I cite it just as a counterpoint to "we know that citizenship is classified two-fold: natural born and naturalized. Since Wong wasn't naturalized (he couldn't be under the Chinese Exclusion Act), he was unquestionably a natural born citizen." While courts often say things like "there are only two categories," the existence and definition of those categories is a judicial construct that usually fits the pivot point of decision in the case in hand. But setting up a two-slot system is nowhere compelled.
One could just as easily say that a person is either born a dual citizen, or not; or is naturalized into dual citizenship, or not.
Quick sideways leap - sometimes the court makes a more complex structure, as it did in the Steel Seizure case. Sometimes the issue is more complex and is analyzed on some sort of sliding scale or multiple prong framework.
I don't believe that the rule "native born is natural born citizen" is correct; or even the WKA conclusion that Ark was a "native born citizen" results in Ark also being a NBC. Not the point of discussion, but I also don't think that "native born is always (diplomat exception aside) a citizen" is compelled by the cases, although that is the way WKA and Plyler have been applied.
There are other important variables in the citizenship analysis besides location of birth, including whether the parent is a legal resident of the US, and whether the child obtains citizenship from another country, even though born in the US.
I think the "two category" system that gets to the eligibility of a dual citizen to hold the office, would focus on "dual citizen or not dual citizen," not "naturalized or native born." While it is tempting to think that this the "native born or not" framework is comprehensive of defining NBC, I would say that at least we don't know if the Supreme Court would see it that way.
OK. You cite it as counter-example, but you don't explain how it serves as that. My contention (supported by the unanimous opinion of the scholarly articles and judicial options over the past 75 years speaking on the point) is that "native born" equates to "natural born." Where in the Kawakita is there a suggestion that he was not a natural born citizen?
In fact, there is language in the opinion that runs counter to your supposed counterpoint:
" The court further charged that, if the jury should find beyond a reasonable doubt that, during the period in question, petitioner was an American citizen, he owed the United States the same duty of allegiance as any other citizen." 343 U.S. at 722
If Kawakita, who is termed a "native-born citizen" (in the syllabus), is born with the same duty of allegiance as all other citizens (which would include all "natural born citizen"), then on what principle do you establish this case to suggest there can be a "native-born, but not natural-born" category? I'm not seeing it, and you don't explain it.
Further, the Court states explicitly "He was thus a citizen of the United States by birth, Amendment XIV." We know from U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark that "subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S." takes its meaning from the common law meaning of "natural born citizen." (I explicated this at length in one of my initial posts to you.) So Kawakita's noted citizenship from birth under the 14th Amendment ipso facto means he was also a natural born citizen.
One could just as easily say that a person is either born a dual citizen, or not; or is naturalized into dual citizenship, or not.
The first part is true, but still begs the question as to the NBC point at issue. The second point is possibly true if it's a born-abroad, citizen-at-birth case. But both points are non-sequiturs -- the two-fold classification I posit isn't negated simply because one can state similar dichotomies on other points.
I don't believe that the rule "native born is natural born citizen" is correct; or even the WKA conclusion that Ark was a "native born citizen" results in Ark also being a NBC.
Again, you make the assertion without offering any support. By contrast, I've shown how J. Gray in WKA explores the meaning of "natural born" in the English and American common law to inform the meaning of "born . . .in the U.S., and subject to the jurisdiction thereof." And I've backed up my contention with a host of scholarly articles all supporting my contention that per WKA "native-born equals natural born."
Not the point of discussion,
It is, whenever in your posts you make the "native born doesn't necessarily mean natural born" remark. You open the door to discussion when you do that.
There are other important variables in the citizenship analysis besides location of birth, including whether the parent is a legal resident of the US, and whether the child obtains citizenship from another country, even though born in the US.
And why are these important, given that no case or scholarly article I've found mentions them as important in the NBC discussion? They may be important to you. But in the absence of any support, you should really preface your remarks with "this is just my opinion, and I admit they don't find support within the scholarly community or caselaw."
I think the "two category" system that gets to the eligibility of a dual citizen to hold the office, would focus on "dual citizen or not dual citizen," not "naturalized or native born."
You act like this is a question or point of nomenclature that has yet to be addressed.
Under our Constitution, a naturalized citizen stands on an equal footing with the native citizen in all respects save that of eligibility to the Presidency. Luria v. U.S., 231 U.S. 9 (1913)
The questions has already be framed as "naturalized versus native-born."
You're just being a denialist at this point.