New Federal Energy Regulatory Commission filing documents detailing issues pertinent to the current Oroville Repair/Recovery Crisis. These documents detail the conflicting statements by DWR & the CA Division of Safety of Dams (DSOD) with the actual dangerous erosion of the Emergency Spillway. DWR & DSOD stated that the hillside was adequate - proven significantly incorrect. These documents filed to FERC also identify the concerns of secrecy in the new construction repair/recovery process - that it is inadequate for concerned citizens (public) to have proper access & review. Notes that the volume of rock in the large area of the spillway should not be hidden as secret via CEII, in addition to noting that such rock would be of little interest to "an attack".
Documents reveal the significance of the 1960's political engineering decision to create a separate Emergency Spillway instead of working out the kinks in getting a fully armored "Combined & Delta Main + Emergency Spillway design" perfected. By DWR making this "engineering" switch to an Emergency Spillway that was "deemed" to be very rare in its use, this decision has come back to haunt the dam design. This decision created the dangerous problem of the loss of a "safe redundant" spillway in case the main spillway had a breakdown. All for the sake of "deeming" the Emergency Spillway would likely not be used except in very rare circumstances - in that the Probable Maximum Flood (PMF) would be so rare that the use of the Emergency Spillway would be 10,000 years or greater. What was not included in this decision was a failure of the main spillway. The Emergency Spillway needs to be a "safe backup" or "redundancy" to cover this contingency.
These documents re-inforce the engineering culture pitfalls of the "politics of engineering" decisions that must not occur in exceptionally critical infrastructure. These documents also demonstrate the continued defense by DWR & DSOD of the 1960's decision in stating the Emergency Hillside was adequate for use. Thus the reinforcement of the poor engineering competency is again revealed in the "loss of safe redundancy" by the first go-around in defending against armoring the hillside in a prior FERC filing & review. Now, today, we have DWR & DSOD complicit in poor engineering competency in revealing yet again a non-safe redundant emergency spillway. This design will not safely operate 369,000 cfs, (a required spill rate spec by the Board Of Consultants), as the apron does not protect the full hillside down to the Feather River.
How many times will this poor engineering competency set of "reasoned away" PMF excuses be used? Yet, the real use of the ES has been for "safe redundancy" - of which it failed spectacularly & will so in the future as the new concept design stands.
note: Blue & red underlining markups, arrows, & comments added for discussion notation - not part of the original document.
Image 1: Newly Filed FERC Submittal of doc 20170419-5231 - Request of Friends of the River, CSPA, American Whitewater, SYRCL, and Sierra Club for clarification of licensing/dam-safety proceedings/process and for a public process at Project 2100 reconstruction.
Image 2: Newly Filed FERC Submittal of doc 20170419-5231 - Request of Friends of the River, CSPA, American Whitewater, SYRCL, and Sierra Club for clarification of licensing/dam-safety proceedings/process and for a public process at Project 2100 reconstruction.
Image 3: Newly Filed FERC Submittal of doc 20170419-5231 - Request of Friends of the River, CSPA, American Whitewater, SYRCL, and Sierra Club for clarification of licensing/dam-safety proceedings/process and for a public process at Project 2100 reconstruction.
Image 4: Newly Filed FERC Submittal of doc 20170419-5231 - Request of Friends of the River, CSPA, American Whitewater, SYRCL, and Sierra Club for clarification of licensing/dam-safety proceedings/process and for a public process at Project 2100 reconstruction.
