the perfumed princes in the AF that have for sooo long tried to butcher the Hog must be apoplectic...
Posted on 10/28/2016 11:49:34 PM PDT by Brad from Tennessee
Active Duty ping.
Factory closed.
Tooling gone.
Engineers and manufacturing linemen no longer there.
Supply train non-existent.
Second and third tier manufactures gone.
Suppliers can’t just re-start the line when they, too, don’t have support structure in place.
Logistics to operate a line non-existant.
Consequently, cost to re-start the line would be prohibitive.
Would be nice if they could re-start and build more.
the perfumed princes in the AF that have for sooo long tried to butcher the Hog must be apoplectic...
What!? Good God!
You have got to be kidding!
Good. Build more.
Recondition the ones in the aircraft graveyard.
Do that too...and build more.
Great jet. . .as we said in A-10 fighter bars, “go ugly early.”
Firing the gun is the most fun you can have with your trousers on.
Luv the jet, luv’d the mission.
True cowboy, manly flying.
Not exactly. Fixed wing CAS is now an Air Force mission. Army could fly other fixed-wing, but not CAS fixed-wing.
Lessons from CAS aircraft attached to Army units was proven to be a tactical and strategic error. Fixed wing CAS can float everywhere, not limited to small ground patches of Army units.
Argument in favor of your position with counter-argument: http://warontherocks.com/2014/02/why-america-needs-an-independent-air-force/
Your premise can be reversed. Something to ponder: We need to attach the Army to the Air Force.
(Think piece found at Army Command and General Staff)
Airpower may now be the primary fire with ground forces serving as supporting fire. This is a radical departure from traditional thought. Airpower was first viewed as a primary fire by an Italian airpower theorist, Giulio Douhet. Starting in 1917, Douhet envisioned massed air attacks that would destroy an army and terrorize a nation into submission.
With today’s technology and weaponry, destroying an enemy with airpower is now a reality, and as far as terrorizing a nation, if not for the Law of Armed Conflict rightfully prohibiting indiscriminate attacks on civilians, this objective could be easily met.
Douhet suggested that airpower could be a primary fire that would be key to a successful war effort. It took nearly seventy years before he was proved correct by the role airpower played in Gulf War I.
In Gulf War I, airpower was the predominant force that ensured a quick and decisive victory. While airpower was not the sole reason for our success, it was the first time in history that airpower truly functioned as it’s own independent maneuver force, as a primary fire, with ground-based fires performing a supporting role.
The effect of strategic targeting in air campaigns can be best seen by contrasting two major Vietnam War air campaigns.
For many military planners and strategic thinkers, the Gulf War I air campaign used the lessons of Vietnam to help produce an historic air campaign plan that for the first time ever, resulted in a war where airpower was the primary fire and landpower merely played a supporting role.
Unfortunately, some of the old school ignored the strategic airpower lessons of Vietnam and Gulf War I.
During the air campaign in Kosovo, Gen Clark (USA), the combatant commander, gave his staff a specific number of targets to hit, but to what end? What was the desired effect? What was the strategic aim envisioned? Gen Clark didn’t want to be bothered, all he cared about was the number of targets on the hit-list, not the effect.
By stating his desire for a specific number of targets, Gen Clark demonstrated his ignorance about what makes airpower powerful, ignored the lessons of history, and abandoned his role in translating political objectives into strategic guidance.
Simply stated, with insightful intelligence, precise targeting, and the ability of airpower to accurately deliver all sorts of weapons effects, we now have a new weapon in our quiver. Now when the time comes to shoot, we have the airpower arrow from which to choose. It is just as lethal, if not more so in some cases, than any other military instrument. To mix metaphors, selecting which weapon to use is like deciding on which golf club to use. With the impressive ability of airpower, combined with exceptional intelligence and targeting, we now have a full golf bag. We can now break par.
Actually, the Army recognized the extraordinary high cost of the logistics supporting/fielding a fixed-wing aircraft at forward deployed locations, like fields, highways, etc, as well as the high cost of fielding maintenance pieces-parts and maintainers, and the heavy cost and logistics demands associated with ammunition storage facilities.
Budgets are put together by each service. A huge issue like transferring a platform from one service to another would be resolved by the Sec Def with presidential agreement and then, only then, is the PB submission sent to the House and Senate.
Congress is where the HAC and SAC take whacks at the PB, as well as the SASC and HASC do their editing, then a conference committee between the House and Senate comes together and horse trading takes place-—all about money and capability and a huge issue like transferring a platform from one service to another would be resolved by the Sec Def with presidential agreement before it is sent to Congress.
Basically, something like a platform transfer would require significant agreement between the losing and gaining service, and then the services would have to be united as they try and convince the Sec Def this transfer should take place. IF the Sec Def is convinced, then he has to convince the president to support this action. IF he is convinced then the PB is sent to Congress.
Not a simple thing and most certainly not something “Congress” would kill unilaterally.
Army never had them.
The “US Army” probably was on the side of an airplane model (that’s where I saw it).
And one they have repeatedly proven reluctant to do. It ain't sexy enough for the flyboys.
Army could fly other fixed-wing, but not CAS fixed-wing.
Suggest you check your facts on this one.
Something to ponder: We need to attach the Army to the Air Force.
There is not enough alcohol in the world to make that argument seem logical.
You can not destroy the enemy with air power only reduce it enough for the ground troops to move in and hold. Sandbox One and Two were both excellent examples of this.
Oh by the way, Weaselly could not find his own butt with assistance of the entire 82nd Airborne. The man left a disaster where ever he went.
There's older. Think again.
Fixed-wig CAS remains USAF mission, and during Cold War days, emphasis was on strategic strike, with the A-10 as the primary CAS aircraft—and having flown the A-10 during that time—we recognized its critical need but the strategic mission was most important to stop massed forces.
It had nothing to do with being “sexy” and everything to do with prioritizing assets. . .and air supremacy and strategic strike were primary.
Having spent a few years with the 101st as a FAC, with combat experience, the old Cold War attitude as expressed by you is no more. Air Force has many A-10 fighter pilots in the upper echelons and they remain fiercely loyal to the mission and the jet, and with the evolution of precision munitions, most all jets in the Air Force inventory can (and do) conduct CAS.
Remember, CAS is the application of air power within close proximity to friendly forces and has nothing to do with flying low. You fly low in a CAS environment when the air-to-air threat is significant and you fly below the fight for command of the air. And the Army loves whatever USAF CAS platform delivers the ordinance. Be it a B-52 or an A-10, it matters not who delivers the mail as long as the mail is delivered on time and at the right address.
Army could fly other fixed-wing, but not CAS fixed-wing, and yes, the facts prove this: https://www.army.mil/article/137612
Something to ponder is a think piece, meaning an exploration of what we think we know and to examine possible scenarios in future where what we know may not be true, and what roles and missions may evolve.
Prime example is Billy Mitchell: http://www.historynet.com/william-billy-mitchell-an-air-power-visionary.htm
Billy Mitchell “provoked the Navy admirals into open hostility through his tirades against their super-dreadnought concepts.” This challenged the primacy of Naval forces even though “there is not enough alcohol in the world to make that argument seem logical.”
By dismissing out of hand the idea that perhaps aviation is evolving to become a primary fire you joined the Admirals in dismissing a concept that is contrary to what they “know.”
Tactics, strategy, weapons, missions, etc, all contribute to an evolving process that if accepted, ensures we field our forces in the most effective way, rather than engage in rice-bowl fights to protect old concepts and missions.
The Army has weight restrictions on aircraft, the A-10 surpasses those weight regulations.
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.