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To: abb; Grampa Dave; Jim 0216; maggief; Mariner; Ray76; daisy12; janetjanet998; LucyT; SE Mom; ...
Upper Spillway Has Extensive Cracking in Oroville Spillway Design Weakness: Patching of cracks at nearly every drain pipe "thinning" of the slab concrete.

Seems the Upper Main Spillway has Extensive crack lines in the slabs. Nearly every drain "line" shows surface repair "patching" over the cracks in the slabs. Photos from 2010, when a thin layer of water was present in the spillway chute, reveals the significant extent of the drain-emplacement-thinning slab cracking problem. The Images reveal the repaired cracks as whitish lines of the newer/fresh patch material over the cracks. Cracks nearly every 20 ft (10 crack lines across the width of the spillway for every 4 slabs) for the length of the ENTIRE spillway.

History of posts, discussion, & reference photos:

Concrete Fractured along Drain Pipe Emplacement (Upper Spillway)

Modern Spillway Design vs Oroville Design - 2 Dam Failures, Drain Pipe, Rebar, "Hydraulic Jacking", "Void" Finding by Radar

Pre-failure Herringbone crack patterns in Main Spillway (drain pipes)

HerringBone Drain Pipe - Fracture pattern in Main Spillway

Construction modifications of Main Spillway Drain System

Years of Warning at Blowout Area? Missing drain water/slabs being repeatedly repaired at leakage

Alarms Raised Years Ago About Risks of Oroville Dam's Spillways

Extensive Patched Cracks start at Gates of Upper Main spillway (first image). (Oroville's slab design only had a top layer of rebar. Oroville's slab design created up to a 60+% reduction in thinning of the slab from the placement of intervals of drain pipes & gravel - forming a inverted "V" of non-concrete. Aggravating the Oroville design was the lack of a lower layer of rebar in the slab.)


Next segment: Extensive Patched Cracks of Upper Main spillway (second image)


Third segment to near Towers where existing broken section of the Upper Main Spillway.


Blowout Failure region (would be at center of image) showing the patched drain line induced cracks. notice the tree growing directly adjacent to the spillway wall just below the "blowout area". Tree is on the side where the drainage canyon formed.


History information (updated):

The "angled cracks" in the spillway concrete slabs and the "jetting" of water out of the sidewall drains should have set off alarms years ago regarding the integrity of the Oroville Main Spillway.

Why? Both of these signs indicate a serious known failure mode in spillways from Stagnation Pressure (via cracks/voids/water). Two prominent examples are Big Sandy Dam, Wyoming, 1983, (spillway chute failure) - Dickinson Dam, North Dakota, 1954 (spillway chute failure).

Excessive water beneath the concrete slabs causes a very powerful effect dubbed "hydraulic jacking" from under the slab (think of a hydraulic car jack). Called in engineering terms: "Stagnation Pressure" & "Stagnation Pressure Failure".

How does the water get under the slabs? The most potent source is from pressurized water from the top of the spillway being forced below through cracks & non-sealed seams in the concrete chute. The more cracks, the more water, the more water, the greater ability of this water to "wash or erode away material" under the slab. Erosion leads to "voids". Voids + "hydraulic jacking" lead to greater stresses on the slab, thus "cracking".

How do you protect from "Stagnation Pressure Failure"? Drain pipes are placed under the concrete slabs to collect & drain any leakage, thus preventing a pressurized water layer under the slab. A well sealed & healthy spillway would have very little waterflow out of the drains. The Oroville Main Spillway slab design is less than modern standards. (1) Modern slab designs have rebar in the top layer and the bottom layer. Oroville's slab design only had a top layer of rebar. (2) Modern slab designs retain the full thickness of the slab by placing drain pipe & pervious material below the slab. Oroville's slab design created a 61% reduction in thinning of the slab from the placement of intervals of drain pipes & gravel - forming a inverted "V" of non-concrete. (3) Aggravating the Oroville design was the lack of a lower layer of rebar in the slab. Thus (1)(2)(3) should have set off alarms when high waterflow was "jetting" out of the drains.

2,421 posted on 03/13/2017 10:38:41 AM PDT by EarthResearcher333
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To: EarthResearcher333

And no one will be held accountable.


2,422 posted on 03/13/2017 12:54:33 PM PDT by Repeal The 17th (I was conceived in liberty, how about you?)
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To: EarthResearcher333
Speaking of power lines....

Just a few quick notes on the power line situation. The following image was taken prior to the event. This is the original transmission line configuration...

In the original configuration, there are 3 ea. 230 kilovolt transmission circuits that tie to the plant's switchyard and a transmission switching substation roughly west of the plant. 2 circuits are on the lower (downhill, closest to the erosion) tower and 1 on the upper tower. Typically, lines of this voltage are capable of carrying 500-800 Megawatts of power. The plant is rated, with all 6 units on line at full output, at 819 MW. Basically, the station is designed to have 3 circuits to allow for contingency loss of one, or for removing one line from service for maintenance.

Recently, they re-arranged the conductors and removed both circuits from the lower tower in preparation for the possibility that it could be lost to erosion from further damage and use of the main spillway. This resulted in only 2 instead of 3 circuits connecting the plant's generation to the power grid, both of which are located on the upper transmission tower.

What they're doing now is installing "temporary" wood poles to allow the relocation of one or two circuits farther up the hill to less risky ground. I use quotations on "temporary" because in the power industry, things like this tend to stay in service for decades. What this will allow is to have the full complement of 3 circuits tying the plant to the grid (which will come in handy when they finish maintenance on the 6th generating unit), and will take one or two circuits well out of harm's way if the main spillway experiences more damage or erosion.

They are also removing the lowest tower, and it appears that they're digging up the footers as well, so a tower is not likely to occupy this spot again. Image from ER333's post above...


2,424 posted on 03/13/2017 1:42:47 PM PDT by meyer (The Constitution says what it says, and it doesn't say what it doesn't say.)
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To: EarthResearcher333

EarthResearcher333, you probably already said this, but were those four pictures taken recently or years ago? If these are recent pictures, is there an old picture(s) that shows what should have been a red flag?


2,425 posted on 03/13/2017 1:43:41 PM PDT by Jim W N
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To: EarthResearcher333

BTW, great pictures, analysis and updates.

If there’s a hearing, maybe they’ll call on you to testify. :)

or :(

...if you don’t like that prospect


2,426 posted on 03/13/2017 1:50:13 PM PDT by Jim W N
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To: EarthResearcher333

Regarding the 4th image in #2421:
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/3524221/posts?page=2421#2421
“...notice the tree growing directly adjacent to the spillway wall just below the “blowout area”...”
-
The fairly regular crack pattern looks different at that location.


2,429 posted on 03/13/2017 6:19:29 PM PDT by Repeal The 17th (I was conceived in liberty, how about you?)
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