Wave Testing of the Anchor rods (they are still waiting for the analysis data - delayed to Sept 2017).
Drains: Much discussion of doing drains properly. Reveals the "flawed" design of the current spillway. They also required "water stops" at the seams. Another "flaw" contributor to "hydraulic jacking".
Overall, I believe all of these issues have been covered in upthread discussions. It is ironic the blacked out areas are considered something someone may want to "attack". I believe the only "attack" that was of concern was from criticism.
The final design of the rebuild may forgo underslab drainage altogether, and rely upon sealing to prevent water infiltration.
Since the ES weir was full nearly to the top with water and it’s unclear exactly how that water entered, what’s the point of keeping the weir? Did the water penetrate a seam? Did it enter from beneath the weir?
Why bother buttressing a weir defective in so many ways? It’s not clear how or even if it’s anchored, or what the condition of the rock beneath it is, and it leaks.
Why not build a new weir using RCC or other modern technology, and key & anchor it to competent rock? Get rid of the ambiguities and the defects. Remove the junk weir, inspect the rock, and build a decent weir.