Thanks for your reply.
From:
“Iraqi Perspectives Project, Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights from Captured Iraqi Documents “
“State sponsorship of terrorism became such a routine tool of state
power that Iraq developed elaborate bureaucratic processes to monitor
progress and accountability in the recruiting, training, and resourcing
of terrorists. Examples include the regime’s development, construction,
certification, and training for car bombs and suicide vests in 1999
and 2000.”
http://lauren.vortex.com/dod-iraq-aq.pdf
I’ll give that a look.
At first glance this looks the same as the information I remember from the Survey Group report. On pg ES-1 and ES-2 it states that:
“The predominant targets of Iraqi state terror operations were Iraqi citizens, both inside and outside of Iraq.”
“On occasion, the Iraqi intelligence services directly targeted the regimes perceived enemies, including non-Iraqis. Non-Iraqi casualties often resulted from Iraqi sponsorship of non-governmental terrorist groups.”
“Saddam’s regime often cooperated directly, albeit cautiously, with terrorist groups when they believed such groups could help advance Iraq’s long term goals. The regime carefully recorded its connections to Palestinian terror organizations in numerous government memos. One such example documents Iraqi financial support to families of suicide bombers in Gaza and the West Bank.”
Unless there is more as I read the full report this is the same information that the Survey Group assembled. Saddam’s concern was his own power and removing any threats to his rule. He was primarily killing Iraqis, particularly Kurds. After Gulf War I he tried to make use of Islamic terror groups if he thought that that would work to his advantage. But while he used them he was wary of them and he was working with them only because he thought it would promote his own interests. He wasn’t advancing the jihad or the Caliphate, he wasn’t an Islamist.