In another thread- a fella is arguing that the Bellei Case made it clear that someone born outside the US had to be naturalized, and claims Cruz is very similar to Bellei- The court apparently found that Bellei was ‘naturalized’ and thus his citizenship could be stripped of him because He or his parents, or both did not meet the specific requirements for naturalized citizenship (Cruz however has- mother was citizen, lived in us for required time, Cruz himself lived in US for required time etc)
[[No, and Cruz did not make himself a born American. He was just born into being an American naturally, and so required no naturalization, either at birth or later.]]
I agree with this statement- My feeling is that it’s a birthright- a ‘natural law’ And that statutes that pertain to natural law can only confirm the natural law and can not alter them by setting up requirements to meet or anything like that- whereas Congress has been given power to set up requirements concerning situations like naturalization where and act of statute is needed to make someone something they aren’t- such as make an alien an American. Ted was no alien simply because his mother was a citizen. Had she not been- then Ted would have needed an act of statute to become a citizen
I’d like to get your opinion on the Bellei case as it does ‘appear’ to have consequences regarding Ted’s issue-
(I have a link to a CRS report that shows later cases ‘may have’ determined that the courts now view ‘certain cases of naturalization’ when considering ‘at birth’ and ‘by birth’ as Natural Born Citizenship (’By birth’ Meaning Jus sanguinis), and not in need of an act to make them citizens even though the term ‘naturalized’ is still used in their cases- there seems to be a distinction made now between naturalized NBC and a Naturalized citizen if I’m reading the report right-) (But to me the term ‘naturalized’ seems to confer an act- I’d have been more comfortable had the definition of ‘by birth’ been “Shall be a NBC without need of an act” or something along those lines- )
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42097.pdf
The Supreme Court recently recognized in Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, that federal law now specifically defines "naturalization" as the "conferring of nationality of a state upon a person after birth," 166 and thus it could be argued that by current definition and understanding in federal law and jurisprudence, one who is entitled to U.S. citizenship automatically "at birth" or "by birth" could not be considered to be "naturalized."At issue in Nguyen was the fact that the father had to meet different conditions than the mother to confer citizenship on the son. The complainant was claiming the controlling statute was an unconstitutional violation of the equal protection clause, because it had different requirements for the father versus the mother. The father, to establish citizenship-worthy paternity, had to have more than just a dna connection to the child, but also had to demonstrate a real, personal connection that could only be accomplished after the child was born.
Available here: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42097.pdf
In this regard, it is significant that, although the Immigration and Nationality Act contains a general severability provision, Congress expressly provided with respect to the very subchapter of the United States Code at issue and in a provision entitled "Sole procedure," that "[a] person may only be naturalized as a citizen of the United States in the manner and under the conditions prescribed in this subchapter and not otherwise." 8 U.S.C. § 1421(d); see also Miller, supra, at 457-458 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). Section 1421(d) refers to naturalization, which in turn is defined as "conferring of nationality of a state upon a person after birth." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(23). Citizenship under section §1409(a) is retroactive to the date of birth, but it is a naturalization under section §1421(d) nevertheless. The conditions specified by section §1409(a) for conferral of citizenship, as a matter of definition, must take place after the child is born, in some instances taking as long as 18 years. Section 1409(a), then, is subject to the limitation imposed by §1421(d).The above passage is classic dicta, placed there to offer clarity to questions that might arise in inferior courts, but not controlling law the way a holding would be. It establishes that the paternity requirements are impliedly not severable from the act as a whole, which has the further implication that the Act would have to be re-legislated from scratch to change the provision in question.
Available here: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_DN_0099_2071_ZO.html