I'm going to modify this slightly. The opinion speaks of the children of persons "domiciled" in the U.S. That term may convey a stronger sense of residency beyond fleeting transience. But then the opinion muddies the water with the "but local and temporary" language. (It's all dicta on this point, really, given that the case didn't involve a child of transient parents.)
So there's a stronger argument to be made potentially against application of WKA to "birth tourism."
The proof that he is wrong is obvious when one considers the status of Indians as practiced by the authorities after the 14th amendment.
Indians did not get automatic citizenship because they were not regarded as "Subject to the Jurisdiction thereof."
Indians were exempt from the provisions of the 14th amendment, though they were, and continuously had been born within the borders.
Indians acquired birth citizenship by the passage of the Indian Citizenship act of 1924, though it is difficult to grasp how congress could change the meaning of an amendment through a legislative act.
Those Mexican, Central American, and South American illegal immigrants coming into the nation would mostly have been regarded as "Indians" under the 1868 understanding of the 14th amendment. If the Indian Citizenship act were repealed, there would be instant legal grounds to deny their children citizenship on that basis alone.
If the US will not grant citizenship to Indians born to tribes within it's borders, why would they grant citizenship to Indians from tribes without it's borders?
They wouldn't. The thought wouldn't have even occurred to them.
But the question remains. If Indians are excluded because they are not "subject to the jurisdiction thereof", then how can anyone argue that Foreign citizens somehow are more subject to our jurisdiction than are Indians?
We hung Indians too. We threw Indians in Jail also, yet we deliberately and explicitly did not make their children citizens.
Back to you Jack@$$.